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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Michael Keen; Joel Slemrod |
| Abstract: | This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. At its heart is a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap. |
| JEL: | H21 H26 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22408&r=iue |
| By: | Groisman, Fernando; Boffi, Santiago; Calero, Analía; Cuba, María Soledad; Liniado, Julia; Sconfienza, María Eugenia; Vergara Parra, Albano |
| Abstract: | The objective of this study is to examine the impact that changes in minimum wage and the main income transfer programs have had on the economic participation of the population and the informal sector in Argentina. The obtained evidence suggests that modifications to minimum wage did not produce adverse effects on employment or have a substantial impact on the probabilities of entering the informal sector. Regarding the income transfers, it was possible to confirm that it did not encourage adults in beneficiary households to become economically inactive. |
| Keywords: | Informality; Social Protection; Minimum Wage |
| JEL: | J2 J4 J6 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:72822&r=iue |
| By: | María José Arteaga Garavito (Division of Economics, CIDE) |
| Abstract: | Este trabajo analiza teóricamente la relación entre justicia, medida como el papel que juegan factores meritocráticos (talento) versus azarosos (suerte) en la determinación del ingreso, y evasión fiscal en economías en donde la probabilidad de detectar la evasión es baja. Se presenta un modelo estático, basado en Alesina y Angeletos (2005), el cual toma en cuenta las decisiones de los agentes, quienes tienen la posibilidad de evadir un porcentaje de su ingreso, y del gobierno, quien fija la tasa de impuestos de acuerdo al criterio del votante mediano. El resultado principal es que es factible la existencia de múltiples equilibrios y la relación entre injusticia, redistribución y evasión es positiva. Por ejemplo: 1) impuestos relativamente bajos, menor injusticia, menor evasión y mayor desigualdad antes de impuestos (México) y 2) impuestos relativamente altos, mayor injusticia, mayor evasión y menor desigualdad (Perú). Es decir, dada una expectativa de impuestos alta y una probabilidad alta de no ser detectado, la evasión será mayor y los incentivos a esforzarse menores y, por lo tanto, políticas redistributivas son ex post óptimas. |
| Keywords: | impuestos, justicia, redistribución, evasión fiscal, informalidad, desigualdad |
| JEL: | H2 H71 D31 E62 P16 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emc:thgrad:tesg005&r=iue |