nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2013‒10‒18
ten papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Universita' Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Patents, Monopoly Power, and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals in Low-Income Nations By Scherer, F. M.
  2. Deferred Patent Examination By Rudyk, Ilja
  3. Intellectual Returnees as Drivers of Indigenous Innovation: Evidence from the Chinese Photovoltaic Industry By Siping Luo; Mary E. Lovely; David Popp
  4. A Cross-Country Characterisation of the Patenting Behaviour of Firms based on Matched Firm and Patent Data By Mariagrazia Squicciarini; Hélène Dernis
  5. The Geography of Patenting In India: Patterns and Determinants By Pradhan, Jaya Prakash
  6. Copyright and the Profitability of Authorship: Evidence from Payments to Writers in the Romantic Period By Megan MacGarvie; Petra Moser
  7. Piracy, Awareness and Welfare in a Required Aftermarket By Ben O. Smith
  8. Pharmaceutical Followers By Peter Arcidiacono; Paul B. Ellickson; Peter Landry; David B. Ridley
  9. How Product Standardization Affects Choice: Evidence from the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange By Keith M Marzilli Ericson; Amanda Starc
  10. Entry and Product Variety with Competing Supply Chains By Matteo Bassi; Marco Pagnozzi; Salvatore Piccolo

  1. By: Scherer, F. M. (Harvard University)
    Abstract: This paper reviews the theory and historical developments that made it possible for the world's least affluent citizens to obtain the benefits of modern pharmaceutical therapy at affordable prices. Considered in turn are the theory of differential prices, the reasons why differential pricing was not widely practiced by pharmaceutical companies selling patented medicines; how low prices eventually became available, with emphasis on AIDS anti-retrovirals; and the consequences of low prices in the least developed nations for the creation of new and more effective medicines.
    Date: 2013–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp13-029&r=ipr
  2. By: Rudyk, Ilja
    Abstract: Most patent systems allow applicants to defer patent examination by some time. Deferred examination was introduced in the 1960s, first at the Dutch patent office and subsequently in many other countries, as a response to mounting backlogs of unexamined patent applications. Some applicants allow the examination option to lapse and never request examination once they learn about the value of their invention. Examination loads are reduced substantially in these systems, albeit at the cost of having a large number of pending patent applications. Economic models of patent examination and renewal have largely ignored this important feature to date. We construct a model of patent application, examination and renewal in which applicants have control over the timing of examination and study the tradeoffs that applicants face. Using data from the Canadian patent office and a simulated GMM estimator, we obtain estimates for parameter values of the value distributions and of the learning process. We use our estimates to assess the value of Canadian patents as well as applications. We find that a considerable part of the value is realized before a patent is even granted. In addition, we simulate the counterfactual impact of changes in the deferment period. The estimates we obtain for the value of one additional year of deferment are relatively high and may explain why some applicants embark on delay tactics (such as continuations or divisionals) in patent systems without a statutory deferment option.
    Keywords: patent; patent value; value of patent applications; patent examination; deferred patent examination
    Date: 2013–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:416&r=ipr
  3. By: Siping Luo; Mary E. Lovely; David Popp
    Abstract: We offer new evidence on indigenous innovation and intellectual returnees by estimating the relationship between patenting by Chinese photovoltaic firms and the presence of corporate leaders with international experience. Our research approach combines data from three sources: the industrial census, international and domestic patent records, and leadership biographical information. Using nonlinear methods, we find robust evidence that returnees positively influence patenting activity and also promote neighboring firm innovation. We find no tendency for export intensive firms to patent more. Controlling for R&D expenditures, we find that firms with returnees in leadership roles have more patents.
    JEL: O30 O31 O32 Q42 Q55
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19518&r=ipr
  4. By: Mariagrazia Squicciarini; Hélène Dernis
    Abstract: This work proposes a characterisation of the patenting behaviours of firms. It relies on patent data linked to firm data from a commercial dataset, regards firms of 20 or more employees located in 15 countries, and refers to the period 1999-2010. The way in which patent assignees’ names are linked to firm names is explained, and the coverage and representativeness of the firm database used is discussed using information from structural business statistics. The profile of patenting and non-patenting firms is delineated on the basis of characteristics such as firm size, ownership, firm age and industry, and of combinations thereof. Statistics related to the sector-specific patterns of patent renewals are also shown.
    Date: 2013–09–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaaa:2013/5-en&r=ipr
  5. By: Pradhan, Jaya Prakash
    Abstract: This study examines the regional profiles of patenting activities in India. The number of most dynamic sub-national spaces in patent applications is found to be limited to just two to three regions or countries. Regionally, West India, North India and South India mostly dominated the patenting activities during 1990‒2010. The patent performance is highly concentrated among individual countries: the two leading states, namely Maharashtra and Delhi accounted for more than half of total patent applications filed in India in the study period. Empirical analysis further emphasized that states patenting activities are shaped by the size of local markets, availability of skilled labour force, knowledge institutions and urban centres.
    Keywords: Patent, Region, India
    JEL: N75 O30 P25
    Date: 2013–10–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:50595&r=ipr
  6. By: Megan MacGarvie; Petra Moser
    Abstract: Proponents of stronger copyright terms have argued that stronger copyright terms encourage creativity by increasing the profitability of authorship. Empirical evidence, however, is scarce, because data on the profitability of authorship is typically not available to the public. Moreover at current copyright lengths of 70 years after the author’s death, further extensions may not have any effects on the profitability of authorship. To investigate effects of copyright at lower pre-existing levels of protection, this chapter introduces a new data set of publishers’ payments to authors of British fiction between 1800 and 1830. These data indicate that payments to authors nearly doubled following an increase in the length of copyright in 1814. These findings suggest that – starting from low pre-existing levels of protection – policies that strengthen copyright terms may, in fact, increase the profitability of authorship.
    JEL: K11 N83 O31 O34
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19521&r=ipr
  7. By: Ben O. Smith
    Abstract: Many industries have two sales stages: the primary market and the aftermarket. Existing research shows consumers are routinely unaware of aftermarkets (Cruickshank, 2000; Hall, 2003); and due to legal or structural restrictions, firms commonly have monopoly power (Borenstein et al., 2000; Adelmann, 2010). However, the primary market could be a great deal more competitive. Examples of this sales process include products with service agreements, software with in-app purchases, and durable goods with required replacement parts. But in many of these aftermarkets, the consumer has the option to obtain the aftermarket product through non-traditional means (e.g. âpiracyâ). We model such an environment by combining the two most common travel cost models: A Salop circle (Salop, 1979) for the primary market and a Hotelling linear city (Hotelling, 1929) for the aftermarket. We find that firms with more competition in the primary market will spend more on âenforcementâ (disincentivising non-traditional acquisitions) and reduce prices in the primary market so they may exhibit more market power in the aftermarket. This is in direct contradiction with the common belief that anti-piracy efforts are the domain of âbig businessâ (Tan, 2002; Kwong et al., 2003; Lysonski and Durvasula, 2008). Further, we find that it is social welfare enhancing for âenforcementâ spending to be as effective as possible.
    JEL: D21 L11 L12
    Date: 2013–10–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jmp:jm2013:psm164&r=ipr
  8. By: Peter Arcidiacono; Paul B. Ellickson; Peter Landry; David B. Ridley
    Abstract: We estimate a model of drug demand and supply that incorporates insurance, advertising, and competition between branded and generic drugs within and across therapeutic classes. We use data on antiulcer drugs from 1991 to 2010. Our simulations show generics and ``me-too'' drugs each increased consumer welfare more than $100 million in 2010, holding insurance premiums constant. However, insurance payments in 2010 fell by nearly $1 billion due to generics and rose by over $7 billion due to me-too antiulcer drugs.
    JEL: I11 L13 L65
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19522&r=ipr
  9. By: Keith M Marzilli Ericson; Amanda Starc
    Abstract: Standardization of complex products is touted as improving consumer decisions and intensifying price competition, but evidence on standardization is limited. We examine a natural experiment: the standardization of health insurance plans on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange. Pre-standardization, firms had wide latitude to design plans. A regulatory change then required firms to standardize the cost-sharing parameters of plans and offer seven defined options; plans remained differentiated on network, brand, and price. Standardization led consumers on the HIX to choose more generous health insurance plans and led to substantial shifts in brands' market shares. We decompose the sources of this shift into three effects: price, product availability, and valuation. A discrete choice model shows that standardization changed the weights consumers attach to plan attributes (a valuation effect), increasing the salience of tier. The availability effect explains the bulk of the brand shifts. Standardization increased consumer welfare in our models, but firms captured some of the surplus by reoptimizing premiums. We use hypothetical choice experiments to replicate the effect of standardization and conduct alternative counterfactuals.
    JEL: D14 D80 H31 I11 L15
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19527&r=ipr
  10. By: Matteo Bassi (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Marco Pagnozzi (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Salvatore Piccolo (Università Cattolica delSacro Cuore di Milano and CSEF)
    Abstract: We study a supply chain model where competing manufacturers located around a circle contract with privately informed and exclusive retailers. The number of brands in the market (determined by the manufacturers’ zero profit condition) depends on the level of asymmetric information within supply chains and on the types of contracts between manufacturers and retailers. With two-part tariffs, wholesale prices fully reflect retailers’ costs. With linear contracts, wholesale prices are constant and independent of retailers’ costs. The number of brands is lower (resp. higher) with asymmetric information than with complete information when contracts are linear (resp. with two-part tariffs). Moreover, the number of brands is always higher with linear contracts than with two-part tari¤s. We also analyze the effects of endogenous entry on welfare.
    Keywords: Product Variety, Entry, Competing Supply Chains, Vertical Contracting, Asymmetric Information
    JEL: D43 D82 L13 L51
    Date: 2013–10–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:343&r=ipr

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