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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒12‒12
six papers chosen by |
| By: | Simon Levin (Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics and RFF University); A. Xepapadeas (Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies and Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics) |
| Abstract: | We seek to explain the emergence of spatial heterogeneity regarding development and pollution on the basis of interactions associated with the movement of capital and polluting activities from one economy to another. We use a simple dynamical model describing capital accumulation along the lines of a ?fixed-savings-ratio Solow-type model capable of producing endogenous growth and convergence behavior, and pollution accumulation in each country with pollution diffusion between countries or regions. The basic mechanism underlying the movements of capital across space is the quest for locations where the marginal productivity of capital is relatively higher than the productivity at the location of origin. The notion that capital moves to locations of relatively higher productivity but not necessarily from locations of high concentration to locations of low concentration, does not face difficulties associated with the Lucas paradox. We show that, for a wide range of capital and pollution rates of flow, spatial heterogeneity emerges even between two economies with identical fundamental structures. These results can be interpreted as suggesting that the neoclassical convergence hypothesis might not hold under differential rates of fl?ow of capital and polluting activities among countries of the same fundamental structure. |
| Keywords: | Transboundary Flows, Capital, Pollution, Diffusion, Turing Instability, Spatial Heterogeneity |
| JEL: | O44 R12 Q52 C65 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.69&r=res |
| By: | Luca Lambertini (University of Bologna, Italy); Joanna Poyago-Theotoky (La Trobe University, Australia); Alessandro Tampieri (University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | We examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and R&D aims to reduce emissions ("green" innovation). We present an n-firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in "green" R&D. When environmental taxation is exogenous, aggregate R&D investment always increases with the number of firms in the industry. Next we analyse the case where the emission tax is set endogenously by a regulator (committed or time-consistent) with the aim to maximise social welfare. We show that an inverted-U relationship exists between aggregate R&D and industry size under reasonable conditions, and is driven by the presence of R&D spillovers. |
| Keywords: | "Green" R&D, R&D Spillovers, Emission Taxation, Time-Consistent Emission Tax, Pre-Commited Emission Tax |
| JEL: | Q55 Q56 O30 L13 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.73&r=res |
| By: | Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos; Anastasios Xepapadeas |
| Abstract: | We study the evolution of compliance of firms in a setup of taxable emissions. Firms can either choose to comply with the emissions rule or violate it. Violation is considered either as a single option or is let to vary between low and high emissions, inducing a different level of fine if the firm gets caught. The firms can switch between strategies according to an evolutionary proportional rule and the conditions for stability are investigated accounting for two distinct types of probability of inspection. |
| Keywords: | Emission taxes, compliance, replicator dynamics. |
| Date: | 2015–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aue:wpaper:1519&r=res |
| By: | - (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) United Nations) |
| Abstract: | The regionwide study of the effects of climate change in the coastal areas of Latin America and the Caribbean has been divided into four main parts in line with the comprehensive risk-assessment methodology that was developed as research progressed. The outputs of this regional study are presented in four core documents: an analysis of the factors that are driving climate change, a study on the vulnerability of coastal areas, an evaluation of the impacts of climate change and an exploration of how all these different factors can be brought together in an assessment of the risks associated with some of the impacts of climate change on the region’s coastal areas. |
| Date: | 2015–04–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecr:col022:37955&r=res |
| By: | Francesco Vona (OFCE SciencesPo and SKEMA Business School, France); Giovanni Marin (IRCrES-CNR, Italy and OFCE-SciencesPo, France); Davide Consoli (Ingenio CSIC-UPV, Spain); David Popp (Department of Public Administration and International Affairs, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, US) |
| Abstract: | While policymakers talk of ‘green skills’, there is little systematic empirical research on the demand for skills that will be needed to operate and develop green technology. We propose a data-driven methodology to identify green skills and to gauge the ways in which the demand for these competences respond to environmental regulation. We find that green skills are high-level analytical and technical know-how related to the design, production, management and monitoring of technology. Environmental regulation triggers technological and organizational changes that increase the demand for these skills. Our analysis suggests also that this is not just a compositional change in skill demand due to job losses in sectors highly exposed to trade and regulation. |
| Keywords: | Green Skills, Environmental Regulation, Task Model, Workforce Composition, Structural Shocks |
| JEL: | J24 Q52 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.72&r=res |
| By: | Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos; Anastasios Xepapadeas |
| Abstract: | We study the evolution of compliance and regulation in a common pool resource setup with myopic appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with the harvesting rule is a result of imitation as described by a proportional rule. The regulator first sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with both proportional and non-proportional fine formulation and and an endogenized probability of audition. The equilibria are then characterized in terms of their stability properties. |
| Keywords: | Common pool resources, replicator dynamics, optimal regulation, compliance |
| Date: | 2015–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aue:wpaper:1518&r=res |