nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2017‒08‒27
two papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Intellectual Property Boxes and the Paradox of Price Discrimination By Ben Klemens
  2. Movie Piracy and Displaced Sales in Europe: Evidence from Six Countries By Herz, Benedikt; Kiljanski, Kamil

  1. By: Ben Klemens (U.S. Treasury)
    Abstract: This paper considers the methods by which some existing laws and proposals offer different tax rates to different types of capital, a scheme variously known as a patent box, innovation box, or intellectual property box (IP box). It presents a model of international tax competition—what tax experts call a race to the bottom and competition experts call Bertrand competition—with some capital fixed and some easily moved across borders. The model finds that the highest expected tax revenue from mobile IP for a country hosting a large amount of fixed, non-IP capital comes from assigning a single tax rate to all types of capital—that is, from not implementing an IP box. In the context of Bertrand competition, firms optimize revenue when not engaging in price discrimination across types of customers. As a research and development (R&D) credit, several examples show that the IP box is more easily manipulated than a traditional credit on R&D expenses.
    Date: 2017–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ceq:wpaper:1703&r=ipr
  2. By: Herz, Benedikt; Kiljanski, Kamil
    Abstract: This paper presents estimates of lost movie sales due to unpaid movie consumption. We are the first to provide estimates that are recent, representative of the internet-using population, and cover multiple countries. Based on an online questionnaire with almost 30,000 respondents, we document that one unpaid (first) viewing of a movie displaces about 0.37 units of paid viewings. Using a back-of-the-envelope calculation, we show that this implies that unpaid movie viewings reduced movie sales in Europe by about 4.4% during the sample period. Lost sales differ substantially by country: they are in the range of 1.65% for Germany and 10.4% for Spain. We also find that 94% of lost sales are due to unpaid viewings by a small group of only 20% of consumers. Our findings have important implications for copyright policy.
    Keywords: movie piracy, copyright, displacement
    JEL: O34
    Date: 2016–09–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80817&r=ipr

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