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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2024‒01‒22
two papers chosen by |
| By: | Forshaw, Rachel; Kharadi, Natalya; McLaughlin, Eoin |
| Abstract: | Air pollution is a global public health threat, responsible for more deaths annually than conventional lifestyle risk factors. While the link between particulate pollution and cardiovascular disease is well-established, evidence for gaseous pollutants remains limited. This study estimates the long-term population effects of a gaseous pollutant - SO2 - from 1901 to 1975 in a panel comprising 29 countries distributed globally, contributing to the under-explored literature on its cardiovascular disease mortality impact. Across a comprehensive range of empirical specifications, we observe a robust economically and statistically significant rise in cardiovascular disease mortality for an increase in SO2 emissions. We also contribute to the literature on economic growth and long-term health outcomes. Our historical perspective aligns with the call for more research on the effects of air pollution in developing nations. We highlight a complex trade-off: greater SO2 emissions increases cardiovascular disease mortality but leads to short-term regional cooling and reduced global warming and as such its abatement may contribute to future climate-related deaths. |
| Keywords: | Air pollution, Cardiovascular disease mortality, Economic growth, Environmental Kuznets Curve, Global public health, SO2 emissions |
| JEL: | I15 N30 N50 Q53 Q54 Q56 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hwuaef:280754&r=res |
| By: | Preksha Jain; Rupayan Pal (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the possibility of designing environmental regulation that ensures `zero emission', by promoting non-polluting `green' technology adoption by firms, without creating new rooms for corruption. It demonstrates that it is feasible to implement the `target equilibrium', in which there is `no emission and no corruption', through environmental regulation alone. It also characterizes the `target equilibrium' implementing `minimum environmental regulation', which corresponds to the least possible subsidy expenditure and the lowest possible tax burden on firms, in alternative scenarios. More interestingly, it shows that, in the presence of corruption possibilities, introduction of reputation enhancing non-monetary incentives for `green' technology adoption makes it harder to implement the target equilibrium'. It underscores that usefulness of status incentives to nudge firms' behaviour for environmental protection is rather limited. These are robust results. |
| Keywords: | Zero emission, Corruption, Minimum environmental regulation, Non-monetary status incentive, Brown tax, Green technology subsidy |
| JEL: | Q58 H23 Q52 D73 |
| Date: | 2023–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2023-009&r=res |