nep-iue New Economics Papers
on Informal and Underground Economics
Issue of 2013‒02‒16
seven papers chosen by
Catalina Granda Carvajal
Universidad de Antioquia

  1. Institutions, Informal Economy and Economic Development By Ceyhun Elgin; Oguz Oztunali
  2. Environmental Kuznets Curve for the Informal Sector of Turkey (1950-2009) By Ceyhun Elgin; Oguz Oztunali
  3. Why do Russian Firms Use Fixed-Term and Agency Work Contracts? By Larisa Smirnykh; Andreas Wörgötter
  4. Why Do Russian Firms Use Fixed-Term and Agency Work Contracts? By Smirnykh, Larisa; Wörgötter, Andreas
  5. Below the Salt: Decentralizing Value-Added Taxes By Richard M. Bird
  6. Living on the Edge: Youth Entry, Career and Exit in Drug-Selling Gangs By Carvalho, Leandro; Soares, Rodrigo R.
  7. Para um modelo de segurança e controlo da criminalidade económico-financeira - Um contributo judiciário By Jorge dos Reis Bravo

  1. By: Ceyhun Elgin; Oguz Oztunali
    Date: 2013–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bou:wpaper:2013/03&r=iue
  2. By: Ceyhun Elgin; Oguz Oztunali
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bou:wpaper:2013/05&r=iue
  3. By: Larisa Smirnykh; Andreas Wörgötter
    Abstract: This study looks into the use of fixed term contracts and agency work in Russia during and shortly after the crisis 2009-10 with the help of an enterprise survey. The results of variance analysis show that the use of fixed-term or agency work contracts is not uniform across sectors, size and skill requirements. Probit analysis reveals that the use of fixed term contracts also in-creases the likelihood of using agency work, but not the other way around. The increase of tem-porary and agency work contracts increases the turnover on the labour market and contributes to an increase in dualisation, but may also help to prevent a larger increase in unemployment during crisis periods.<P>Pourquoi les entreprises russes utilisent les contrats de travail à durée déterminée et de l'Agence ?<BR>Cet article analyse, sur la base de données individuelles issues d?une enquête auprès des en-treprises, les principales caractéristiques de l?utilisation de contrats à durée déterminée et du tra-vail intérimaire en Russie pendant la crise 2009-10 et peu après cette période. Les résultats de l'analyse de la variance montrent que l'utilisation de ces contrats n'est pas uniforme et varie selon les secteurs, la taille de l?entreprise et les compétences requises. L?analyse par Probit révèle que l'utilisation de contrats à durée déterminée augmente également la probabilité de recours au tra-vail intérimaire, mais pas l?inverse. L'augmentation des contrats de travail temporaires et intéri-maires augmente la rotation de la main d?oeuvre sur le marché du travail et contribue à une aug-mentation du dualisme, mais elle peut aussi contribuer a contenir la hausse du chômage en pé-riode de crise.
    Keywords: Russia, labour demand, labour contracts, employment level, turnover, Russie, contrats de travail, niveau de l'emploi, demande de travail
    JEL: J21 J23 J41 J63
    Date: 2013–01–14
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1014-en&r=iue
  4. By: Smirnykh, Larisa (Higher School of Economics, Moscow); Wörgötter, Andreas (OECD, Paris)
    Abstract: This study looks into the use of fixed term contracts and agency work in Russia during and shortly after the crisis 2009–10 with the help of an enterprise survey. The results of variance analysis show that the use of fixed-term or agency work contracts is not uniform across sectors, size and skill requirements. Probit analysis reveals that the use of fixed term contracts also increases the likelihood of using agency work, but not the other way around. The increase of temporary and agency work contracts increases the turnover on the labour market and contributes to an increase in dualisation, but may also help to prevent a larger increase in unemployment during crisis periods.
    Keywords: labour contracts, employment level, turnover, labour demand, Russia
    JEL: J41 J21 J63 J23
    Date: 2013–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izapps:pp54&r=iue
  5. By: Richard M. Bird (University of Toronto)
    Abstract: Although VATs applied simultaneously within the same country by different levels of government were long considered to be either undesirable or infeasible, two quite different types of sub-central VATs – regional consumption taxes and local business taxes -- now exist in a number of countries. Brazil, Canada, and India have introduced regional (state and provincial) VATs which, like national VATs, are general taxes on consumption administered through a transaction-based credit-invoice approach. Although these three countries are very different, and each has established such a tax for its own reasons in different ways and with varying degrees of success, as this paper discusses, on the whole such regional VATs appear to work fairly well, especially in Canada. The issues that arise with independent regional VATs are closely related to those arising with national VATs in a common market such as the EU. A number of problems such as ‘carousel’ (or ‘missing trader’) fraud have recently received considerable attention in the EU and a variety of alternative solutions to such problems have been suggested, some involving major structural changes in the VAT. Experience with regional VATs, however, suggests that what is needed to resolve most such problems is primarily a firmer ‘EU-wide’ framework for improving VAT administration. The second type of sub-central VAT that has recently emerged in Italy, Japan, and France (as well as in several U.S. states) takes the form of a revised form of local business tax which is generally imposed on an ‘income’ (origin) basis in contrast to the destination-based consumption VATs discussed earlier. These taxes seem superior in some important respects to other forms of local business taxation and appear to be compatible with both regional and national VATs. Although important economic and administrative aspects require careful consideration in designing and implementing ‘two-level’ (dual) VATs, such dual VATs (or even triple VATs, including an ‘income-type’ VAT at the local level) are evidently both feasible technically and acceptable politically. This conclusion does not mean that regional VATs are either inherently desirable or necessarily the best alternative for any country (or set of countries). But it does suggest that such taxes may work more satisfactorily in at least some countries than other forms of regional sales taxes or local business taxes. Indeed, both varieties of ‘decentralized VATs’ discussed here may become more important over time.
    Date: 2013–02–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1302&r=iue
  6. By: Carvalho, Leandro (RAND); Soares, Rodrigo R. (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio))
    Abstract: We use data from a unique survey of members of drug-trafficking gangs in favelas (slums) of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to characterize drug-trafficking jobs and study the selection into gangs, analyzing what distinguishes gang-members from other youth living in favelas. We also estimate wage regressions for gang-members and examine their career path: age at entry, progression within the gangs' hierarchy, and short- to medium-term outcomes. Individuals from lower socioeconomic background and with no religious affiliation have higher probability of joining a gang, while those with problems at school and early use of drugs join the gang at younger ages. Wages within the gang do not depend on education, but are increasing with experience and involvement in gang-related violence. The two-year mortality rate in the sample of gang-members reaches 20%, with the probability of death increasing with initial involvement in gang violence and with personality traits associated with unruliness.
    Keywords: crime, youth, gangs, drugs, trafficking, Brazil
    JEL: J4 K42 O15 O17
    Date: 2013–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7189&r=iue
  7. By: Jorge dos Reis Bravo
    Abstract: This paper attempts to propose a criterion for recognition of economic and financial crime. Some aspects of contact and gap between this reality and organized crime are focused, wherein the crime of corruption is assumed as the typological figure of confluence between those two realities. We try to list the legal standards, within the criminal and procedural loose system, tending to enhance the prevention and fight against economic and financial crime, surprising some discontinuities that perhaps do not favor an appropriate intervention on the phenomena they seek to control. We note the difficulties of legal definition of concepts such as economic and financial crime and organized crime, derived, understandably, to some extent, from the very ambiguity of criminological and sociological-cultural categories which characterization is not univocal and stable. An approach of what may be an appropriate and efficient methodology eminently judiciary intervention on the phenomenon of economic and financial crime is assayed, focusing on the possible reconfiguration of the role and terms of intervention of the major institutions on preventing and criminal investigation (v.g., supervisory and regulatory authorities, inspective departments of Public Administration, the Council for Prevention of Corruption, the Public Prosecution Office - the DCIAP and Judiciary Police - the UNCC). It is also tested the pre-understandings and possible terms of intervention of institutional actors most directly involved in the fight against economic and financial crime. Accepting the centrality of corruption as a confluence phenomenon between economic and financial crime and organized crime, we seek to analyze the set of assumptions that can base an alternative model of safety and control of corrupting practices.
    Keywords: economic and financial crime; organized crime; highly organized crime; fraud and corruption; crime prevention; special methods of criminal investigation; special investigative measures of organized and economic and financial crime; asset recovery; strategic concept of prevention and fight against economic and financial crime; security and control of corruption.
    Date: 2013–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:obegef:018&r=iue

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