|
on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Céspedes, Nikita (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú); Gutiérrez, Ana Paola (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú); Belapatiño, Vanessa (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú) |
| Abstract: | Se estudia la duración del desempleo en una economía con alta informalidad, alto autoempleo e inactividad laboral. La duración promedio del desempleo en una economía con estas características (Perú) es aproximadamente tres meses, valor inferior a lo estimado para economías desarrolladas. La tendencia decreciente de este indicador es consistente con el episodio de crecimiento económico. La informalidad laboral, el autoempleo y la inactividad son los principales elementos detrás de la reducida duración del desempleo. La duración también es consistente con la existencia de una relación positiva de la tasa de riesgo de dejar el desempleo y la duración del desempleo para desempleados recientes. Finalmente, se muestra que la duración del desempleo no guarda relación con los cambios en la política de seguro de desempleo. |
| Keywords: | Duración del desempleo, tasa de riesgo, desempleo, informalidad, duración, empleo, seguro de desempleo |
| JEL: | J21 J62 J63 J64 J65 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apc:wpaper:2014-002&r=iue |
| By: | Alm, James; Hodge, Timothy R.; Sands, Gary; Skidmore, Mark |
| Abstract: | In this paper we develop a theoretical model of the individual decision to become delinquent on one’s property tax payments. We then apply the model to the City of Detroit, Michigan, USA, where the city is in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings, and a rate of property tax delinquency of 48 percent, resulting in uncollected tax revenues of about 20 percent. We use detailed parcellevel data for Detroit to evaluate the factors that affect both the probability that a property owner is tax delinquent and, conditional upon delinquency, the magnitude of the delinquency. Our estimates show that properties that have lower value, longer police response times, are nonhomestead (non-owner occupied residential properties), have a higher statutory tax rate, have a higher assessed value relative to sales price, are owned by a financial institution or by a Detroit resident, are delinquent on water bills, and for which the probability of enforcement is low are more likely to be tax delinquent These findings can be used to inform policies targeted at improving tax compliance within the City. |
| Keywords: | Property tax, Delinquency, Tax compliance, |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vuw:vuwcpf:3149&r=iue |
| By: | Joy Buchanan (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University); Bart Wilson (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a laboratory experiment to explore whether the protection of intellectual property (IP) incentivizes people to create non-rivalrous knowledge goods, foregoing the production of other rivalrous goods. In the contrasting treatment with no IP protection, participants are free to resell and remake non-rivalrous knowledge goods originally created by others. We find that creators reap substantial profits when IP is protected and that rampant pirating is common when there is no IP protection, but IP protection in and of itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for generating wealth from the discovery of knowledge goods. Rather, individual entrepreneurship is the key. Length: 36 |
| Keywords: | intellectual property, experimental economics |
| JEL: | C92 D89 K39 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1044&r=iue |