nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2020‒08‒31
six papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination By Michael D. Frakes; Melissa F. Wasserman
  2. The Scientific Output of a Database on Commercialized Patents By Svensson, Roger
  3. Do Retailers Manipulate Prices to Favour Private Label over Brands? By Ratula Chakraborty
  4. The European Patent System: A Descriptive Analysis By Georg von Graevenitz; Antanina Garanasvili
  5. Are Green Inventions really more complex? Evidence from European Patents. By Fusillo, Fabrizio
  6. Patent Puzzle, Inflation, and Internal Financial Constraint By Suzuki, Keishun

  1. By: Michael D. Frakes; Melissa F. Wasserman
    Abstract: The debate surrounding escalating prescription drug prices has increasingly focused on the legitimacy of the practice of brand-name manufacturers receiving patent protection on peripheral features of the drug such as the route of administration, as opposed to just the active-ingredient itself. The key question is whether these later-obtained, secondary patents protect novel features and represent true innovation or, instead, provide little to no innovative benefit and improperly delay generic entry. In this paper, we explore how the Patent Office may improve the quality of the secondary patents issued—thereby reducing the degree of unnecessary and harmful delays of generic entry—by giving examiners more time to review patent applications. Our findings suggest that current examiner time allocations are causing patent examiners to issue low quality secondary patents on the margin. We further set forth evidence suggesting that the costs to investing in greater ex ante scrutiny of secondary pharmaceutical patent applications by the Patent Office are greatly outweighed by the benefits, which include the avoidance of downstream litigation expenses and gains to consumer and total surplus from reduced drug prices.
    JEL: I18 O34
    Date: 2020–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27579&r=all
  2. By: Svensson, Roger (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))
    Abstract: The purpose of this study is to present a unique database on commercialized patents and to illustrate how it can be used to analyze the commercialization process of patents. The dataset is based on a survey of Swedish patents owned by inventors and small firms with a remarkably high response rate of 80 percent. It contains some key variables on commercialization not found anywhere else, including whether, when and how (acquisition, licensing, existing or new firm) patents were commercialized as well as whether this commercialization was profitable or not. Thus, this patent database measures technological innovation. The dataset is complemented with indicators of patent quality (patent renewal, forward citations, and patent family) from archive sources. Basic statistics for the key variables are described. Finally, the scientific output in terms of published articles in peer-reviewed journals shows how this database can be used to analyze the commercialization process of patents. The dataset has, for instance, been used to 1) evaluate government loan programs for inventors; 2) analyze the different roles of the inventor and the Schumpeterian entrepreneur during commercialization; 3) estimate the transfer of tacit knowledge when patents are sold or licensed; and 4) analyze the entry strategy among inventors in oligopolistic markets.
    Keywords: Patents; Commercialization; Innovation; Small firms; Inventors; Acquisition; Licensing; New start-up firms; Forward citations; Renewal; Patent equivalents; Financing; Entry strategy; Venture capital
    JEL: G24 G34 L10 L20 M13 O30 O31 O32 O34 O38
    Date: 2020–08–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1349&r=all
  3. By: Ratula Chakraborty (Centre for Competition Policy and Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia)
    Abstract: Retailers act as both customers and competitors for brand manufacturers when selling private label in direct competition with brands. This paper considers whether retailers exploit this double-agent position to practice switch marketing, manipulating elements of the retail marketing mix to encourage shoppers to switch from buying brands to private label. Such manipulation can be blatant in nature, such as comparative advertising, brand delisting trials, copycat packaging, and biased shelf allocation. However, the key interest in this paper concerns whether retailers use a more subtle means through strategic pricing to favour private label over brands. The paper reveals very different price treatments of brands and matching private label goods. However, the identified pricing patterns are more indicative of retailers manipulating prices for the sake of segmenting consumers rather than displacing brands.
    Keywords: brand, private label, retailer, pricing, marketing, manipulation
    JEL: K21 L13 L14 L40
    Date: 2018–10–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2018_02&r=all
  4. By: Georg von Graevenitz (QMUL School of Business and Management); Antanina Garanasvili (Centre for Intellectual Property Policy and Management, Bournemouth University)
    Abstract: The European Patent System consists of national patent offices (NPOs) and the supranational European Patent Office (EPO). EPO and the NPOs have granted patents in Europe side-by-side since 1980. The resulting patent system is complicated and less coordinated than might be expected. Firms must consider a number of variables when selecting the route of patenting they take within this system: price, rigour of examination, duration of examination, quality of legal redress. To date there is little descriptive evidence on how firms choose between EPO and national offices. This paper provides a rich descriptive analysis of patenting in Europe. We analyze how origin, size and technological focus of companies, affect how they choose among patent offices within the EPS and report differences in examination durations and grant rates across patent offices.
    Date: 2018–10–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2018_12&r=all
  5. By: Fusillo, Fabrizio (University of Turin)
    Abstract: A large body of existing literature extensively studied the economic deter-minants and effects of environmental innovations. However, only a few studiesanalyzed the specific features of green technologies in the early phasesof theinvention process. The aim of this paper is to investigate knowledgerecombi-nation patterns in the green domain. The focus is on identifying whether andhow different bodies of technology are combined and integrated. Exploitinga large sample of European patent data, from 1980 to 2012, the paper inves-tigates the degree of diversity in the knowledge sources and the generationphase of green inventions. Using the Integration Score as an index of techno-logical diversity we compare the recombinant features of Green Technologieswith a control sample of “Traditional Technologies†, accurately drawn fromthe universe of all patent applications. Empirical results suggest that, aftercontrolling for a number of typical characteristics which may affect diversity,Green Technologies systematically show a higher degree of diversitywhencompared to non-green ones.
    Date: 2020–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:dipeco:202015&r=all
  6. By: Suzuki, Keishun
    Abstract: Although Schumpeterian growth models typically predict that stronger patent protection enhances innovation-driven economic growth, the empirical evidence does not support this idea. We explore the unclear relationship at work by shedding light on the financing of R&D investment. Empirically, R&D-intensive firms preferentially rely on their internal cash flows rather than external funds. We develop a simple monetary Schumpeterian growth model in which R&D firms face an endogenous financing choice that is consistent with this evidence. In our model, the scale of R&D investment may be financially constrained by internal cash because external financing is costly. Our model shows that the relationship between patent protection and growth can be either N-shaped, inverted-U shaped, or positive depending on the inflation rate. Specifically, we find that the growth effect of the pro-patent policy is likely to be negative under a high inflation rate, while the growth effect is always positive under the Friedman rule.
    Keywords: Innovation, Patent Protection, Inflation, Financing of R&D
    JEL: E44 O31 O34
    Date: 2020–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:101937&r=all

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