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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒12‒28
seven papers chosen by |
| By: | Gerard van der Meijden (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Karolina Ryszka (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Cees Withagen (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | We study resource extraction by a non-renewable resource supplier who faces demand from two regions, one of which employs a tax on the imported resource and a subsidy on the available backstop technology, and one that has no environmental policy in place. The resource extraction path possibly contains two limit pricing phases, both in the presence and in the absence of speculators on the market. In the case with speculators, the resource price is continuous. Without speculators, the price jumps upward when demand from the region with climate policy drops to zero. A tightening of climate policies results in lower initial resource consumption; no Weak Green Paradox occurs. Yet, a decrease in the backstop production cost or an increase in the backstop subsidy shorten the overall extraction period, potentially resulting in higher total climate costs in the case without speculators. An analysis of the welfare effects reveals that the regulated region faces differential non-green and green incentives to tighten its climate policies in the two price regimes. We find that, even though climate damages might go down, unilateral policy tightening is possibly detrimental to the regulated region's non-green welfare due to a resource supply shift to the unregulated region. |
| Keywords: | limit pricing; non-renewable resource; monopoly; climate change; carbon tax; renewables subsidy |
| JEL: | Q31 Q37 |
| Date: | 2015–12–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150136&r=res |
| By: | Heidi Tuhkanen (Stockholm Environmental Institute); Evelin Urbel-Piirsalu (Stockholm Environmental Institute); Tea Nõmmann (Stockholm Environmental Institute); Mikołaj Czajkowski (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Nick Hanley (University of St Andrews, Department of Geography and Sustainable Development) |
| Abstract: | Many marine and coastal ecosystems are under increasing pressure from multiple stressors. In the Baltic Sea, these stressors include oil and chemical spills from shipping, nutrient run-off from land and invasive species. All of these pressures have been rising over the recent past. Increasing pressures lead to reductions in environmental quality, which produce negative effects on human well-being. In this paper, the choice experiment method is used to estimate the benefits to people in Estonia resulting from reductions in pressure from multiple stressors in the Baltic. |
| Keywords: | multiple stressors, Good Environmental Status, marine and coastal water quality, choice experiments, oil and chemical spills, eutrophication, invasive species |
| JEL: | Q51 O13 Q56 Q57 Q58 Q34 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2015-41&r=res |
| By: | Stöver, Jana; Weche, John P. |
| Abstract: | We investigate the impact of environmental regulation on firm performance and Investment behavior. Exploiting the case of a German water withdrawal regulation that is managed on the state level, we analyze firms' reactions to an increase in the water tax using a regression-adjusted difference-in-differences approach. We analyze the individual firm's response to a change in environmental regulation, distinguishing between add-on and integrated environmental investments. This allows us to include intra-firm innovations into our analysis, which are likely to be of importance for increasing resource-efficiency. Our results show that the regulation in question shows no sign of affecting firms' overall competitiveness. The results imply that the predicted negative impact of the regulation on firms' economic Performance that was brought up before the introduction of the tax, does not seem to weigh heavily in this case. Nevertheless, when placed into a sustainable competitiveness context, the Regulation considered does not qualify as an appropriate policy tool for fostering green growth. |
| Keywords: | environmental regulation,DID,green growth,green investment,Porter hypoth- esis,sustainable competitiveness,water withdrawal regulation |
| JEL: | L60 O31 O32 Q58 Q55 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hwwirp:170&r=res |
| By: | Eric Nazindigouba Kere (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I); Somlanare Romuald Kinda (Université Ouagadougou - Université Ouagadougou - Université Ouagadougou); Rasmané Ouedraogo (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I) |
| Abstract: | According to several reports, natural disasters and climate change will intensify and dampen development if appropriate measures are not implemented. Our paper contributes to this literature and analyzes the impact of natural disasters on domestic resource mobilization in developing countries. Using propensity score matching estimators over the period of 1980-2012 for 120 developing countries, our results conclude that government revenues decrease in the aftermath of natural disasters. Moreover natural disasters that occur in border countries have a negative impact on government revenues of neighbor countries. However, the adverse effects of natural disasters are dampened in countries with high level of resilience capacity and stronger governance. |
| Keywords: | Natural disasters , Tax revenue , Resilience capacity , Corruption. |
| Date: | 2015–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01242968&r=res |
| By: | Damien Sans (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS, & EHESS) |
| Abstract: | The literature on the micro-economics of the eco-industry often assumed interiority of pollutant net emissions. In a perfectly competitive final good market vertically integrated with an upstream monopoly supply this assumption implies that an optimal tax is always greater than its associated marginal social damage. In this short note we will relax this assumption and challenge that result. The market structure generates a unique threshold on the scale of the marginal social damage, whereby for any value above the threshold an optimal tax is strictly lower and net emissions are zero. |
| Keywords: | Microeconomics, eco-industry, Imperfect Competition, Optimal Taxation |
| JEL: | D42 D62 H23 L11 Q58 |
| Date: | 2015–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1549&r=res |
| By: | Richard Schmalensee; Robert Stavins |
| Abstract: | This essay provides an overview of the major emissions trading programs of the past thirty years on which significant documentation exists, and draws a number of important lessons for future applications of this environmental policy instrument. References to a larger number of other emissions trading programs that have been implemented or proposed are included |
| JEL: | Q40 Q48 Q54 Q58 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21742&r=res |
| By: | Toshihiro Okubo (Faculty of Economics, Keio University); Yuta Watabe (Faculty of Economics, Keio University); Kaori Furuyama (Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study the waste haven hypothesis that waste materials are exported to developing countries. Using Japanese trade data on recyclable waste resources (plastic waste, waste paper, iron and steel scrap, and nonferrous metal scraps), we find evidence from our econometric analysis that Asian countries provide a waste haven for Japan. In particular, Japan exports waste materials to Asian countries with low per-capita incomes and large markets. We suggest that environmental regulation should be tightened to reduce traded waste in Asia. |
| Keywords: | waste haven, willingness-to-pay, recyclable waste resources, environmental regulations |
| JEL: | F18 L51 Q56 |
| Date: | 2015–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:keo:dpaper:2015-014&r=res |