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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2022‒10‒24
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Rupayan Pal (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research); Preksha Jain (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research); Prasenjit Banerjee (University of Manchester) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses environmental regulation under corruption and explores the possibility to attain the first best - `no corruption and no pollution', with a special focus on implications of non-monetary incentives for firms to adapt green technology. It first demonstrates that (a) the effect of corruption control policies on the environment is not always positive, and (b) stricter environmental regulation intensifies the problem of corruption - implying a trade-off between environmental protection and corruption control. Next, it characterizes the `minimum environmental regulation', involving least-subsidy to green technology seller and minimum-tax on brown production, which implements the first best outcome in the equilibrium. Interestingly, by allowing for firm heterogeneity in terms of preferences for social reputation, it demonstrates that introduction of non-monetary incentives in a corrupt environment increases the burden on the government's exchequer, unlike as in absence of corruption possibilities. These results are robust, regardless of (a) whether corrupt transaction is initiated by bribee or briber and (b) whether bribe rate is exogenous or endogenous. |
| Keywords: | Green Technology Subsidy, Brown Tax, Social Status, Non-monetary Incentives, Reputation, Bribe, The first best |
| JEL: | H23 Q52 D73 Q58 K42 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2022-011&r= |
| By: | Nicolas Piluso (CERTOP - Centre d'Etude et de Recherche Travail Organisation Pouvoir - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées); Edwin Le Heron (CED - Centre Émile Durkheim - IEP Bordeaux - Sciences Po Bordeaux - Institut d'études politiques de Bordeaux - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Bordeaux) |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes the effects of introducing a corporate carbon tax on GDP and the effectiveness of this macroeconomic policy. The study is based on constructing a simple Keynesian model with flexible prices. It shows that the carbon tax can have a double beneficial effect on the economy in addition to its favorable effect on the environment: i.e., an increase in GDP and employment. The initial values (y = 100; C = 60; I = 18; G = 16; g(A) = 6) was used to simulate a positive shock of the carbon tax T, increasing from 1.75 to 1.9. The paper considers three different cases depending on the low (Case 1), medium (Case 2), or high (Case 3) sensitivity of the marginal propensity to consume in response to an increase in the prices of goods. In addition, case 4 is considered: stimulus policy associated with climate policy; and case 5 is: policy to increase nominal wages. The results show that the carbon tax can lead to an increase in prices. Although the tax does not excessively negatively affect consumption, it has a positive effect on GDP via the increase in green investments and the induced increase in public spending. Households are, therefore, not necessarily penalized because they benefit from the multiplier effects of the increase in public spending due to the introduction of the ecological tax. Furthermore, stimulus policy is even more effective when combined with an emissions tax. |
| Keywords: | pollution,carbon tax,inflation,fiscal policy,employment,GDP |
| Date: | 2022–09–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03777346&r= |
| By: | Maho Nakagawa (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Mathieu Lefebvre (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Anne Stenger (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the question of the effectiveness and permanence of temporary incentives to contribute to a public good. Using a common experimental framework, we investigate the effects of a recommendation that takes the form of an exhortative message to contribute, a monetary punishment and a non-monetary reward to sustain high levels of contributions. In particular, we shed light on the differential impact these mechanisms have on heterogeneous types of agents. The results show that all three incentives increase contributions compared to a pre-phase where there is no incentive. Monetary sanctions lead to the highest contributions, but a sudden drop in contributions is observed once the incentive to punish is removed. On the contrary, Recommendation leads to the lowest contributions but maintains a long-lasting impact in the Postpolicy phase. In particular, it makes free-riders increase their contribution over time in the post-incentive phase. Finally, non-monetary reward backfires against those who are weakly conditional cooperators. Our findings emphasize the importance of designing and maintaining incentives not only for free-riders, but for strong and weak conditional cooperators as well, depending on characteristics of the incentives. |
| Keywords: | Public goods game,Monetary policy,Game theory,Conservation science,Experimental design,Experimental economics,Social psychology,Test statistics |
| Date: | 2022–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03777681&r= |
| By: | Kastoryano, Stephen (University of Reading); Vollaard, Ben (Tilburg University) |
| Abstract: | We uncover a hidden illegal fishing practice: the use of fishing nets with illegally small mesh size. The small mesh prevents nearly all fish of saleable size from escaping the net, but also traps a large number of fish which are too small to be sold on the market and are therefore discarded at sea. Our approach relies on readily available data on reported fish landings rather than on data from inspections, which are rare, and which tend to be anticipated by fishermen. We focus on bottom trawling, the world's most widely used fishing method. We exploit the fact that using illegally small mesh size strongly increases the share of small fish in the catch. Using quasi-random variation in nautical patrol as a source of variation in the incentive to comply, we show that in weeks without patrol the share of small fish in the landed catch is systematically larger than in adjacent weeks with patrol. Our results are in line with widespread use of illegally small mesh. |
| Keywords: | enforcement, regulation, environmental economics, fisheries |
| JEL: | D22 K42 Q22 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15543&r= |
| By: | Pablo Bra\~nas-Garza; Antonio Cabrales; Mar\'ia Paz Espinosa; Diego Jorrat |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study a game in which success requires a sufficient total contribution by members of a group. There are significant uncertainties surrounding the chance and the total effort required for success. A theoretical model with max-min preferences towards ambiguity predicts higher contributions under ambiguity than under risk. However, in a large representative sample of the Spanish population (1,500 participants) we find that the ATE of ambiguity on contributions is zero. The main significant interaction with the personal characteristics of the participants is with risk attitudes, and it increases contributions. This suggests that policymakers concerned with ambiguous problems (like climate change) do not need to worry excessively about ambiguity. |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2209.11079&r= |