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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Ghafele, Roya; Gibert, Benjamin |
| Abstract: | This paper outlines and evaluates several intellectual property monetization strategies available to patent holders in developing countries that help generate domestic innovation and knowledge-driven growth by promoting more active technology markets. Based on a review of World Intellectual Property Report indicators, the patent ownership gap between a sample of developed and developing countries has narrowed gradually for more technologically-sophisticated developing countries. However, based on complementary International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments data, the patent commercialization divide (as indicated by licensing income) has been widening. The paper argues that patents, and all forms of intellectual property, are an enabling mechanism rather than a defensive right: an intangible asset class that can be proactively nurtured and managed for greater value extraction to stimulate knowledge-based entrepreneurship and growth in developing countries. The paper presents multiple case studies of alternative monetization strategies to address the commercialization divide. These strategies range from private, market-driven options to those requiring a greater amount of public policy support: from patent securitization and patent exchanges (focusing on the United States-initiated Intellectual Property Exchange International and the Shanghai Silicon Intellectual Property Exchange), to the strengthening of technology transfer and commercialization infrastructure (focusing on the experience of the Association of University Technology Managers and Taiwan, China's Intellectual Property Rights Institute), to patent litigation support (including South Korea's support of patent infringement lawsuit costs for small and medium enterprises). The paper also highlights areas where further policy research would be helpful. |
| Keywords: | E-Business,Technology Industry,ICT Policy and Strategies,Debt Markets,Real&Intellectual Property Law |
| Date: | 2012–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6143&r=ipr |
| By: | Pilar Beneito (University of Valencia and ERICES); María E. Rochina-Barrachina (University of Valencia and ERICES); Amparo Sanchis (University of Valencia and ERICES) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze how industrial property rights (IPRs), measured by patents granted, affect competition at the industry level, and their induced effects on firms’ innovation incentives. We use for that purpose a panel dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1990-2006. Using indicators of fundamentals of competitive pressure and factor analysis techniques, we construct a new synthetic measure of competition. Our results indicate that although the use of IPRs (in terms of industry patenting intensity) reduces market competition, it may also encourage firms’ innovation incentives (in terms of firms’ R&D expenditures and the number of product innovations). |
| Keywords: | IPRs, patents, competition, innovation |
| JEL: | D22 L10 L60 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eec:wpaper:1211&r=ipr |
| By: | Schuett, F. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: I present a model in which firms differing in R&D productivity choose between ambitious research projects, which are socially desirable, and unambitious ones, which are socially undesirable. The patent office must decide how rigorously to examine applications, which affects the probability of weeding out bad applications but also how firms self-select into more or less ambitious projects. Both the ex post and ex ante welfare effects need to be taken into account in determining the optimal examination intensity. The model allows me to assess the impact of various policy changes on examination and welfare, including the creation of specialized patent courts, post-grant opposition, and the delegation of fee-setting authority to the patent office. It generates a number of predictions that are consistent with empirical evidence on the patent system. |
| Keywords: | innovation;patent office;optimal patent policy. |
| JEL: | O31 O38 D73 D82 L50 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012026&r=ipr |
| By: | Michael Fritsch; Luis F. Medrano E. |
| Abstract: | We analyze the spatial diffusion of laser-technology in Germany during the early phase of development, between 1960 and 2005. Research in this new technological field began in a few larger centers and then spread to other regions. In the early years, a large firm of the electronics industry located in Munich played a dominating role. The intraregional diffusion of the knowledge in laser technology was particularly high in those regions which have started laser research rather early. There is also no significant effect of regional knowledge in the field of laser technology on the number of regional laser-producers, what may be due to the rather early development stage of the system where not many producers entered the market. Mobility of persons as well as co-publications and co-patents between institutions played only a minor role in the period under investigation. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa10p1099&r=ipr |
| By: | Mueller-Langer, Frank; Watt, Richard |
| Abstract: | We analyse optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two-sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the relationship between readers and authors in a journal. In contrast to previous literature, we firstly show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of high-quality journals. Second, we find that removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) decreases journal profits but has ambiguous social welfare effects. |
| Keywords: | Open access; academic journals; two-sided market; ambiguous welfare effects of removal of copyright |
| JEL: | L82 L11 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–04–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40191&r=ipr |