nep-iue New Economics Papers
on Informal and Underground Economics
Issue of 2015‒08‒25
five papers chosen by
Catalina Granda Carvajal
Universidad de Antioquia

  1. A Model for Tax Evasion with Some Realistic Properties By Richard Vale
  2. Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting By Cyril Chalendard
  3. Labour mobility and the informal sector in Algeria: a cross-sectional comparison (2007-2012) By Philippe Adair; Youghourta Bellache
  4. Impacts of Universal Health Coverage: A Micro-founded Macroeconomic Perspective By Huang, Xianguo; Yoshino, Naoyuki
  5. Les attitudes sont-elles différentes face à la fraude fiscale et à la fraude sociale ? By Mathieu Lefebvre; Pierre Pestieau; Arno Riedl; Marie Claire Villeval

  1. By: Richard Vale
    Abstract: We present a discrete-time dynamic model of income tax evasion. The model is solved exactly in the case of a single taxpayer and shown to have some realistic properties, including avoiding the Yitzhaki paradox. The extension to an agent-based model with a network of taxpayers is also investigated.
    Date: 2015–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1508.02476&r=all
  2. By: Cyril Chalendard (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)
    Abstract: This paper identifies opportunities for improving the performance of revenue-collection authorities. To detect and combat fraud, we argue that revenue-collection authorities should, notably in the absence of reliable third-party information, exploit non-usual sources of information. Specifically, our micro-level study of customs evasion provides evidence that using any internal or external available source of information facilitates customsenforcement. Estimates highlight that exploiting historical data and/or relying on an information provider - a pre-shipment inspection company - significantly reduces evasion in Cameroon. The potential endogeneity of pre-shipment inspections is addressed by using instrumental variables. Results are robust to a variety of additional checks.
    Date: 2015–07–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01179445&r=all
  3. By: Philippe Adair (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS); Youghourta Bellache (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)
    Abstract: Thanks to a multinomial logit model, we identify the determinants of access to the various labour market segments in Bejaia, a central-eastern region of Algeria. We first use cross-sectional analysis upon two samples of 1,252 and 2,026 individuals collected from two household surveys we have conducted in 2007 and 2012. The labour market patterns encompass the formal/ informal divide as well segmentation within the informal sector–upper tiersvs. lower tier. Determinants of labour mobility depend on the social and demographic characteristics (age, gender and marital status) and human capital of individuals. Then, we sketch an exploratory investigation upon a small cohort of 445 individuals between 2007 and 2012. The aforementioned determinants explain the significant mobility of individuals taking place across sectors that is oriented towards the informal sector. To a lesser extent, individuals shift within the informal sector itself, which is essentially limited to its ‘lower tier’ segment.
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01100244&r=all
  4. By: Huang, Xianguo (Asian Development Bank Institute); Yoshino, Naoyuki (Asian Development Bank Institute)
    Abstract: This paper studies the impact of tax-financed universal health coverage schemes on macroeconomic aspects of labor supply, asset holding, inequality, and welfare, while taking into account features common to developing economies, such as informal employment and tax avoidance, by constructing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. Agents have different education levels, employment statuses, and idiosyncratic shocks. Given three tax financing options, calibration results suggest that the financing options matter for outcomes both at the aggregate and disaggregate levels. Universal health coverage, financed by labor income tax revenue, could reduce inequality due to its large redistributive role. Social welfare cannot be improved when labor decisions are endogenous and distortions are higher than the redistributive gains for all tax financing options. In the absence of labor supply choice, mild welfare gains are found.
    Keywords: universal health coverage; DSGE model; idiosyncratic shocks; social welfare
    JEL: E24 E26 E62 H23 H51 J11
    Date: 2015–08–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0533&r=all
  5. By: Mathieu Lefebvre (Palaiseau - Onera - The French Aerospace Lab - ONERA); Pierre Pestieau (CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR, TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics); Arno Riedl (The Maastricht University School of Business and Economics - University of Maastricht); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon)
    Abstract: En période de crise économique, les besoins de l’Etat augmentent et l’assiette fiscale se réduit ; il est alors courant de voir resurgir dans le débat public la lutte contre les diverses formes de fraude qui reduisent les recettes publiques. Dans ce contexte, on oppose régulièrement fraude fiscale à fraude sociale et la discussion porte souvent sur l’importance relative de l’une et de l’autre. On entend par fraude fiscale le détournement illégal d’un système fiscal afin de ne pas contribuer au financement des charges publiques, et par fraude sociale à le fait d’échapper au versement des prélèvements sociaux ou de bénéficier indûment de prestations sociales. Les deux formes de fraude se recoupent parfois. S’il est difficile de mesurer avec précision l’une et l’autre forme de fraude, on estime généralement que la fraude fiscale représente un manque à gagner pour l’Etat beaucoup plus important que la fraude sociale. Cependant, il est important de noter que ces deux types de fraude émanent certainement de populations aux caractéristiques différentes en termes d’activité et de ressources. Il est donc intéressant d’essayer d’identifier les facteurs explicatifs de ces deux types de fraude, à savoir s’ils répondent aux mêmes ressorts économiques et impératifs moraux. Des populations ou des groupes sont souvent stigmatisés pour pratiquer l’un ou l’autre type de fraude. Cet article se propose d’expliquer les facteurs menant à ces deux types de fraude et ce, à partir de données obtenues d’une expérience en laboratoire. De par ses exigences de contrôle et son artificialité, l’expérimentation de laboratoire peut contribuer à apporter des éléments de réponse. En effet, par le choix de valeurs de paramètres appropriées, elle permet de comparer directement les deux types de fraude du point de vue économique de façon à isoler des dimensions non-économiques de la prise de décision.
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01098751&r=all

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