| By: |
Jennifer Alix-Garcia (University of California, Berkeley);
Alain de Janvry (University of California, Berkeley);
Elisabeth Sadoulet (University of California, Berkeley) |
| Abstract: |
Explaining land use change in Mexico requires understanding the behavior of
the local institutions involved. We develop two theories to explain
deforestation in communities with and without forestry projects, where the
former involves a process of side payments to non-members of the community and
the latter of partial cooperation among community members. Data collected in
2002 combined with satellite imagery are used to test these theories. For the
forestry villages, we establish a positive relationship between the
distribution of profits as dividends instead of public goods and forest loss.
For communities not engaged in forestry projects, deforestation is largely
related to the ability of the community to induce the formation of a coalition
of members that cooperates in not encroaching. This happens more easily in
smaller communities with experienced leaders. A disturbing result of the
analysis is that deforestation is higher when a community engages in forestry
projects, even after properly accounting for self-selection into this
activity. This suggests that forestry projects as they now exist in Mexico are
not sustainable and contribute to the deforestation problem. |
| Keywords: |
deforestation, common property, partial cooperation, |
| Date: |
2003–11–07 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:964&r=res |