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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Armagan Tuna Aktuna Gunes (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Christophe Starzec (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); François Gardes (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris) |
| Abstract: | We use the demand system approach to estimate the size of informal economy in Turkey following the methodology based on the analysis of the individual consumption behaviour proposed by Pissarides, Weber (1989), Lyssiotou et al. (2004), and Fortin et al. (2009). We extend this method by taking into account both the monetary expenditures and time spent on domestic activities. The necessary information of money and time inputs in consumption on the household's level is obtained by statistical match of Turkish Family Budget and Time Use surveys (2006). As expected, the estimated model size of the informal economy in Turkey using the full (time plus money) expenditure is higher than those obtained by only monetary approach (in average 40.6% and 33.5% of GDP respectively) and also higher than obtained by more conventional macroeconomic methods (for example 35.1% by Schneider in 2005 with DYMIMIC model). |
| Keywords: | Informal economy; complete demand system; time use full expenditures |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00841346&r=iue |
| By: | David Margolis (EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor) |
| Abstract: | Over half of all workers in the developing world are self-employed. Although some self-employment is chosen by entrepreneurs with well-defined projects and ambitions, roughly two thirds results from individuals having no better alternatives. The importance of self-employment in the overall distribution of jobs is determined by many factors, including social protection systems, labor market frictions, the business environment, and labor market institutions. However, self-employment in the developing world tends to be low productivity employment, and as countries move up the development path, the availability of wage employment grows and the mix of jobs changes. |
| Keywords: | self-employment, entrepreneurship, development |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01052586&r=iue |
| By: | Luttmer, Erzo F.P. (Dartmouth College); Singhal, Monica (Harvard Kennedy School) |
| Abstract: | Standard economic models of tax compliance have focused on enforcement-driven compliance. Notably, tax administrators also tend to place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of improving "tax morale" by encouraging voluntary compliance, creating a culture of compliance, and changing social norms. Tax morale does indeed appear to be an important component of compliance decisions, and there is strong evidence that tax morale operates through a variety of underlying channels. There is less evidence - to date - that indicates we know how to leverage these channels to improve compliance and revenue collection in a consistently successful way. |
| Keywords: | tax compliance, intrinsic motivation, reciprocity, social effects, culture |
| JEL: | H26 |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8448&r=iue |
| By: | Blaufus, Kay; Braune, Matthias; Hundsdoerfer, Jochen; Jacob, Martin |
| Abstract: | In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability does not affect this result. Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for example, on legal activities. |
| Keywords: | evasion,tax morale,tax compliance,self-serving bias,moral spillover |
| JEL: | H20 H26 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201418&r=iue |
| By: | Blaufus, Kay; Braune, Matthias; Hundsdoerfer, Jochen; Jacob, Martin |
| Abstract: | In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability does not affect this result. Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for example, on legal activities. |
| Keywords: | Evasion,Tax Morale,Tax Compliance,Self-Serving Bias,Moral Spillover |
| JEL: | H20 H26 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:arqudp:174&r=iue |