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on Resource Economics |
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Issue of 2005‒01‒23
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Vihang Patel (Indian Institute of Technology,Kharagpur) |
| Abstract: | The Flexible Mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provide a robust framework for emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just economically efficient, but is also pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or illiquid markets, to attain higher value from the emission trading, we have shown that coalition strategies provide a pertinent alternative to production optimization measures which may not be feasible at times. The whole game is analyzed taking a resource based view of the strategic factor markets. We have also illustrated the measures needed to provide stability to the coalitions and hence the coalition strategies. |
| Keywords: | coalition, strategy, game theory, emission, environment, resource based view, strategic factor market |
| JEL: | C7 D8 |
| Date: | 2005–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0501002&r=res |
| By: | Ujjayant Chakravorty (Department of Economics, Emory University); Darrell Krulce (QUALLCOM, Inc., San Diego); James Roumasset (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa) |
| Abstract: | The one-demand Hotelling model fails to explain the observed specialization of nonrenewable resources. We develop a model with multiple demands and resources to show that specialization of resources according to demand is driven by Ricardian comparative advantage while the order of resource use over time is determined by Ricardian absolute advantage. An abundant resource with absolute advantage in all demands must be initially employed in all demands. When each resource has an absolute advantage in some demand, no resource may be used exclusively. The two-by-two model is characterized. Resource and demand-specific taxes are shown to have significant substitution effects. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic comparative advantage, energy, non-renewable resources, multiple demands, Hotelling |
| JEL: | D9 Q3 Q4 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:200401&r=res |
| By: | Brooks Kaiser (Gettysburg College); James Roumasset (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa) |
| Abstract: | The standard view that the absence of property rights is inefficient contradicts the Coasean proposition that the relative efficiency of different institutions depends on their ability to economize on transaction costs. Moreover, the comparative theory of open access and private property institutions fails to recognize the intermediate institution of common property, finesses dynamic optimization, and provides an incomplete account of governance. We provide a comparative statics framework for alternative modes of resource management, albeit one that allows for dynamic optimization, and show that open access can be efficient under conditions of low population pressure. We show that the intensification of production with population pressure in Hawaii co-evolved with specialization and increased governance, in accordance with the efficiency theory. Instead of market-based specialization, however, economic organization in pre-contact Hawaii was hierarchically determined via top-down management of the ahupua´a. |
| Keywords: | Demsetz, property rights, Hawaiian history, specialization, decentralization |
| JEL: | C53 D12 F14 J14 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:200407&r=res |