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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Rachel Griffith (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of Manchester); Helen Miller (Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | <p><p><p>In 2010 China was the world's fourth largest filer of patent applications. This followed a decade of unprecedented increases in investment in skills and Research and Development. If current trends continue China could rank first in the very near future. We provide evidence that the growth in Chinese patenting activity has been accompanied by a growth in Chinese inventors creating technologies that are near to the science base. </p><p></p><p></p><p>Part of the success of China has been to attract the investment of foreign multinationals. This is also true for a number of other Emerging Economies. Europe's largest multinational firms increasingly file patent applications that are based on inventor activities located in emerging economies, often working alongside inventors from the firm's home country. </p></p></p> |
| Keywords: | China; innovation; offshoring; patents. |
| JEL: | F21 F23 O3 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:11/15&r=ipr |
| By: | Gallié, Emilie-Pauline; Legros, Diego |
| Abstract: | This article investigates the effects of human capital and technological capital on innovation. While the role of technological capital as measured by research and development (R&D) expenditure has been intensively investigated, few studies have been made on the effect of employee training on innovation. This article explores the relationship between innovation and firm employee training. Our methodological approach contributes to the literature in three ways. We propose various indicators of firm employee training. We build a count data panel with a long time-data series to deal with the issue of firms’ heterogeneity. We propose a dynamic analysis. Using dynamic count data models on French industrial firms over the period 1986–1992, we find positive and significant effects of R&D intensity and training on patenting activity. Whatever the indicators of training our results show that the firm employee training has a positive impact on technological innovation. |
| Keywords: | Patents; R&D; Employee training; Count panel data; Linear feedback model; |
| JEL: | C23 C25 J24 L60 O31 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/6962&r=ipr |
| By: | Fabrice Valognes, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM-CNRS UMR 6211; Hélène Ferrer, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM-CNRS UMR 6211; Guillermo Owen, Dept. of Mathematics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA. |
| Abstract: | We consider a situation in which members of an oligopoly have different technologies, which allow them to produce at different costs. Members may license their technology to other members. Using the Aumann-Drèze modification of the Shapley value, we compute fair prices for these licenses. We also study the problem of stability for these ``licensing coalitions.'' |
| Keywords: | Cooperative Game Theory, Technology Transfers, Modified Shapley Value |
| JEL: | C71 L13 L24 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201109&r=ipr |
| By: | Denis Bouyssou (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - CNRS : UMR7024 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX); Thierry Marchant (Department of Data Analysis - Ghent University) |
| Abstract: | The standard data that we use when computing bibliometric rankings of scientists are just their publication/citation records, i.e., so many papers with 0 citation, so many with 1 citation, so many with 2 citations, etc. The standard data for bibliometric rankings of departments have the same structure. It is therefore tempting (and many authors gave in to temptation) to use the same method for computing rankings of scientists and rankings of departments. Depending on the method, this can yield quite surprising and unpleasant results. Indeed, with some methods, it may happen that the "best" department contains the "worst" scientists, and only them. This problem will not occur if the rankings satisfy a property called consistency, recently introduced in the literature. In this paper, we explore the consequences of consistency and we characterize two families of consistent rankings. |
| Keywords: | Bibliometrics, ranking of scientists, ranking of departments |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00606931&r=ipr |