nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2014‒04‒11
nine papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Universita' del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Compatibility, Intellectual Property, Innovation and Efficiency in Durable Goods Markets with Network Effects By Athanasopoulos, Thanos
  2. An Introduction to the Patstat Database with Example Queries By Gaétan de Rassenfosse; Hélène Dernis; Geert Boedt
  3. Comparing Patent Litigation Across Europe: A First Look By Stuart Graham; Nicolas van Zeebroeck
  4. Catching up and falling behind in technological progress: the experience of the textile and chemical industries in Italy between 1904 and 1937 By Makiko Hino; Mototsugu Fukushige
  5. Welfare Effects of Endogenous Copyright Enforcement - the Case of Digital Goods By Markus Pasche
  6. Private or Public Law Enforcement? The Case of Digital Piracy Policies with Non-monitored Illegal Behaviors By Éric Darmon; Thomas Le Texier
  7. Does R&D increase the profit contribution of intangible assets? An exploration of European and American automotive supplierss By Stefan Lutz
  8. Open Source, Dual Licensing and Software Competition By Éric Darmon; Dominique TORRE
  9. Book Translations as Idea Flows: The Effects of the Collapse of Communism on the Diffusion of Knowledge By Ran Abramitzky; Isabelle Sin

  1. By: Athanasopoulos, Thanos (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)
    Abstract: This paper analyses firms’ behaviour towards compatibility and the relation of these decisions with their incentives to invest into improving their durable, network goods. By using a sequential game where the dominant firm plays first, we give its competitor the ability to build on innovations previously introduced by the market leader. Recognizing the intertemporal linkage in forward looking customers’purchasing choices, we find that in anticipation of a relatively large quality improvement by the rival, strategic pricing leads the dominant firm to support compatibility even if it could exclude its rivals by using a patent for its invention. Furthermore, not only doesn’t interoperability de-facto maximise social welfare but we also identify no market failure when network effects are not particularly strong. Key words: Firms ; Pricing ; Compatibility ; Innovation ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights ; Antitrust Law ; Competition ; Externalities ; Product Durability ; Welfare JEL classification: D43 ; L13 ; D71 ; D62 ; L15 ; L4 ; K21 ; L51 ; O34 ; O31
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1043&r=ipr
  2. By: Gaétan de Rassenfosse (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Hélène Dernis (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris); Geert Boedt (European Patent Office, Austria)
    Abstract: This paper provides an introduction to the Patstat patent database. It offers guided examples of ten popular queries that are relevant for research purposes and that cover the most important data tables. It is targeted at academic researchers and practitioners willing to learn the basics of the database.
    Keywords: Patent, Patstat
    JEL: O30
    Date: 2014–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2014n08&r=ipr
  3. By: Stuart Graham; Nicolas van Zeebroeck
    Abstract: Although patent litigation has become increasingly global, with litigants earning billion-dollar verdicts and seeking judgments in many different jurisdictions around the world, scholarship has been almost completely silent on how such litigation develops outside the United States. This void in understanding is particularly glaring in Europe, where U.S. and other litigants are increasingly drawn, and to which policy makers interested in harmonizing the U.S. patent system look in vain for answers. Courts, litigants, commentators and policy makers speculate about how litigation and judicial outcomes differ, but have no factual basis for comparing or understanding what really transpires. With a view to settling this uncertainty and allowing for the emergence of a more robust body of scholarship, this Article sets forth the results of an empirical study of a database including nearly 9,000 patent suits from seven of the largest and most judicially-active countries in the European Union during 2000 to 2010. In the process, it shows that the incidence of litigation and the bases of judicial outcomes diverge radically across the different countries and varying patented technologies in Europe. Accordingly, the Article for the first time provides an empirically grounded, factual basis for examining stubborn questions relevant to those needing clarity about the legal environment in Europe, and to comparatively study the United States’ system. The results unveiled in this Article are profound, bringing clarity to a legal environment that has been heretofore shrouded in shadow. The results shows that the frequency of patents reaching a judgment in litigation varies widely across European countries, in ways that belie the simple differences associated with the quantity of domestic stocks of enforceable patents. By demonstrating that disputes are much more frequent in some countries (e.g. the Netherlands and France) compared to others, the Article uncovers that practitioners’ estimates – the sole previous source – are incorrect. In showing how litigation varies widely across technologies, this Article provides critical insights on the likelihood of different kinds of patents reaching a judgment in diverse European courts. It also offers surprising evidence on how litigants’ raising patent validity and infringement claims differs from one European court to another, and that outcomes too are starkly different. The main policy implications of the Article are derived from the patterns reported concerning patent litigation across technologies and countries. The findings highlight both the fragmentation and variation within the European patent system, and the fundamentally different dynamics that will continue to shape patent enforcement across technology sectors and industries. The patterns also underline the variation in predictability, and differences in legal certainty, that innovators, patent holders, and their technology competitors experience in the fragmented European system. These cross-country differences highlight institutional variation among the jurisdictions, which in turn drives the costs and incentives to use the courts, helping to provide critical evidence as Europe implements a move to a continent-wide Unitary Patent and Unitary Patent Court in 2015. Moreover, the Article’s teaching is relevant to current U.S. policy debates about reforms intended to address perceived problems in patent litigation, since several of the changes proposed in Congress closely resemble rules already in place in the several European jurisdictions, about which this Article presents important trends and outcomes.
    JEL: O34 K41 L24 O52
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/159411&r=ipr
  4. By: Makiko Hino (Faculty of Commerce, Doshisha University); Mototsugu Fukushige (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)
    Abstract: We estimate the stocks of patents and their growth rates in the Italian textile and chemical industries between 1904 and 1937. The stocks and growth rates by nationality are estimated for Italy, France, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, and the USA. The Italian patent stock in the textile industry followed and attempted to catch up with the stock of the leading countries; by contrast, that in the chemical industry fell behind during that period. Although growth rates were similar, Italyfs growth rates fell into the lower group before and after World War I. Our results indicate that not all Italian industries succeeded in catching up with the leading countries.
    Keywords: technological progress, patent, textile, chemical, Italy
    JEL: N62 N63 O31
    Date: 2014–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:1414&r=ipr
  5. By: Markus Pasche (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)
    Abstract: In case of digital goods such like music, intellectual property rights are typically not exerted by the creators (artists) but by intermediaries. Their profits, and therefore also the income of the artists, are endangered by copyright infringements (piracy). It is well known from static welfare analysis that to some extent piracy reduces the deadweight loss by limiting monopoly power and could therefore increase welfare. This paper contributes to the discussion by including the costs of law enforcement into the welfare analysis. Most models in the literature assume that law is enforced by governmental activities. In contrast, this paper considers that law enforcement is exerted by agents (e.g. lawyer chancellories, provider of screening technologies) which are also seen as intermediaries. The enforcement effort is therefore endogenously determined. It is shown that this will lead to suboptimal welfare outcomes. A social planner has to regulate punishment and enforcement effort to a moderate level. A more rigorous fight against piracy could only be justified by negative dynamic welfare effects due to a loss of creativity. However, there is no empirical evidence for that.
    Keywords: digital goods, music, piracy, copyright, intermediation, law en- forcement, welfare
    JEL: D60 L12 K11 K42
    Date: 2014–03–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-008&r=ipr
  6. By: Éric Darmon (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France); Thomas Le Texier (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France)
    Abstract: In the case of digital piracy should rights be publicly or privately enforced? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of non-monitored illegal channels raise important issues for the design of digital anti-piracy policies. In this paper, we study the impact of these two enforcement settings (public vs. private) in the presence of an illegal non-monitored outside option for users. Taking account of market outcomes, we show that in both cases, the optimal strategies of the legal seller and the monitoring authority leads to rejection of the outside option out while accommodating to the presence of illegal monitored channels. Compared to private enforcement, public enforcement generates higher monitoring levels and lower price levels. Public enforcement also generates greater (legal) welfare. However, we identify potential con ict of interests between the legal seller and the social planner when the eciency of non monitored networks is low. We provide some insights into the role of supply side anti-piracy policies.
    Keywords: copyright infringement, law enforcement, digital piracy, illegal file-sharing, illegal behavior deterrence
    JEL: D23 D78 K42
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201403&r=ipr
  7. By: Stefan Lutz (Royal Docks Business School, University of East London)
    Abstract: Economic theory implies that research and development (R&D) efforts increase firm productivity and ultimately profits. In particular, R&D expenses lead to the development of intangible assets in the form of intellectual property (IP) and these assets command a return that increases overall profits of the firm. This hypothesis is investigated for the North American and European automotive supplier industries. Results indicate that R&D expenses in fact increase both intangible asset levels and their profit contributions. In particular, increases in the R&D expense to sales ratio lead to increases in the profit contribution of intangible assets relative to sales. This indicates that more R&D intensive IP should command higher royalty rates per sales when licensed to third parties and within multinational enterprises alike.
    Keywords: Productivity; Intellectual property; Royalties; MNE; Transfer pricing.
    JEL: D24 L20 L62 M21
    Date: 2014–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucm:doicae:1406&r=ipr
  8. By: Éric Darmon (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France); Dominique TORRE (GREDEG CNRS, Universite Nice Sophia-Antipolis, France)
    Abstract: To distribute software, commercial vendors of proprietary software have the opportunity to use some dual licensing (DL) strategy i.e. to provide their software under two different licensing terms (proprietary and open source). We investigate the relevance and impacts of this distribution strategy in the presence of an incumbent open source software competitor. We determine the conditions for this strategy to be protable for the commercial rm and its impact on price, market shares and welfare. We show that dual licensing may be used as a complement for proprietary software when development spillovers are large. We examine how, in this case, a dual licensing strategy can be used to exclude the open source software from the market and how this is compatible with higher price and lower market share for the proprietary distribution. This situation can also generate conflicts of interests between proprietary software and users resulting in sub-optimal outcomes. Finally, our analysis reveals the key role played by development spillovers and software compatibility for the DL decision.
    Keywords: dual licensing, hybrid business model, software distribution strategy, open source spillover
    JEL: D23 D42 L86
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201405&r=ipr
  9. By: Ran Abramitzky; Isabelle Sin
    Abstract: We use book translations as a new measure of international idea flows and study the effects of Communism’s collapse in Eastern Europe on these flows. Using novel data on 800,000 translations and difference-in-differences approaches, we show that while translations between Communist languages decreased by two thirds with the collapse, Western-to-Communist translations increased by a factor of four and quickly converged to Western levels. Convergence was more pronounced in the fields of applied and social sciences, and was more complete in Satellite and Baltic than in Soviet countries. We discuss how these patterns help us understand how repressive institutions and preferences towards Western European ideas shaped the international diffusion of knowledge.
    JEL: F02 F15 N0 N70 N74 P20 P30 P51 P52
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20023&r=ipr

This nep-ipr issue is ©2014 by Giovanni Ramello. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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