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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒02‒11
seven papers chosen by |
| By: | Shapiro, Joseph S. (Yale University); Walker, Reed (University of California, Berkeley) |
| Abstract: | Between 1990 and 2008, emissions of the most common air pollutants from U.S. manufacturing fell by 60 percent, even as real U.S. manufacturing output grew substantially. This paper develops a quantitative model to explain how changes in trade, environmental regulation, productivity, and consumer preferences have contributed to these reductions in pollution emissions. We estimate the model's key parameters using administrative data on plant-level production and pollution decisions. We then combine these estimates with detailed historical data to provide a model-driven decomposition of the causes of the observed pollution changes. Finally, we compare the model-driven decomposition to a statistical decomposition. The model and data suggest three findings. First, the fall in pollution emissions is due to decreasing pollution per unit output within narrowly defined products, rather than to changes in the types of products produced or changes to the total quantity of manufacturing output. Second, the implicit pollution tax that rationalizes firm production and abatement behavior more than doubled between 1990 and 2008. Third, environmental regulation explains 75 percent or more of the observed reduction in pollution emissions from manufacturing. |
| Keywords: | environmental regulation, air quality, trade and environment |
| JEL: | F18 H23 Q56 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8789&r=res |
| By: | Antoniou, Fabio (Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I, Humboldt-Univeristät zu Berlin); Kyriakopoulou, Efthymia (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | We introduce a model of strategic environmental policy where two firms compete à la Cournot in a third market under the presence of multiple pollutants. Two types of pollutants are introduced, a local and a transboundary one. The regulator can only control local pollution as transboundary pollution is regulated internationally. The strategic effect present in the original literature is also replicated in this setup. However, we illustrate that when transboundary pollution is regulated through the use of tradable emission permits instead of non-tradable ones then a new strategic effect appears which had not been identified thus far. In this case, local pollution increases further and welfare is lowered. We also provide evidence from the implementation of EU ETS over the pollution of PM10 and PM2.5.<p> |
| Keywords: | Environmental regulation; multiple pollutants; (non) tradable permits; strategic interactions |
| JEL: | F12 F18 Q58 |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0610&r=res |
| By: | Luca Lambertini (Department of Economics, University of Bologna); Giuseppe Pignataro (La Trobe University, Victoria Australia); Alessandro Tampieri (CREA, Université de Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyse a setup where consumers are heterogeneous in the perception of environmental quality. The equilibrium is verified in a setting with horizontal and vertical (green) differentiation. Profits are increasing in the mis- perception of quality, while the investment in green quality decreases the more the goods are substitutes. We further consider the introduction of either an emis- sion tax or an environmental standard. Both interventions rise the investment in quality, but their effect is differently influenced by the level of environmental misperception. We show that an optimal environmental standard may be effective against greenwashing when the marginal damage of emissions is low. |
| Keywords: | Green Quality, Misperception; Pigouvian taxation; Environmental Standard |
| JEL: | L13 L51 Q50 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:15-01&r=res |
| By: | Coria, Jessica (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Jaraite, Jurate (Centre for Environmental and Resource Economics, School of Business and Economics, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we empirically compare the transaction costs from monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of two environmental regulations directed to cost-efficiently reduce greenhouse gas emissions: a carbon dioxide (CO2) tax and a tradable emissions system. We do this in the case of Sweden, where a set of firms are covered by both types of regulations, i.e., the Swedish CO2 tax and the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). This provides us with an excellent case study as it allows us to disentangle the costs of each regulation from other firm-specific variables that might affect the overall cost of MRV procedures. Our results indicate that the MRV costs of CO2 taxation do not depend on firms’ emissions, while they do in the case of the EU ETS. For firms of equivalent emissions’ size, the MRV costs are lower for CO2 taxation than for the EU ETS, which confirms the general view that regulating emissions upstream by means of a CO2 tax yields lower transaction costs vis-á-vis downstream regulation by means of emission trading. |
| Keywords: | Carbon dioxide emissions; Carbon tax; Emissions Trading; EU ETS; Firm-level data; Sweden |
| JEL: | D23 H23 Q52 Q58 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0609&r=res |
| By: | Claudia Ghisetti (Department of Economics and Management, University of Ferrara, Italy.); Massimiliano Mazzanti (Deptartment of Economics and Management. University of Ferrara, Italy.); Susanna Mancinelli (Deptartment of Economics and Management. University of Ferrara, Italy.); Mariangela Zoli (Università di Roma Tor Vergata, Italy.) |
| Abstract: | We analyse the role of financial barriers behind the adoption of environmental innovations with a focus on SMEs by using recent survey data at EU level. Finance is a key lever of innovation, especially relevant in the current phase of the economic cycle, and might play a critical role in defining green economy directions. Empirical analyses confirm financial barriers as a deterrent for the innovative capacity of EU firms. This is true for the economy as a whole, and for manufacturing firms taken alone. Being smaller and having a low amount of human capital in the firm also hampers environmental innovations . On the ‘positive’ side, we note that existing regulations and expected increasing demand for green products both support EI adoption. Financial barriers are perceived by firms and influenced by technological lock-ins, uncertainty in investments, non-competitive markets, and a lack of subsidies. We observe that the ‘deterrent barrier hypothesis’, alternative to the ‘revealed barrier hypothesis’, is not rejected here, as in recent analyses of traditional innovations: perceived financial constraints deter innovative strategies. |
| Keywords: | Environmental innovations, Financial barriers, Firms, Environmental Regulations |
| JEL: | Q55 O31 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:srt:wpaper:0115&r=res |
| By: | Todd D. Gerarden; Richard G. Newell; Robert N. Stavins |
| Abstract: | Energy-efficient technologies offer considerable promise for reducing the financial costs and environmental damages associated with energy use, but these technologies appear not to be adopted by consumers and businesses to the degree that would apparently be justified, even on a purely financial basis. We present two complementary frameworks for understanding this so-called “energy paradox” or “energy-efficiency gap.” First, we build on the previous literature by dividing potential explanations for the energy-efficiency gap into three categories: market failures, behavioral anomalies, and model and measurement errors. Second, we posit that it is useful to think in terms of the fundamental elements of cost-minimizing energy-efficiency decisions. This provides a decomposition that organizes thinking around four questions. First, are product offerings and pricing economically efficient? Second, are energy operating costs inefficiently priced and/or understood? Third, are product choices cost-minimizing in present value terms? Fourth, do other costs inhibit more energy-efficient decisions? We review empirical evidence on these questions, with an emphasis on recent advances, and offer suggestions for future research. |
| JEL: | L00 Q4 Q48 Q5 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20904&r=res |
| By: | Asiedu, Edward; Ibanez, Marcela |
| Abstract: | To study the persistence of cultural norms that mandate respect towards the elder, we conducted an artefactual field experiment in two cities in Ghana. Using a public good game with third-party punishment, we find that punisher's age is an important determinant of cooperation. Our results indicate the elder are more efficient using punishment than youngsters. |
| Keywords: | Field experiment, status, age, punishment, public goods, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Public Economics, H41, C92, C93, |
| Date: | 2014–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:gagfdp:175303&r=res |