nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2012‒06‒25
thirteen papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Secrecy Versus Patents: Process Innovations and the Role of Uncertainty By Tapan Biswas; Jolian McHardy
  2. Joint innovation in ICT standards: How consortia drive the volume of patent filings By Justus Baron; Yann Ménière; Tim Pohlmann
  3. Exploring technology in the biofuels sector through patent data: the BioPat database By Valeria Costantini; Francesco Crespi; Ylenia Curci
  4. Patent licensing with Bertrand competitors By Stefano Colombo; Luigi Filippini
  5. Commercializing inventions from public research: Does speed matter? By Alexander Schacht
  6. Friends and Rivals: Modelling the Social Relations of Inventors By Lorenzo Cassi; Lorenzo Zirulia
  7. Regional trajectories of innovation in Green Chemistry: Evidence from the Aquitaine region (In French) By Vanessa OLTRA; Maïder SAINT-JEAN
  8. Management of Knowledge Workers By Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
  9. Research collaboration in co-­inventor networks: combining closure,bridging and proximities By Cassi, Lorenzo; Plunket, Anne
  10. A New Index Measure of Technological Capabilities for Developing Countries By Nabaz T. Khayyat; Jeong-Dong Lee
  11. Tell Me Who You Patent With and I'll Tell You Who You Are: Evidence from Inter-Regional Patenting Networks in Three Emerging Technological Fields By Giulia Ajmone Marsan; Annalisa Primi
  12. Product innovation in a vertically differentiated model By L. Filippini; C. Vergari
  13. Openness and Technology Diffusion in Payment Systems: The Case of NAFTA By Francisco Callado; Jana Hromcova; Natalia Utrero

  1. By: Tapan Biswas; Jolian McHardy
    Abstract: Whilst firms often prefer secrecy to patents and process innovations particularly lend themselves to secrecy, we establish a rationale for process innovators who patent. Using a simple two-period model, we show that under myopic optimisation, the incentive to patent rather than pursue secrecy increases as the probability that the rival firm attaches to it being low-cost falls and as the proportion of the cost reduction due to the innovation, secured by the rival firm in the period after the patent has expired, falls. However, the gain to the innovating firm from patenting rather than secrecy strictly increases if the cost reduction due to the innovation is sufficiently small that the high-cost firm could profitably bluff that it is low-cost. Finally, allowing the low-cost firm the option of using an output signal in such cases, may make the patent strategy more or less attractive relative to the case of myopic optimisation.
    Keywords: Cournot Duopoly; Patenting; Secrecy; Uncertainty
    JEL: D23 D43 O12 O34
    Date: 2012–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rim:rimwps:18_12&r=ipr
  2. By: Justus Baron (CERNA - Centre d'économie industrielle - Mines ParisTech); Yann Ménière (CERNA - Centre d'économie industrielle - Mines ParisTech); Tim Pohlmann (BERLIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY - Berlin Institute of Technology)
    Abstract: The development of formal ICT standards is a loose form of collaborative innovation: firms first develop rival technologies, some of which are then eventually selected in the standard. Against this background, firms often use informal consortia to define a clearer technology roadmap ahead of the formal standard setting process. The paper aims to assess how such consortia influence the volume of patents filed around standards, and whether this is efficient. We show that their effect actually depends on the strength of firms' incentives to develop the standard. Consortium membership triggers a higher number of patent files when insufficient rewards for essential patents induce underinvestment in the standard. This effect is necessarily pro-efficient. In situations where excessive rewards induce patent races, consortium membership only moderately increases or even reduces their volume of patents. At least in the latter case, the effect of consortia membership is also pro-efficient.
    Date: 2012–06–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00707291&r=ipr
  3. By: Valeria Costantini; Francesco Crespi; Ylenia Curci
    Abstract: This paper describes the methodology, characteristics and potential use of BioPat, a dataset containing patents in the field of biofuels. The innovative methodology we use aims to solve drawbacks related to how patent data are allocated and organized in international databases. In order to create a database which includes patents strictly related to the investigated field, we propose an original method based on keywords, rather than on International Patent Classification (IPC) codes. Starting with a systematic mapping of biofuel production processes, we built a simplified but comprehensive description of the technological domain related to the production of biofuels by applying so-called process analysis. The keyword selection relies on an iterative approach, based on an analysis of recent scientific literature. The database was finalized with a series of interviews with experts in the biofuels sector, and compared with IPC-based biofuel codes, revealing improved accuracy when selecting data using our methodology.
    Keywords: Biofuels, Patents, Keywords selection method, Innovation patterns
    JEL: O31 O34 Q42 Q55
    Date: 2012–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0154&r=ipr
  4. By: Stefano Colombo (DISCE, Università Cattolica); Luigi Filippini (DISCE, Università Cattolica)
    Abstract: We study optimal licensing contracts in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly, and show that per-unit contracts are preferred to ad valorem contracts by the patentee, while welfare is higher under the ad valorem contract. The difference between Cournot and Bertrand case is explained in terms of quantity effect and profits effect.
    Keywords: Two-part contracts; patent licensing, ad valorem royalties; Bertrand
    JEL: D45
    Date: 2012–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie6:itemq1262&r=ipr
  5. By: Alexander Schacht (Graduate College "The Economics of Innovative Change", Friedrich Schiller University, Germany)
    Abstract: This study addresses the determinants of time-to-licensing, defined as the elapsed time between the disclosure of an invention and the signed licensing contract, and its impact on the commercial success of the licensed inventions from public research. Using a dataset containing detailed information on the licensing activities of the Max Planck Society, I do not find significant evidence that time-to-licensing negatively influences the commercial success of the inventions disclosed between 1980 and 2004. However, separating the effect of the time-to-licensing for the inventions disclosed between 1990 and 2004, I do find a significant negative influence on the likelihood and extent of the commercial success. Thus, the pace of technology transfer has become important because of the rapidly changing business environment and technological obsolescence. Furthermore, inventions from the biomedical section, collaborative inventions with private-sector firms, and inventions that are co-invented with senior scientists require less time to become licensed.
    Keywords: academic inventions, innovation speed, technology commercialization
    JEL: L24 L25 O32
    Date: 2012–06–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-026&r=ipr
  6. By: Lorenzo Cassi (CES, Université Paris 1 – Panthéon-Sorbonne, OST, France; KITeS, Bocconi University, Italy); Lorenzo Zirulia (University of Bologna, Italy; KITeS, Bocconi University, Italy; RCEA, Italy)
    Abstract: In this chapter we develop a model where a population of inventors is rival in the production of patents. Inventors are embedded in the social space, and this affects the process of knowledge creation and diffusion. Our main contribution to the existing theoretical literature on social networks and knowledge is to introduce explicitly patents and patents’ citations. This is interesting per se, and it favours a better comparability of results with those of empirical analysis on the same topic. Results from numerical simulations show that our model is able to replicate the empirical negative relationship between patents’ citations and social distance. Furthermore, different social network structures may have an impact on the exact shape of such relationship.
    Date: 2012–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rim:rimwps:39_12&r=ipr
  7. By: Vanessa OLTRA; Maïder SAINT-JEAN
    Abstract: This article tries to apprehend the technological trajectories that develop in Aquitaine region in the field of green chemistry (GC). Breschi’s research works are used to stress that spatial patterns of innovation vary greatly amongst sectors according to the specific features of the underlying technology, as summarized by the concept of technological regime. In such a perspective, we take into account the role of industrial structures and technological regimes to apprehend regional trajectories of innovation in the field of GC. In order to characterize such trajectories, an empirical analysis is carried out by using patent data for the period 1990-2009. We end up with an original database of GC patents for the Aquitaine region which enables us to emphasize the concentration of innovative sources as well as the specialization fields in relation with the regional industrial structure.
    Keywords: Green chemistry, Regional trajectories of innovation, Technological Regime, Patents
    JEL: O30 R11 L65
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2012-14&r=ipr
  8. By: Hvide, Hans K. (University of Aberdeen); Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Norwegian School of Economics (NHH))
    Abstract: We study how firm-specific complementary assets and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results show when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms protected weakly by complementary assets must sue leaving workers in order to obtain positive profits. Moreover, firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages and have lower turnover, but the higher pay has a detrimental effect on worker initiative. Finally, our analysis suggests that strengthening firms' property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens worker initiative.
    Keywords: entrepreneurship, innovation, intellectual property rights, litigation, personnel economics, R&D, start-ups, worker mobility
    JEL: J30 J60
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6609&r=ipr
  9. By: Cassi, Lorenzo; Plunket, Anne
    Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of co-inventor tie formation using micro-data on genomic patents from 1990 to 2006 in France. In a single analysis, we consider the relational and proximity perspectives that are usually treated separately. In order to do so, we analyse various forms of proximity as alternative driving forces behind network ties that occur within existing components (i.e. closure ties) as well as those between two distinct components (i.e. bridging ties). In doing so, we contrast network and proximity determinants of network formation and we investigate to what extent social networks allow economic actors to cross over geographical, technological and organizational boundaries.
    Keywords: Social networks; relational perspective; proximity; co-patenting; network formation
    JEL: L65 Z13 O33 O31 D85 R11
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39481&r=ipr
  10. By: Nabaz T. Khayyat (TEMEP, College of Engineering, Seoul National University); Jeong-Dong Lee (TEMEP, College of Engineering, Seoul National University)
    Abstract: This study is conducted to develop a new measurement tool to analyze the extent of innovation by developing nations. The role of science and technology in enhancing the rate of innovation is also investigated. The existing methods for measuring innovation such as Technology Index (WEF), Technology Achievement Index (UNDP), Industrial Development Scorecard (UNIDO), ArCo (Archibugi and Coco) and Science and Technology Index (RAND Corporation) are compared and based on their limitations a new tool with higher advantage is developed. The new index labeled as Technology Creation Index (TC-index) is decomposed into six distinct components. The index is estimated for 61 developing countries from Asia, North and South America and Africa. The countries are classified into three groups based on their extent of innovation derived from principal component analysis to assess the country group heterogeneity. The results suggest that in construction of the TC-index patents granted, human development index, local availability of specialized training and resources, foreign direct investment inflows, number of citations per science and education articles, secondary gross enrollment rate and science and education journals are identified as the main contributors to the higher rate of innovation in developing nations.
    Keywords: Innovation measurement, technological infrastructure, diffusion of innovations, human skills, economic and social indicators.
    JEL: C19 C49 I32 J24 O30 O32
    Date: 2012–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snv:dp2009:201291&r=ipr
  11. By: Giulia Ajmone Marsan; Annalisa Primi
    Abstract: This paper presents an overview of co-patenting trends at the national and regional level in three technology fields (biotechnology, telecommunications and renewable energy), across regions in the OECD and emerging economies, from the late 1970s to the late 2000s. After a general introduction on regional patenting activities, inter-regional co-inventorship networks in the three selected technologies are built and analysed. Different behaviors and relative network positioning emerge, in terms of top patenting regions both across technological fields and over time. Co-patenting networks increase their density over time and they show preferential attachment properties, namely regions with a central position in an early phase of development of the network tend to maintain their positioning in the future. However, there are also windows of opportunity for new central nodes to emerge in the network. Evidence shows that the structure of the network evolves differently depending on technological field and that the role of spatial proximity and capability proximity is mixed in influencing co-inventorship patterns. Co-patenting networks include star players that establish connections regardless of the proximity of partners; but also several wellperforming actors that benefit from proximity or relative proximity of agents.<BR>Cet article analyse des réseaux de co-brevets parmi les régions des pays OCDE et des économies émergentes sélectionnées, dans trois secteurs technologiques (télécommunications, biotechnologie, énergie renouvelable) sur la période 1977-2007. Après une introduction générale sur la production de brevets à niveau régional, les réseaux inter-régionaux de co-brevets dans les trois technologies sont construits et analysés. Des comportements et des positionnements différents à niveau des régions émergent, dans la structure générale des réseaux analysés, selon la technologie et dans le temps. Les réseaux de co-brevets deviennent plus denses avec le temps et montrent la propriété de l’attachement préférentiel, soit les régions avec une position centrale dans le réseau au début tendent à la garder dans le temps. Toutefois, il existe des opportunités pour atteindre un positionnement central même pour les régions qui entrent dans le réseau dans des phases successives. Les données montrent comment la structure du réseau évolue avec des caractéristiques différentes selon la classe technologique et comment la proximité spatiale et la proximité des connaissances influencent l’évolution du phénomène de la co-invention des brevets : les réseaux d’excellence contiennent les acteurs leaders, qui établissent leurs collaborations innovantes sans tenir en compte la proximité géographique, ainsi que plusieurs acteurs performants qui bénéficient aussi de la proximité géographique relative avec autres agents.
    Keywords: ICT, patents, green technologies, biotechnology, regional innovation, network analysis, co-inventorship
    JEL: D85 L00 O1 O25 O3 R12
    Date: 2012–03–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:govaab:2012/3-en&r=ipr
  12. By: L. Filippini; C. Vergari
    Abstract: We study the licensing incentives of an independent input producer owning a patented product innovation which allows the downstream firms to improve the quality of their final goods. We consider a general two-part tariff contract for both outside and incumbent innovators. We find that technology diffusion critically depends on the nature of market competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand). Moreover, the vertical merger with either downstream firm is always privately profitable and it is welfare improving for large innovations: this implies that not all profitable mergers should be rejected.
    JEL: L15 L13 L24
    Date: 2012–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp833&r=ipr
  13. By: Francisco Callado (Departament d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Girona); Jana Hromcova (Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona); Natalia Utrero (Departament d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Girona)
    Abstract: We study the relationship between openness and payment system development. In particular, we analyze how the existence of technology diffusion from a more developed country fosters a transformation of payment choice in a less developed country. We apply our analysis to Mexico. Economic growth in Mexico was not high enough to cause a transformation of payment choice observed in the data after 2001. We argue that the switch towards electronic payments can be attributed to openness and related payment technology spillovers from the US in the context of NAFTA.
    Keywords: cash, payments, openness, NAFTA
    JEL: E42 F43 O33 O54
    Date: 2012–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea1206&r=ipr

This nep-ipr issue is ©2012 by Roland Kirstein. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.