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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | MAULEON, Ana (Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, CEREC, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium and Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); VERGARI, Cecilia (Department of Economic Sciences, University of Bologna, I-40125 Bologna, Italy) |
| Abstract: | We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royal- ties with two firms producing horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes (fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We show that the patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties. |
| Keywords: | patent licensing, fixed fee, royalty, bargaining, private information |
| JEL: | C78 D43 D45 L13 |
| Date: | 2010–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010077&r=ipr |
| By: | Sebastian von Engelhardt (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena) |
| Abstract: | For a decade, economists have been fascinated by the phenomenon of open source software (OSS). OSS is marked by free access to the software and its source code. It is developed in a public, collaborative manner by thousands of non-paid volunteers as well as profit seeking firms. Today, OSS is well established in the ICT sector and represents a new intellectual property paradigm. This paper provides an introduction into the topic OSS versus closed source software (CSS, also called 'proprietary' software). After a brief history of OSS and CSS, the differences between the open and the closed source principles and the basic logic of OSS business models are explained. Next, the paper presents what economists know about the OSS phenomena, i.e. gives an overview of the motives of the (non-paid) OSS developers, the institutions of OSS, the effects of OSS on competition, the incentives and role of firms, and finally of open source principle beyond software. |
| Keywords: | open source, open source software, intellectual property rights, information and communications technologies |
| JEL: | L17 O34 L86 |
| Date: | 2011–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-005&r=ipr |
| By: | NAGAOKA Sadao |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effects of uncertainty, rent dissipation, and a bundle of patents on corporate licenses. We use a newly developed data set, based on a large-scale survey (4,000 patents) of Japanese inventors, which uniquely covers the nature of the underlying research projects. Our major findings are the following. First, consistent with a theoretical prediction of our model, uncertainty of the licensing value of the patent increases significantly the licensorfs willingness to license, for a given license possibility. This effect significantly accounts for a substantial part of the observed gap between unilateral and cross-licensing for upstream inventions. Second, a higher quality patent is more likely to be offered for a license and more likely to be licensed once offered for a license. Third, the positive effect of the importance of the first mover advantage upon the licensorfs willingness to license is no weaker when the patent is used internally by the licensor. This suggests that the rent dissipation effect is significantly controlled contractually or is weak due to competition in the technology market. Fourth, the size of the bundle of the complementary patents enhances cross licenses and reduces unilateral licenses, with the former effect becoming increasingly dominant, and that inventions related to the core business of a licensor are more likely to be cross licensed. |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:11004&r=ipr |
| By: | BELLEFLAMME, Paul (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE and Louvain School of Management, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); PEITZ, Martin (Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This article reviews recent theoretical contributions on digital piracy. It starts by elaborating on the reasons for intellectual property protection, by reporting a few facts about copyright protection, and by examining reasons to become a digital pirate. Next, it provides an exploration of the consequences of digital piracy, using a base model and several extensions (with consumer sampling, network effects, and indirect appropriation). A closer look at market-structure implications of end-user piracy is then taken. After a brief review of commercial piracy, additional legal and private responses to end-user piracy are considered. Finally, a quick look at emerging new business models is taken. |
| Keywords: | information good, piracy, copyright, IP protection, internet, peer-to-peer, software, music |
| JEL: | L11 L82 L86 |
| Date: | 2010–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010060&r=ipr |
| By: | Block, Joern; Spiegel, Frank |
| Abstract: | Family firms are important not only for a region but for the economy as a whole. In particular, the long-term orientation and the local embeddedness of family firms suggest a positive effect on regional innovation activity. Yet, despite the widely acknowledged importance of family firms for the economy, little research exists on this issue. This paper analyses the effect of family firms on regional innovation. Using a dataset of 326 German regions, our regressions show that regions with a higher share of family firms also show higher levels of innovation activity, as measured by the number of successful patent applications. The implications of these findings for policy and research are discussed. |
| Keywords: | innovation; family firms; geography; Mittelstand; patents |
| JEL: | L26 O3 |
| Date: | 2011–02–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28604&r=ipr |
| By: | Elisa Lanzi (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei); Elena Verdolini (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Università Cattolica di Milano); Ivan Hašcic (OECD Environment Directorate) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies innovation dynamics in efficiency improving electricity generation technologies as an important means of mitigating climate change impacts. Relevant patents are identified and used as an indicator of innovation. We find that patenting in efficiency improving technologies has mostly been stable over time, with a recent decreasing trend. We also find that majority of patents are first filed in OECD countries and only then in non-OECD or BRIC countries. Conversely, non-OECD and BRIC countries apply for patents that are mostly marketed domestically. This result shows that there is significant technology transfer in the field of efficiency improving technologies for electricity production. This flow of know-how is likely to contribute to mitigation of greenhouse gases emissions in emerging economies in the long run. |
| Keywords: | Climate Change, Technological Innovation, Energy, Patents, Fossil Fuels |
| JEL: | Q32 Q4 Q55 |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2011.10&r=ipr |
| By: | MIYAGIWA, Kaz (Emory University, USA); SONG, Huasheng (CRPE and College of Economics, Zhejiang University, China; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE and IRES, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; KULeuven-LICOS & CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of contingency trade policy in a multi-country oligopoly model with and without R&D opportunities. We show that firms benefit from unilateral protection but initiate antidumping (AD) only against the targets domiciled in substantially smaller countries. Also, AD filings are more likely when firms face R&D opportunities. These results are consistent with recent empirical findings, namely, (1) actions are mostly between industrial and developing countries, (2) developing countries use AD to retaliate against industrial countries, and (3) AD is concentrated in R&D-intensive industries. Interestingly, intellectual property rights violations in developing countries have no connection to AD filings. |
| Keywords: | F12, F13, L13 |
| Date: | 2010–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010064&r=ipr |
| By: | Leyden, Dennis (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics); Link, Albert (University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Motivated by the question of which institutions within our, or any nation’s, national innovation system will leverage economic growth in the greatest amount for a given investment in innovation, we compare and contrast the behavior of two types of research institutions: government research laboratories (hereafter, labs) and university research labs. Because of a unique blend of institutional structures and rewards, we argue that universities are in a better position than government labs to provide the research necessary to stimulate economic growth. We then test and validate our model empirically using a unique database on the research output from university and government information retrieval (IR) labs. |
| Keywords: | R&D; university labs; government labs; information retrieval |
| JEL: | H40 O31 |
| Date: | 2011–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:uncgec:2011_003&r=ipr |