nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2018‒11‒19
four papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Technology and persistence in global software piracy By Simplice Asongu; Christelle Meniago
  2. Consumer Misinformation and the Brand Premium: A Private Label Blind Taste Test By Bronnenberg, Bart; Dube, Jean-Pierre; Sanders, Robert
  3. Consumer Misinformation and the Brand Premium: A Private Label Blind Taste Test By Bart Bronnenberg; Jean-Pierre H. Dubé; Robert E. Sanders
  4. Creative Class Competition and Innovation in the Absence of Patent Protection By Batabyal, Amitrajeet

  1. By: Simplice Asongu (Yaoundé/Cameroon); Christelle Meniago (Sol Plaatje University, South Africa)
    Abstract: This study examines the persistence of software piracy with internet penetration vis-à-vis of PC users, conditional on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) institutions. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 99 countries for the period 1994-2010 and the Generalised Method of Moments. The main finding is that, compared to internet penetration, PC usage is more responsible for the persistence of global software piracy. Knowing how technology affects the persistence of piracy is important because it enables more targeted policy initiatives. We show that the sensitivity of software piracy to IPRs mechanisms is contingent on the specific technology channels through which the pirated software is consumed.
    Keywords: Piracy; Business Software; Software piracy; Intellectual Property Rights
    JEL: F42 K42 O34 O38 O57
    Date: 2018–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:18/041&r=ipr
  2. By: Bronnenberg, Bart; Dube, Jean-Pierre; Sanders, Robert
    Abstract: We run in-store blind taste tests with a retailer's private label food brands and the leading national brand counterparts in three large CPG categories. In a survey administered during the taste test, subjects self-report very high expectations about the quality of the private labels relative to national brands. However, they predict a relatively low probability of choosing them in a blind taste test. Surprisingly however, an overwhelming majority systematically chooses the private label in the blinded test. During the week after the intervention, the tested private label product market shares increase by 15 share points, on top of a base share of 8 share points. However, the effect diminishes to 8 share points during the second to fourth week after the test and to 2 share points during the second to fifth month after the test. Using a structural model of demand, we show these effects survive controls for point-of-purchase prices, purchase incidence, and the feedback effects of brand loyalty. We also find that the intervention increases the preference for the private label brands, and that it decreases the preference for the national brands, relative to the outside good. The findings are consistent with a treatment effect of information on demand where the memory for this information decays slowly over time. Alternative explanations to the information treatment are ruled out.
    Keywords: brands and branding; consumer information; market structure; private label
    JEL: L11 L15 M31 M37
    Date: 2018–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13283&r=ipr
  3. By: Bart Bronnenberg; Jean-Pierre H. Dubé; Robert E. Sanders
    Abstract: We run in-store blind taste tests with a retailer’s private label food brands and the leading national brand counterparts in three large CPG categories. In a survey administered during the taste test, subjects self-report very high expectations about the quality of the private labels relative to national brands. However, they predict a relatively low probability of choosing them in a blind taste test. Surprisingly however, an overwhelming majority systematically chooses the private label in the blinded test. During the week after the intervention, the tested private label product market shares increase by 15 share points, on top of a base share of 8 share points. However, the effect diminishes to 8 share points during the second to fourth week after the test and to 2 share points during the second to fifth month after the test. Using a structural model of demand, we show these effects survive controls for point-of-purchase prices, purchase incidence, and the feedback effects of brand loyalty. We also find that the intervention increases the preference for the private label brands, and that it decreases the preference for the national brands, relative to the outside good. The findings are consistent with a treatment effect of information on demand where the memory for this information decays slowly over time. Alternative explanations to the information treatment are ruled out.
    JEL: L11 L15 M31 M37
    Date: 2018–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25214&r=ipr
  4. By: Batabyal, Amitrajeet
    Abstract: Recently, Batabyal and Yoo (2018) have analyzed Schumpeterian competition in a region that is creative a la Richard Florida and where the creative class is made up of existing and candidate entrepreneurs. These researchers assume that an existing entrepreneur has a fully enforced patent on the inputs or machines that he has produced. We dispense with this assumption and study a scenario in which there is no patent protection for the representative existing entrepreneur (REE). This REE can undertake two possible types of innovation at the same cost. The first (second) type of innovation is general (specific) and hence can (cannot) be copied by the so called candidate entrepreneurs. In this setting, we perform two tasks. First, we show that although the REE will never undertake the general innovation, he may undertake the specific innovation. Second, we point out that even though the general innovation is not undertaken, the value to the creative region from the general innovation exceeds that from the specific innovation.
    Keywords: Creative Class, General Innovation, Patent, Specific Innovation
    JEL: O31 R11
    Date: 2018–03–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:89604&r=ipr

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