nep-res 2021-04-05 papers

on Resource Economics

Issue of 2021‒04‒05
two papers chosen by

The economic and environmental benefits from international co-ordination on carbon pricing: Insights from economic modelling studies By Daniel Nachtigall; Jane Ellis
Common pool resource management and risk perceptions By Can Askan Mavi; Nicolas Quérou

The economic and environmental benefits from international co-ordination on carbon pricing: Insights from economic modelling studies

By:	Daniel Nachtigall (OECD); Jane Ellis (OECD)
Abstract:	This paper assesses quantitative estimates based on economic modelling studies of the economic and environmental benefits from different forms of international co-ordination on carbon pricing. Forms of international co-ordination include: harmonising carbon prices (e.g. through linking carbon markets), extending the coverage of pricing schemes, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, developing international sectoral agreements, and establishing co-ordination mechanisms to mitigate carbon leakage. All forms of international co-operation on carbon pricing can deliver benefits, both economic (e.g. lower mitigation costs) and/or environmental (e.g. reducing GHG emissions and carbon leakage). Benefits tend to be higher with broader participation of countries, broader coverage of emissions and sectors and more ambitious policy goals. Most, but not all, countries gain economic benefits from international co-operation, and these benefits vary significantly across countries and regions. Complementary measures outside co-operation on carbon pricing (e.g. technology transfers) could ensure that co-operation provides economic benefits for all countries.
Keywords:	Border carbon adjustment, Climate change mitigation, Climate-economy-modelling, Fossil fuel subsidy reforms, Harmonising carbon prices, International Co-operation, Sectoral agreements
JEL:	F18 H23 Q54 Q56 Q58
Date:	2021–04–01
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:envaaa:173-en&r=all

Common pool resource management and risk perceptions

By:	Can Askan Mavi (University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]); Nicolas Quérou (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
Abstract:	Motivated by recent discussions about the issue of risk perceptions for climate change related events,we introduce a non-cooperative game setting where agents manage a common pool resource under a po-tential risk, and agents exhibit different risk perception biases. Focusing on the effect of the polarizationlevel and other population features, we show that the type of bias (overestimation versus underestimationbiases) and the resource quality level before and after the occurrence of the shift have first-order impor-tance on the qualitative nature of behavioral adjustments and on the pattern of resource conservation.When there are non-uniform biases within the population, the intra-group structure of the populationqualitatively affects the degree of resource conservation. Moreover, unbiased agents may react in non-monotone ways to changes in the polarization level when faced with agents exhibiting different types ofbias. The size of the unbiased agents' sub-population does not qualitatively affect how an increase inthe polarization level impacts individual behavioral adjustments, even though it affects the magnitudeof this change. Finally, it is shown how perception biases affect the comparison between centralized anddecentralized management.
Keywords:	Conservation,Perception bias,Environmental risk,Renewable resources,Dynamic games,Dynamic games JEL Classification: Q20,Q54,D91,C72
Date:	2020–12–10
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-03052114&r=all

General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.

NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.