nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2018‒03‒12
four papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Patent Protection and Threat of Litigation in Oligopoly By Capuano, Carlo; Grassi, Iacopo
  2. Intellectual Property Rights and the Ascent of Proprietary Innovation in Agriculture By Matthew S. Clancy; GianCarlo Moschini
  3. University invention and the abolishment of the professor’s privilege in Finland By Ejermo, Olof; Toivanen, Hannes
  4. Propensity to Patent and Firm Size for Small R&D-Intensive Firms By Link, Albert; Scott, John

  1. By: Capuano, Carlo; Grassi, Iacopo
    Abstract: In recent years, the increasing awarding of patents has captured the attention of scholars operating in different fields. The economic literature has studied the causes of this proliferation; we propose an entry game focusing on one of the consequences, showing how an incumbent may create a patent portfolio in order to control market entry and to collude. The incumbent fixes the level of patent protection and the threat of denunciation reduces the entrant's expected profits; moreover, if the entrant deviates from collusion, the incumbent can strengthen punishment suing the competitor for patent infringement, reducing her incentive to deviate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should pay attention to the level of patent protection implemented by the incumbent and note whether the holder of a patent reacts to entry by either suing or not suing the competitor. In the model, we use completely general functional forms in analyzing the issues, and this allows us to obtain general results not depending on the assumptions about the kind of oligopolistic competition.
    Keywords: patents,litigation,collusion,entry game
    JEL: D43 K21 L13
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:175243&r=ipr
  2. By: Matthew S. Clancy; GianCarlo Moschini (Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD))
    Abstract: Biological innovations in agriculture did not enjoy protection by formal intellectual property rights (IPRs) for a long time, but the recent trend has been one of considerable broadening and strengthening of these rights. We document the nature of these IPRs and their evolution, and provide an assessment of their impacts on innovation. We integrate elements of the institutional history of plant IPRs with a discussion of the relevant economic theory and a review of applicable empirical evidence. Throughout, we highlight how the experience of biological innovation mirrors, or differs from, the broader literature on IPRs and innovation. We conclude with some considerations on the relation between IPRs and market structure and the pricing of proprietary inputs in agriculture
    Date: 2017–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ias:cpaper:17-wp572&r=ipr
  3. By: Ejermo, Olof (Department of Economic History, Lund University); Toivanen, Hannes (Teqmine)
    Abstract: In 2007 Finland changed ownership rights to inventions from its employees – "the professor’s privilege" – to universities. We investigate how this change affected academic patenting using new data on inventors and patenting in Finland for the period 1995- 2010. Matched sample panel data regressions using difference-in-differences show that patenting by individuals dropped by at least 29 percent after 2007. Unlike other countries studied, in Finland the reform was known before implementation. Adding the period after announcement to the reform period increases the drop in academic patenting to 46 percent. Our and others’ results call into question whether the European reform of the professor’s privilege were good innovation policy.
    Keywords: academic patenting; Finland; professor’s privilege; university ownership
    JEL: I23 I28 O31 O32 O34 O38
    Date: 2018–03–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lucirc:2018_006&r=ipr
  4. By: Link, Albert (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics); Scott, John (Dartmouth College, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: The Schumpeterian hypothesis about the effect of firm size on research and development (R&D) output is studied for a sample of R&D projects for R&D-intensive firms that are small but have substantial variance in their sizes. Across the distribution of firm sizes, the elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D ranged from 0.41 to 0.55, with the elasticities being largest for intermediate levels of firm size and also varying directly with the extent to which the projects are Schumpeterian in the cost or value senses. The paper’s findings at the R&D project level are compared with the literature’s findings at the line of business, firm, and industry levels, and the findings are consistent with the literature’s findings for small firms.
    Keywords: Patents; Research and Development (R&D); Firm Size; Schumpeterian hypothesis; Technological Progress; Innovation
    JEL: L10 L20 L25 O30
    Date: 2018–01–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:uncgec:2018_001&r=ipr

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