nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2013‒08‒23
four papers chosen by
Giovanni Ramello
Universita' Amedeo Avogadro

  1. A look at both sides of the coin: Investigating the protective and the disclosure effect of patenting By Heger, Diana; Zaby, Alexandra K.
  2. A Macroeconomic Model of Imperfect Competition with Patent Licensing By Hui-ting Hsieh; Ching-chong Lai
  3. Profit shifting and 'aggressive' tax planning by multinational firms: Issues and options for reform By Fuest, Clemens; Spengel, Christoph; Finke, Katharina; Heckemeyer, Jost; Nusser, Hannah
  4. File-Sharing and Film Revenues: An Empirical Analysis By McKenzie, Jordi; Walls, W. D.

  1. By: Heger, Diana; Zaby, Alexandra K.
    Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of the two basic effects of patenting: the positive effect of temporarily mitigating competition, and the negative effect of mandatory disclosure of a patent application. Providing empirical evidence for the presented theoretical results we find that (i) a technological lead and the propensity to patent are negatively related as opposed to common intuition, (ii) in industries with imperfect appropriability in case of secrecy the extent of the technological lead is positively associated with the propensity to patent, and that (iii) the intensity of patent protection mitigates the competitive threat a patentee faces. --
    Keywords: patenting decision,disclosure requirement,patent scope,vertical product differentiation,IPC codes
    JEL: L13 O14 O33 O34
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13048&r=ipr
  2. By: Hui-ting Hsieh (Department of Economics, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan); Ching-chong Lai (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan; Department of Economics, National Cheng Chi University, Taiwan; Institute of Economics, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan)
    Abstract: This paper sets up an imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model that features the strategic interaction between the patent-holding firm and licensees, and uses it to analyze the relevant macro variables under various licensing arrangements. Some main findings emerge from the analysis. First, the equilibrium aggregate output and aggregate consumption under fixed-fee and royalty licensing regimes are always greater than those under the no licensing regime. Moreover, the equilibrium aggregate output and consumption under the fixed-fee licensing regime are always greater than those under the royalty licensing regime. Second, with the higher (lower) technology level the patent-holder prefers the fixed-fee (royalty) contract. Third, welfare could be improved through technology transfer, and the level of welfare under the fixed-fee licensing regime is higher than that under the royalty licensing regime.
    Keywords: Imperfect competition, Macroeconomic model, Fixed-fee licensing, Royalty licensing
    JEL: D45 E10 L16
    Date: 2013–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sin:wpaper:13-a007&r=ipr
  3. By: Fuest, Clemens; Spengel, Christoph; Finke, Katharina; Heckemeyer, Jost; Nusser, Hannah
    Abstract: This paper discusses the issue of profit shifting and 'aggressive' tax planning by multinational firms. The paper makes two contributions. Firstly, we provide some background information to the debate by giving a brief overview over existing empirical studies on profit shifting and by describing arrangements for IP-based profit shifting which are used by the companies currently accused of avoiding taxes. We then show that preventing this type of tax avoidance is, in principle, straightforward. Secondly, we argue that, in the short term, policy makers should focus on extending withholding taxes in an internationally coordinated way. Other measures which are currently being discussed, in particular unilateral measures like limitations on interest and license deduction, fundamental reforms of the international tax system and country-by-country reporting, are either economically harmful or need to be elaborated much further before their introduction can be considered. --
    Keywords: tax avoidance,profit shifting,multinational firms,intellectual property,tax policy,tax reform
    JEL: H20 H25 F23 K34
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13044&r=ipr
  4. By: McKenzie, Jordi; Walls, W. D.
    Abstract: This study examines the impact of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing on the Australian theatrical film industry. Using a large data set of torrent downloads observed on three popular P2P networks, we find evidence of a sales displacement effect on box office revenues. However, although statistically significant, the economic significance of this displacement appears relatively small. To establish causality, we make use of two precedent-setting Australian Federal Court case rulings, as well as observed levels of contemporaneous downloading in geographically separated markets within Australia. We observe that the release gap between the US and Australian markets is a key contributor to piracy early in a film's theatrical life; this finding provides a partial explanation for the industry's move toward coordinated worldwide rele ases.
    Date: 2013–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9271&r=ipr

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