nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2021‒09‒06
three papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Global Patent Systems: Revisiting the National Bias Hypothesis By Elise Petit; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe; Lluís Gimeno Fabra
  2. Are Patent Offices Substitutes? By Elise Petit; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe; Lluís Gimeno Fabra
  3. Quantitative Assessment on Frictions in Technology Market By Zhang, Yiran

  1. By: Elise Petit; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe; Lluís Gimeno Fabra
    Abstract: This paper revisits the literature providing empirical evidence that patent offices are biased in favour of their national applicants. If true, this “national bias” would be proof of disrespect of several international patent-related treaties. Existing investigations are however subject to an important limitation: they focus only on grant rates – a potentially biased indicator of stringency, since it is influenced by economic forces. It is argued that including a deeper analysis of how the patent examination process is carried out provides a more robust approach. Relying on a unique database of 2400 patent families filed simultaneously in three patent offices (EPO, JPO & USPTO), the paper finds no evidence of national bias throughout the examination process of any of them.
    Keywords: Patent systems, TRIPs, national bias, examination, international comparison
    Date: 2021–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/330840&r=
  2. By: Elise Petit; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe; Lluís Gimeno Fabra
    Abstract: This paper evaluates whether and to what extent patent offices can substitute for each other. Based on an original dataset comprising 7.200 PCT patents filed simultaneously in Japan, the USA and Europe, the empirical analysis confirms that the degree of substitution is significant. Patent offices search up to 37% less technology classes, generate up to 33% less citations, and send up to 43% less communications when a PCT application was previously processed by another office. They also rely more on international citations and provide more information in the early stage of the examination process. Further substitution may still be leveraged, as around 55% of technology classes searched and up to 70% of backward citations are duplicates -voluntarily or not - of prior examination work.
    Keywords: Patent systems, TRIPs, national bias, examination, international comparison
    Date: 2021–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/330841&r=
  3. By: Zhang, Yiran
    Abstract: In this paper, I first document several novel stylized facts from Chinese patent transaction data matched with manufacturing firm data. A key finding is that Chinese patent market is significantly less developed than the U.S. To understand the causes and consequences, I build a model that endogenizes firm R&D investment, patent trading decision and productivity growth. I structurally estimate the model and find the following two main results. First, Chinese patent market plays a small role in growth. It only accounts for 5% of China’s GDP growth rate, as opposed to 17% in the U.S. Second, I evaluate the importance of three frictions calibrated to Chinese patent market: search cost, fixed transaction cost and information asymmetry. Search cost turns out to be the main friction to explain the gap of patent market size. If search cost was reduced to the US level, China’s productivity growth would increase by 0.16 percentage points.
    Keywords: Under-developed Patent Market, patent quality, search cost, fixed cost, information asymmetry
    JEL: O3
    Date: 2021–01–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:109470&r=

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