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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Pohlmann, Tim; Opitz, Marieke |
| Abstract: | Patent trolls have many faces, since the media uses this expression in various ways. The patent troll phenomenon thus seems to be an ambiguous term that is discussed in several directions. This paper reveals that a patent troll as such has no distinct shape or appearance. Our analysis redeems a troll classification solely from firms’ market position, such as being non-practicing, and shows that a patent troll business can only be defined by the respective activities to enforce IPR. Using 10 cases, of which five are treated in detail, the analysis reveals a distinct typology of the troll business. This paper is furthermore able to identify troll behavior to be: a) an efficient mechanism to enforce IP rights and b) a strategy that yields excessive license fees and causes inefficient negotiation costs. |
| Keywords: | Patent Trolls; Patent Sharks Patent Strategies; Patent Failure |
| JEL: | O34 K00 M10 |
| Date: | 2010–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27342&r=ipr |
| By: | Laurent Granier (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, UMR 5824, 93, chemin des Mouilles, Ecully, F-69130, France; ENS-LSH, Lyon, France); Sébastien Trinquart (UNOCAM, Paris, France) |
| Abstract: | In 2009, Sanofi-Aventis, whose generic subsidiary is Winthrop, merges with the generic firm, Zentiva. This paper fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning mergers in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their market share, some brand-name firms produce generics themselves, called pseudo- generics. We develop a Cournot duopoly model by considering the pseudo-generics production as a mergers’ catalyst. We show that a brand-name company always has an incentive to purchase its competitor. The key insight of this paper is that the brand-name laboratory can increase its merger gain by producing pseudo-generics beforehand. In some cases, pseudo-generics would not otherwise be produced and this production is then a predatory strategy. |
| Keywords: | Mergers, Pharmaceutical Market, Predation, Pseudo-Generics |
| JEL: | I11 L12 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1027&r=ipr |
| By: | Padmashree Gehl Sampath |
| Abstract: | An analysis of the innovation in the Indian pharmaceutical industry is done. This section traces the origins, the strengths and weaknesses of the innovation system in the pharmaceutical sector in India, and its industrial structure and activities, in order to establish the importance of the Indian industry for access to medicines in the developing world today. This section also arrives upon a categorization of firms in the Indian industry, based on empirical data, which is used in the rest of the study to draw conclusions on various issues. A discussio of the main changes that are forcing a transition in the industry today, of which the introduction of product patent protection is the main one. |
| Keywords: | firms, product patent, industry, protection, empirical data, innovation, Indian pharmaceutical industry, developing world, transition, |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3336&r=ipr |
| By: | NAGAOKA Sadao |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes empirically how significantly the existence of non-contractible research effort by a vertical partner (as measured by a provision of a co-inventor) affects the ownership structure of vertical collaborative research and whether such effort also significantly enhances research productivity, exploiting rich information at the project level provided by a large scale inventor survey in Japan. Participation of a supplier co-inventor significantly enhances research productivity and is also a very significant determinant of the ownership structure, controlling for the initial knowledge contribution and the financial contribution by a supplier. On the other hand, while a user co-inventor affects the ownership structure even more predominantly, it contributes much less to the productivity of joint research. Such a gap may be partly explained by the necessity of a user to combine relevant patents. Finally, the willingness to license is not lower for a vertically co-owned patent, even if co-ownership partly substitutes a license. This suggests that co-ownership does not significantly constrain licensing, even if ex-post agreement for a license becomes necessary. |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:10064&r=ipr |
| By: | Kitagawa, Fumi (University of Bristol); Wigren, Caroline (CIRCLE, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | The recent rise in university-industry partnerships has stimulated an important public policy debate degrading the theoretical rationale for government support for knowledge transfer/exchanges from higher education sector. This paper draws on a particular case study conducted at Lund University, which is the largest comprehensive research university in Sweden. We ask the role of fundamental research at the university and organizational responses to growing expectations with respect to its subsequent use and applications, particularly those of ‘Centres of research excellence’. We identify new forms of intermediary organizations as ‘brokers on the boundaries’ which bridge the gap between everyday scientific activities of researchers, entrepreneurial activities of academics, and more centralized forms of strategic initiatives taken by an ‘entrepreneurial university’ as an organizational actor. The paper concludes by identifying organizational strategic choices and constraints, and implications for rapidly changing higher education and research policies in Sweden and beyond. |
| Keywords: | Academic Entrepreneurship; Sweden |
| JEL: | O30 |
| Date: | 2010–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lucirc:2010_002&r=ipr |
| By: | Mainak Mazumdar; Meenakshi Rajeev; Subhash C Ray |
| Abstract: | Using the non parametric approach of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) this paper examines the input and output efficiencies of the Indian pharmaceutical firms for the period 1991 to 2005. [Occasional Paper No. 17]. |
| Keywords: | Indian, pharmaceutical, firms, non-radial, patents,non-parametric approach, data envelopment analysis, DEA, input, output efficency, |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3334&r=ipr |
| By: | Kaplan, Todd R; Wettstein, David |
| Abstract: | Using contests to generate innovation has and is widely used. Such contests often involve offering a prize that depends upon the accomplishment (effort). Using an all-pay auction as a model of a contest, we determine the optimal reward for inducing innovation. In a symmetric environment, we find that the reward should be set to c(x)/c′(x) where c is the cost of producing an innovation of level x. In an asymmetric environment with two firms, we find that it is optimal to set different rewards for each firm. There are cases where this can be replicated by a single reward that depends upon accomplishments of both contestants. |
| Keywords: | contests; innovation; mechanism design. |
| JEL: | D44 C70 O32 L12 |
| Date: | 2010–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:27397&r=ipr |