New Economics Papers
on Public Finance
Issue of 2012‒11‒11
five papers chosen by



  1. The Effect of Age-Targeted Tax Credits on Retirement Behavior By Laun, Lisa
  2. Tax Evasion and Public Expenditures on Tax Collection Services in an Endogenous Growth Model By Sifis Kafkalas; Pantelis Kalaitzidakis; Vangelis Tzouvelekas
  3. Economic ideas and tax policy: The introduction of progressivity in tax systems in Western Europe. The cases of France and Spain By Javier San Julian Arrupe (Universitat de Barcelona)
  4. The tax and the mighty: Tax payer concentration lowers local business taxation in German Municipalities By Ivo Bischoff; Stefan Krabel
  5. Property tax in the Czech Republic and Slovakia since 1993 By Sedmihradská, Lucie

  1. By: Laun, Lisa (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of two age-targeted policy initiatives to delay retirement that were simultaneously implemented in Sweden in 2007: an earned income tax credit and a payroll tax credit. Both policies were targeted at workers aged 65 or above at the beginning of the tax year. The paper exploits that the special rules for elderly were governed by the year of birth while the social security system is governed by age at retirement, i.e., the day of birth, in analyzing the effect of the new policies. The results suggest that the age-targeted tax credits increased employment in the year following the 65th birthday by 1.5 percentage points among individuals with annual earnings above the 2007 tax liability threshold three to five years earlier. An analysis of fiscal implications indicates, however, that the increase in employment was not large enough to offset the implied decrease in tax revenues.
    Keywords: Labor supply; Retirement; Earned income tax credit; Payroll taxes
    JEL: H24 J14 J18 J21
    Date: 2012–10–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2012_0014&r=pub
  2. By: Sifis Kafkalas (University of Crete); Pantelis Kalaitzidakis (Dept of Economics, University of Crete, Greece); Vangelis Tzouvelekas (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between tax evasion and the two main policy instruments affecting evasion rates, namely, the announced tax rate and the share of tax revenues allocated to tax monitoring mechanisms. For doing so, we adopt a simple one-sector endogenous growth model modified under tax evasion following Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1993) analysis on income taxes and tax evasion. Our model confirms Barro�s (1990) theoretical finding stating that the optimal tax rate is equal to the elasticity of private capital. However, when tax evasion matters to the social welfare, the effective tax rate is lower than the output elasticity in line with Futagami et al., (1993) and Turnovsky (1997) theoretical results. Our model is then calibrated using data from 145 developed and developing countries for 2011. Simulation results suggest that both tax evasion and output growth are decreasing with the share of tax revenues allocated to monitoring expenses, while welfare maximizing policies imply an announced tax rate lower from the elasticity of public capital and a share of monitoring expenses around 6.0%.
    Keywords: tax evasion, tax monitoring, effective tax rate, social loss.
    JEL: H21 H26 H54
    Date: 2012–04–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crt:wpaper:1202&r=pub
  3. By: Javier San Julian Arrupe (Universitat de Barcelona) (Universitat de Barcelona)
    Abstract: In the last decade of the 19th century, the United Kingdom, France and Spain established progressive rates in their succession taxes. This paper compares the legislative processes that France and Spain countries followed in this matter. In both cases politicians arguments for and against progressive taxation were similar, and backed by well-known economic ideas and authors. The process in France was leaded by a majority of MPs believing that progressive taxes aided in the achievement of real justice in taxpaying. In Spain, there was not this majority, but the reform passed due to other circumstances. This would be one step in the application of new insights on tax fairness; however, proportionality as the right technique of taxation and government refrain from modifying distribution were still predominant.
    Keywords: parliament, public finance, inheritance tax, progressivity, political economy, liberalism
    JEL: K34 B12 N43 A11 H24
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bar:bedcje:2012285&r=pub
  4. By: Ivo Bischoff (University of Kassel); Stefan Krabel (University of Kassel)
    Abstract: We analyze the impact of large firms on business tax rates using data from German mu-nicipalities in Hesse in 1998-2005. Results suggest that business tax rates decrease with tax-payers’ concentration, indicating strong local lobbying power of large firms.
    Keywords: tax competition, yardstick competition, local business taxation, large firms, Germany
    JEL: F1 F16 H2
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201245&r=pub
  5. By: Sedmihradská, Lucie
    Abstract: In the early 1990´s it was expected that the property tax would play a significant role in the process of fiscal decentralization in the transition countries. Comparison of the development of legally granted and actually effected municipal autonomy regarding the property tax in the Czech Republic and Slovakia showed that increased autonomy led only to a limited extent to its effective exploitation and its contribution to increased accountability is questionable due to deteriorated transparency in the Czech Republic and significant tax exporting in Slovakia.
    Keywords: property tax; municipal fiscal autonomy; Czech Republic; Slovakia
    JEL: H71
    Date: 2012–04–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:42259&r=pub

General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.