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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Travis J. Lybbert (Department Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of California, Davis); Nikolas J. Zolas (Center for Economic Studies, United States Census Bureau) |
| Abstract: | International technological diffusion is a key determinant of cross-country differences in economic performance. While patents can be a useful proxy for innovation and technological change and diffusion, fully exploiting patent data for such economic analyses requires patents to be tied to measures of economic activity. In this paper, we describe and explore a new algorithmic approach to constructing concordances between the International Patent Classification (IPC) system that organizes patents by technical features and industry classification systems that organize economic data, such as the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) and the Harmonized System (HS). This ‘Algorithmic Links with Probabilities’ (ALP) approach incorporates text analysis software and keyword extraction programs and applies them to a comprehensive patent dataset. We compare the results of several ALP concordances to existing technology concordances. Based on these comparisons, we select a preferred ALP approach and discuss advantages of this approach relative to conventional approaches. We conclude with a discussion on some of the possible applications of the concordance and provide a sample analysis that uses our preferred ALP concordance to analyze international patent flows based on trade patterns. |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wip:wpaper:5&r=ipr |
| By: | Aaditya Mattoo (World Bank); Arvind Subramanian (Peterson Institute for International Economics) |
| Abstract: | Generating technological progress requires deploying the full range of policy instruments, including those related to trade policy. The authors consider four areas: subsidization of green goods and technologies; border-tax adjustments (BTAs) related to carbon content; restrictions on the export of fossil fuels, especially natural gas; and intellectual property protection of new technologies and products related to climate change. They propose changes to trade rules that would promote climate change goals. The proposed changes have an underlying political economy logic and consistency. Changes would allow global environmental "bads" to be penalized (by permitting border taxes on less clean imports), global environmental goods and technologies to be promoted (by relaxing the constraints on the use of production and export subsidies and strengthening IPR protection), and prevent global environmental "goods" being penalized (by eliminating the export restrictions on natural gas). |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb13-10&r=ipr |
| By: | Joëlle Noailly (CIES, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland and CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands); Roger Smeets (Rutgers Business School, Newark, USA) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the determinants of directed technical change in the electricity generation sector. We use firm-level data on patents led in renewable (REN) and fossil fuel (FF) technologies by about 7,000 European firms over the period 1978-2006. We separately study specialized firms that innovate in only one type of technology during the sample period, and mixed firms that innovate in both technologies. We find that for specialized firms the main drivers of innovation are fossil-fuel prices, market size, and firms' past knowledge stocks. Also, prices and market size drive the entry of new REN firms into innovation. By contrast, we find that innovation by mixed firms is mainly driven by strong path-dependencies since for these firms past knowledge stock is the major driver of the direction of innovation. These results imply that generic environmental policies that affect prices and energy demand are mainly effective in directing innovation by small specialized firms. In order to direct innovation e orts of large mixed corporations with a long history of FF innovation, targeted R&D policies are likely to be more effective. |
| Keywords: | Directed Technical Change, Energy, Patents, Firms' Dynamics |
| JEL: | Q4 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2013.34&r=ipr |
| By: | Leppälä, Samuli (Cardiff Business School) |
| Abstract: | Arrow's information paradox asserts that demand for undisclosed information is undefined. Reassessing the paradox, I argue that the value of information for the buyer depends on its relevance, which can be known ex ante, and the uncertainty shifts to the capability of the seller to acquire the knowledge and her reliability in disclosing it. These three together form the buyer’s reservation price. Consequently, differences in capability and reliability between the sellers may revoke the appropriation problem of nonproprietary information, where the original source loses her monopoly after the first purchase. |
| Keywords: | Arrow’s information paradox; markets for information; knowledge; reliability; appropriability |
| JEL: | D83 L15 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2013/2&r=ipr |
| By: | Borrás, Susana (Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark CIRCLE, Lund University, Sweden); Edquist, Charles (CIRCLE, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this article is to discuss the different types of instruments of innovation policy, to examine how governments and public agencies in different countries and different times have used these instruments differently, to explore the political nature of instrument choice and design (and associated issues), and to elaborate a set of criteria for the selection and design of the instruments in relation to the formulation of innovation policy. The article argues that innovation policy instruments must be designed and combined into mixes in ways that address the problems of the innovation system. These mixes are often called “policy mix”. The problem-oriented nature of the design of instrument mixes is what makes innovation policy instruments ‘systemic’ |
| Keywords: | Policy mix; innovation system; innovation policy instruments; governance; regulation; public policy |
| JEL: | O30 O31 O32 O33 O38 |
| Date: | 2013–02–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lucirc:2013_004&r=ipr |
| By: | Markus Simeth (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), College of Management, Switzerland); Julio Raffo (World Intellectual Property Organization, Economics and Statistics Division, Geneva, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | Whereas recent scholarly research has provided many insights about universities engaging in commercial activities, there is still little empirical evidence regarding the opposite phenomenon of companies disseminating scientific knowledge. Our paper aims to fill this gap and explores the motivations of firms that disclose research outcomes in a scientific format. Besides considering an internal firm dimension, we focus particularly on knowledge sourcing from academic institutions and the appropriability regime using a cost-benefit framework. We conduct an econometric analysis with firm-level data from the fourth edition of the French Community Innovation Survey (CIS4) and matched scientific publications for a sample of 2,512 R&D performing firms from all manufacturing sectors. The analysis provides evidence that the access to important scientific knowledge imposes the adoption of academic disclosure principles, whereas the mere existence of collaborative links with academic institutions is not a strong predictor. Furthermore, the results suggest that overall industry conditions are influential in shaping the cost-benefit rationale of firms with respect to scientific disclosure. |
| Keywords: | R&D, Industrial Science, Knowledge Disclosure, University-Industry collaboration |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wip:wpaper:6&r=ipr |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Ufuk Akcigit; Nicholas Bloom; William R. Kerr |
| Abstract: | We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A key feature is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using detailed US Census micro data on firm-level output, R&D and patenting. The model provides a good fit to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output and R&D, and its implied elasticities are in the ballpark of a range of micro estimates. We find industrial policy subsidizing either the R&D or the continued operation of incumbents reduces growth and welfare. For example, a subsidy to incumbent R&D equivalent to 5% of GDP reduces welfare by about 1.5% because it deters entry of new high-type firms. On the contrary, substantial improvements (of the order of 5% improvement in welfare) are possible if the continued operation of incumbents is taxed while at the same time R&D by incumbents and new entrants is subsidized. This is because of a strong selection effect: R&D resources (skilled labor) are inefficiently used by low-type incumbent firms. Subsidies to incumbents encourage the survival and expansion of these firms at the expense of potential high-type entrants. We show that optimal policy encourages the exit of low-type firms and supports R&D by high-type incumbents and entry. |
| JEL: | E02 L1 O31 O32 O33 |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18993&r=ipr |