nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2015‒01‒19
nine papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”

  1. Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Innovation: Evidence from TRIPS By Margaret Kyle; Yi Qian
  2. The patterns of patents in China: By Xie, Zhuan; Zhang, Xiaobo
  3. Incentives for product and process innovations: a case for the drug industry By Bhan, Aditya; Kabiraj, Tarun
  4. Democratizing intellectual property systems : how corruption hinders equal opportunities for firms By Paunov C.
  5. Does the mobility of R&D labor increase innovation? By Kaiser, Ulrich; Kongsted, Hans Christian; Rønde, Thomas
  6. Technological capabilities and growth: A study of economic convergence among Chinese prefectures By Federico Frattini; Francesco Nicolli; Giorgio Prodi
  7. On the number of licenses under symmetric versus asymmetric information with signaling By Antelo, Manel; Sampayo, Antonio
  8. Effective tax rates under IP tax planning By Evers, Lisa; Spengel, Christoph
  9. What Affects Brand Equity: The Precise Measurement With Consumer Choice Model By Natalia A. Kochkina; Olga V. Novikova; Dmitriy B. Potapov

  1. By: Margaret Kyle; Yi Qian
    Abstract: We examine the effect of pharmaceutical patent protection on the speed of drug launch, price, and quantity in 60 countries from 2000-2013. The World Trade Organization required its member countries to implement a minimum level of patent protection within a specified time period as part of the TRIPS Agreement. However, members retained the right to impose price controls and to issue compulsory licenses under certain conditions. These countervailing policies were intended to reduce the potential static losses that result from reduced competition during the patent term. We take advantage of the fact that at the product level, selection into TRIPS "treatment" is exogenously determined by compliance deadlines that vary across countries. We find that patents have important consequences for access to new drugs: in the absence of a patent, launch is unlikely. That is, even when no patent barrier exists, generic entry may not occur. Conditional on launch, patented drugs have higher prices but higher sales as well. The price premium associated with patents is smaller in poorer countries. Price discrimination across countries has increased for drugs patented post-TRIPS and prices are negatively related to the burden of disease, suggesting that countervailing policies to offset expected price increases may have had the intended effects.
    JEL: I10 O34
    Date: 2014–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20799&r=ipr
  2. By: Xie, Zhuan; Zhang, Xiaobo
    Abstract: Innovations are a key driver of long-term economic growth. There has been an explosion of patent filings in China in the past three decades. But empirical studies on the pattern of innovations at the firm level are rather scant primarily due to lack of firm-specific patent data. We have made concerted efforts to match Chinese patent data with a large firm-level database. The matched dataset enables us to examine the patterns of patents at the firm level.
    Keywords: Innovation, patents, intellectual property, Economic development, Gender, Women, microeconomics,
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1385&r=ipr
  3. By: Bhan, Aditya; Kabiraj, Tarun
    Abstract: We consider an interaction of competing firms in an integrated world market and study their R&D incentives under each of product patent and process patent regimes. We follow a framework generally observed in the drug industry. We show that product patent regime leads to a larger R&D investment. Consumers may also benefit from product patenting. However, if the number of goods is large enough, the choice of patent regime loses significance with respect to R&D incentives.
    Keywords: Innovation; process patenting; product patenting; drug industry
    JEL: F23 L13 O34
    Date: 2014–12–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:61030&r=ipr
  4. By: Paunov C. (UNU-MERIT)
    Abstract: This paper analyses how corruption affects firms ownership of intellectual property titles that relate to firms technological, organizational and further innovation efforts quality certificates and patents. Using firm-level data covering 48 developing and emerging countries, we show corruption reduced the likelihood of firms seeking quality certificates. Smaller firms were more affected by corruption and benefited less from higher levels of trust in their business environment. Corruption did not have impacts on the quality certificate ownership of exporters, foreign- and publicly-owned firms. Firms machinery investments were also negatively affected. By contrast, we do not find effects on firms ownership of patents.
    Keywords: Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights; Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development; Intellectual Property Rights;
    JEL: O34 O12 D23
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2014077&r=ipr
  5. By: Kaiser, Ulrich; Kongsted, Hans Christian; Rønde, Thomas
    Abstract: We investigate the effect of mobility of R&D workers on the total patenting activity of their employers. Our study documents how mobile workers affect the patenting activity of the firm they join and the firm they leave. The effect of labor mobility is strongest if workers join from patent-active firms. We also find evidence of a positive feedback effect on the former employer's patenting from workers who have left for another patent-active firm. Summing up the effects of joining and leaving workers, we show that labor mobility increases the total innovative activity of the new and the old employer. Our study which is based on the population of R&D active Danish firms observed between 1999 and 2004 thus provides firm-level support for the notion that labor mobility stimulates overall innovation of a country or region due to knowledge transfer.
    Keywords: labor mobility,innovation,research and development,patenting
    JEL: J62 C26
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14115&r=ipr
  6. By: Federico Frattini (Department of Economics and Management, University of Ferrara, Italy.); Francesco Nicolli (IRCReS-CNR, Italy; Department of Economics and Management, University of Ferrara, Italy.); Giorgio Prodi (Department of Economics and Management, University of Ferrara, Italy; CCWE - Tsinghua University, Beijing, China.)
    Abstract: The paper focuses on the role of technological capabilities in pushing regional catch-up in China. A leading force behind its fast economic growth has been the government action in reforming rules and institutions and supporting structural change in the long run. The local clustering process of technological capabilities represents an important piece in this strategy. The regional endowment of technological capabilities is approached by the geographical distribution of innovation activities among prefectures. The analysis aims to verify if there is convergence among the prefectural income levels and technological capabilities positively affect the intra-national catching-up process. Accordingly, this contribution presents a growth convergence estimation model that includes four indexes for innovation systems already adopted in literature. Indicators refer to the information about Chinese patent applications at EPO in the period 1996–2010 (OECD REGPAT and Citations databases, January 2014). In order to fit the research questions, patent data have been restricted, re-organized and originally regionalized by the authors running a semantic search of prefectures’ names in the “address” field associated to each Chinese inventor. Main results show that an absolute convergence process already started, although disparities decline slowly, and the accumulation of technological capabilities can foster this dynamic.
    Keywords: Buen Vivir, China, growth, patent, region, catch-up
    JEL: O30 O47 O53 R19
    Date: 2014–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:srt:wpaper:2914&r=ipr
  7. By: Antelo, Manel; Sampayo, Antonio
    Abstract: We analyze a two-period licensing game in which a non-producer upstream patent holder licenses an innovation to either one or two downstream licensees for a payment based on the licensee’s expected per-period profit. Licensees have private information about the innovation’s value, and their period-1 output may signal that value. We find that two licensees are more likely to be preferred under asymmetric information with signalling than under symmetric information.
    Keywords: Licensing, symmetric and asymmetric information, profit-based payments, monopoly, duopoly
    JEL: D45
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:60759&r=ipr
  8. By: Evers, Lisa; Spengel, Christoph
    Abstract: Tax planning with intangibles has become one of the most popular and most vividly debated topics in international taxation. We incorporate various intellectual property (IP) tax planning models into forward-looking measures of effective tax rates, namely the disposal of intangibles to low-tax subsidiaries, intra-group licensing arrangements, and intra-group contract R&D. In doing so, we draw upon the methodology put forward by Devereux and Griffith and amend this model by considering a research & development (R&D) investment which is carried out by a parent company, whereby the resulting intangible is exploited by a foreign subsidiary. We point out analytically under which conditions IP tax planning achieves the objective of reducing the effective average tax rate of the group. We find that the disposal of intangibles to low-tax subsidiaries does not achieve this tax planning objective, if the true value of the asset is subject to tax upon the disposal. We show to what extent the parent must understate the value of the intangible in order to reduce the group's tax burden. We furthermore point out that contract R&D may generally achieve a significant lower effective tax burden. We present cost of capital and effect average tax rates to illustrate these findings.
    Keywords: corporate taxation,effective tax rate,tax planning,profit shifting,transfer pricing,intellectual property,intangible assets,contract R&D
    JEL: F23 H25 H32 H87 K34
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14111&r=ipr
  9. By: Natalia A. Kochkina (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Olga V. Novikova (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Dmitriy B. Potapov (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: This paper investigates how different marketing variables (advertising, sales promotion and product assortment) affect brand equity. First, we assess weekly dynamics of brand equity intercepts using discrete choice model based on disaggregate store-level scanner data. Then we use these estimates as the dependent variable to study the impact of different marketing instruments. This paper contributes to the field basically in two ways: we measured brand equity of heterogeneous product taking into account its variety both on choice modeling stage and brand equity drivers estimation stage; we have got quite precise estimates because were able to exploit very detailed data about choices and marketing instruments. Our research reveals that share of voice of TV commercials affects brand equity positively and promotion intensity – negatively. Expanding product assortment, companies may enlarge brand equity by increasing the number of SKUs in large-format stores.
    Keywords: brand equity, scanner data, marketing-mix instruments, product assortment
    JEL: L81
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:26man2014&r=ipr

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