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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2020‒08‒10
two papers chosen by |
| By: | López-Feldman, Alejandro; Chávez, Carlos; Alejandra Vélez, María; Bejarano, Hernán; B. Chimeli, Ariaster; Féres, José; Robalino, Juan; Salcedo, Rodrigo; Viteri, César |
| Abstract: | COVID-19 is currently having major short run effects with possible serious long run implications for the environment and the management of natural resources in Latin America. In this paper, we discuss the possible effects of the pandemic on air pollution, deforestation and other relevant environmental dimensions across the region. With contributions from environmental economists from eight countries, we give an overview of the initial and expected environmental effects of this health crisis. We discuss potential effects on environmental regulations, possible policy interventions, and an agenda for future research for those interested in the design and evaluation of environmental policies relevant for the Latin American context. |
| Keywords: | Air pollution; COVID-19; coronavirus; deforestation; environmental impacts; environmental policy; Latin America; pandemic; SARS-Cov2-19 |
| JEL: | R10 |
| Date: | 2020–07–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nereus:2020_004&r=all |
| By: | Bärd Harstad (University of Oslo and the Frisch Centre.); Francesco Lancia (Università di Salerno, CSEF and CEPR.); Alessia Russo (BI Norwegian Business School and CEPR.) |
| Abstract: | We characterize the optimal policy and policy instruments for self-enforcing treaties when countries invest in green technology before they pollute. If the discount factor is too small to support the first best, then both emissions and investments will be larger than in the first best, when technology is expensive. When technology is inexpensive, countries must instead limit or tax green investment in order to make future punishment credible. We also uncover a novel advantage of price regulation over quantity regulation, namely that when regulation is sufficiently flexible to permit firms to react to non-compliance in another country, the temptation to defect is reduced. The model is tractable and allows for multiple extensions. |
| Keywords: | climate change, environmental agreements, green technology, policy instruments, repeated games, compliance, self-enforcing treaties. |
| JEL: | D86 F53 H87 Q5 |
| Date: | 2020–07–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:572&r=all |