nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2012‒07‒23
seven papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Determinants of Essential Intellectual Property Rights for Wireless Communications Standards: Manufacturing firms vs. non-manufacturing patentees By Byeongwoo KANG; MOTOHASHI Kazuyuki
  2. Managing licensing in a market for technology By Arora, Ashish; Fosfuri, Andrea; Rønde, Thomas
  3. Valuation of innovation: The case of iPhone By Korkeamäki, Timo; Takalo, Tuomas
  4. Cooperative Markets for Ideas: When does Technology Licensing Combine with R&D Partnerships? By Giulia Trombini; Anna Comacchio
  5. Assessing Technology-based Spin-offs from University Support Units By Mircea Epure; Diego Prior; Christian Serarols
  6. The Generation of Common Purpose in Innovation Partnerships : a Design Perspective By Thomas Gillier; Akin Kazakçi; Gérald Piat
  7. The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability By Schmitz, Patrick W

  1. By: Byeongwoo KANG; MOTOHASHI Kazuyuki
    Abstract: Obtaining essential intellectual property rights (IPRs) is important for innovation competition in the network industry, where technical standardization plays a critical role in development. In this study, we empirically investigate the determinants of essential IPRs for wireless communications standards by using the patent database. More specifically, we use the technological capabilities of both the firm and the patent inventor to explain the probability of its selection as an essential IPR. In addition, we compare manufacturing firms' and non-manufacturing patentees' (NMPs) technology strategies for essential IPRs. Our results indicate that manufacturing firms accumulate their technological capability in specific technology fields, whereas NMPs cover broader technology fields to keep their dominant position in the standardization process.
    Date: 2012–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:12042&r=ipr
  2. By: Arora, Ashish; Fosfuri, Andrea; Rønde, Thomas
    Abstract: Over the last decade, companies have paid greater attention to the management of their intellectual assets. We build a model that helps understand how licensing activity should be organized within large corporations. More specifically, we compare decentralization—where the business unit using the technology makes licensing decisions—to centralized licensing. The business unit has superior information about licensing opportunities but may not have the appropriate incentives because its rewards depend upon product market performance. If licensing is decentralized, the business unit forgoes valuable licensing opportunities since the rewards for licensing are (optimally) weaker than those for product market profits. This distortion is stronger when production-based incentives are more powerful, making centralization more attractive. Growth of technology markets favors centralization and drives higher licensing rates. Our model conforms to the existing evidence that reports heterogeneity across firms in both licensing propensity and organization of licensing.
    Keywords: Licensing; Markets for technology; Organization design
    JEL: L22 L24
    Date: 2012–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9048&r=ipr
  3. By: Korkeamäki, Timo (Hanken School of Economics and Bank of Finland); Takalo, Tuomas (Bank of Finland Research)
    Abstract: We study the value of innovation in a case study of one of the most visible innovative products in recent years, Apple’s iPhone. The value effects of news announcements, patent publications, and trademarks relating to iPhone are taken into account. Our estimate of the lower bound on the value of iPhone is fairly high, 30 billion U.S. (event-day) dollars or 10% to 13% of the firm’s market cap (at the end of 2009). We find that patentable technology explains about 25% of the total value, which derives from market reactions to publication of patent applications rather than grants. We also observe a weak negative reaction among Apple’s rivals to news about iPhone. Apple appears to capture most of the value within the iPhone supply chain.
    Keywords: innovation management; intellectual property rights; valuation; event studies
    JEL: G14 O32 O34
    Date: 2012–07–17
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofrdp:2012_024&r=ipr
  4. By: Giulia Trombini (Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia); Anna Comacchio (Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia)
    Abstract: The study departs from the traditional view of licensing as a spot market transaction and investigates license integration with R&D partnerships, introducing the concept of licensing combination. Drawing on licensing and R&D partnership literature and adopting the Òtransactional valueÓ approach, we propose two types of antecedents Ð knowledge and dyad features Ð to investigate licensing combination. Using a dataset combining 441 original license agreements with firmsÕ patenting and market activity in the global biopharmaceutical industry, we find a substantial heterogeneity in the ways licensors and licensees jointly exploit markets for knowledge and the specific role of R&D collaboration and minority equity in inter-organizational exchange through licensing. Results show that licensing combination with R&D collaboration is likely when the licensed innovation is embryonic, the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensorÕs technology and partners have different technological backgrounds. Instead, licensing of highly specific knowledge is likely to be supported by minority equity participation on the part of the licensee. Finally, licensing is combined with both forms of partnership in case of competence distance between partners. In the light of the empirical results, four types of licensing combination are proposed for future research.
    Keywords: Markets for technology, Licensing combination, R&D collaboration, Minority equity participation, Knowledge transfer, Joint value
    JEL: O32
    Date: 2012–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpdman:21&r=ipr
  5. By: Mircea Epure; Diego Prior; Christian Serarols
    Abstract: Literature highlights the importance of university spin-offs and their assistance mechanisms. However, there is little evidence on how to select and operationalize the appropriate variables for assessing this type of firms. This paper provides tools to estimate and interpret the efficiency of spinoffs embedded in university-based support mechanisms. We thus contribute to the literature in at least two ways. First, we identify the specific inputs and outputs that are required by both the organizational and regional development perspectives. Second, an application considers a unique sample of spin-offs created at Catalan universities within a regional support program. Main descriptive results indicate that many efficient spin-offs have formal technology transfer agreements and emerge from universities with more technological background. Second stage analyses show that higher levels of innovation and specific academic knowledge or experience related with the university of origin are associated with higher efficiency.
    Keywords: university spin-off, regional development, efficiency, entrepreneurship, technology transfer, innovation
    JEL: M1 R1
    Date: 2012–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:650&r=ipr
  6. By: Thomas Gillier (MTS - Management Technologique et Strategique - Grenoble École de Management (GEM)); Akin Kazakçi (CGS - Centre de Gestion Scientifique - Mines ParisTech); Gérald Piat (EDF R&D - EDF)
    Abstract: Purpose - Scholars and practitioners have both emphasized the importance of collaboration in innovation context. They have also largely acknowledged that the definition of common purpose is a major driver of successful collaboration, but surprisingly, researchers have put little effort into investigating the process whereby the partners define the common purpose. This research aims to explore the Generation of Common Purpose (GCP) in innovation partnerships. Design/methodology/approach - An action-research approach combined with modeling has been followed. Our research is based on an in-depth qualitative case study of a cross-industry exploratory partnership through which four partners, from very different arenas, aim to collectively define innovation projects based on micro-nanotechnologies. Based on a design reasoning framework, the mechanisms of GCP mechanism are depicted. Findings - Regarding GCP, two main interdependent facets are identified: (1) the determination of existing intersections between the parties' concept and knowledge spaces ('Matching'); (2) an introspective learning process that allows the parties to transforms those spaces ('Building'). Practical implications - The better understanding of the GCP and the specific notion of "C-K profiles", which is an original way to characterize each partner involved in a partnership, should improve the capabilities of organizations to efficiently define collaborative innovation projects. Originality/value - This article explores one of the cornerstones of successful collaboration in innovation: the process whereby several parties define the common purpose of their partnership.
    Keywords: Innovation ; Partnership ; Design ; Generation of common purpose ; Innovation partnerships ; Shared objectives ; C-K design theory ; Cross-industry exploratory partnership
    Date: 2012–07–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:gemptp:halshs-00718287&r=ipr
  7. By: Schmitz, Patrick W
    Abstract: An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is negotiated and unobservable effort must be exerted to develop a product. In the absence of liability constraints, the inventor's investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet, given limited liability, overinvestments may occur and the inventor's investment incentives may be decreasing in his bargaining power.
    Keywords: hold-up problem; incomplete contracts; limited liability; research and development
    JEL: D86 L23 O31
    Date: 2012–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9050&r=ipr

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