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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Antonio Della Malva (Maastricht University (The Netherlands)); Francesco Lissoni (DIMI-Università di Brescia and KITES-Universitá Bocconi, Milan (Italy)); Maria Patrick Llerena (BETA, Universitè de Strasbourg (France)) |
| Abstract: | The Innovation Act was introduced by the French government in 1999, with the aim of encouraging academic institutions to protect and commercialize their scientists’ inventions. We explore the effects of the Act on the distribution of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) over academic scientists’ inventions. We find that before the Act, academic institutions had a strong tendency to leave such IPRs in the hands of their main funders, namely public research organizations (such as CNRS or INSERM), and business companies. After the introduction of the Act, French academic institutions have increased their propensity to claim IPRs over their employees’ invention, mainly under the form of co-ownership with business companies. This result vary with the technological class of the patent, the presence and age of a TTO within the university, and the university size and type. |
| Keywords: | academic inventions, academic research, intellectual property, patents |
| JEL: | L31 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:kites29_wp&r=ipr |
| By: | Vincenzo Denicolò (Università di Bologna); Christine Halmenschlager (University Paris II) |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of the fragmentation of intellectual property rights on optimal patent design. The major finding is that when several complementary innovative components must be assembled to operate a new technology, the patentability requirements should be stronger than in the case of stand-alone innovation. This reduces the fragmentation of intellectual property, which is socially costly. However, to preserve the incentives to innovate, if a patent is granted the strength of protection should be generally higher than in the stand-alone case. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual Property Rights, Fragmentation, Patent Requirements |
| JEL: | O3 O34 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.1343&r=ipr |
| By: | Paul H. Jensen (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne); Elizabeth Webster (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, The University of Melbourne) |
| Abstract: | We use data from 3000 academic scientists to estimate the effects of other parties' patents on the academics' research. Nearly half of all scientists report that their choice of research projects has been affected by the presence of other parties' patents. We find that transaction costs and the culture of the workplace have the largest influence over whether or not patents affect the direction of research but that scientists’ understanding of patent law; their recent experience seeking permission to use patented material; and the source of research funds are also significant. |
| Keywords: | public science, innovation, R&D, invention, public research, patent |
| JEL: | O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2010–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2010n18&r=ipr |
| By: | Christian Ghiglino; Nicole Kuschy |
| Abstract: | The present paper builds a simple model of patent citations not based on the rich-get-richer aspect of preferential attachment. In our model the dynamics of citations are driven by known heterogeneities in the applicability of existing patents and aging. The model matches closely the hazard rates of citations for the vast majority of patents in a random sample of patents granted by the USPTO between 1975 and 1999. Furthermore, we show that the long run distribution of patent citations is well fitted when the distribution of applicability across patents follows a Gamma-distribution.We also discuss the possibility that popularity of patents might influence citation decisions if innovators are not perfectly informed about patents' applicability. We find that popularity matters but the size of the effect is very small. Finally, the possibility to distinguish between citations to patents within the same class and to different classes allows us to show that the magnitude of the influence of popularity is increasing in technological distance. |
| Date: | 2010–10–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esx:essedp:692&r=ipr |
| By: | Ufuk Akcigit (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania); William R. Kerr (Department of Economics, Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | We study how exploration versus exploitation innovations impact economic growth through a tractable endogenous growth framework that contains multiple innovation sizes, multi-product firms, and entry/exit. Firms invest in exploration R&D to acquire new product lines and exploitation R&D to improve their existing product lines. We model and show empirically that exploration R&D does not scale as strongly with firm size as exploitation R&D. The resulting framework conforms to many regularities regarding innovation and growth differences across the firm size distribution. We also incorporate patent citations into our theoretical framework. The framework generates a simple test using patent citations that indicates that entrants and small firms have relatively higher growth spillover effects. |
| Keywords: | : Endogenous Growth, Innovation, Exploration, Exploitation, Research and Development, Patents, Citations, Scientists, Entrepreneurs. |
| JEL: | O31 O33 O41 L16 |
| Date: | 2010–10–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:10-035&r=ipr |
| By: | Luigi Orsenigo (Dimi, University of Brescia, Brescia, Italy and KITeS, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy); Valerio Sterzi (KITeS, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy) |
| Abstract: | It has been long recognised that the role and effects of patents vary considerably across industries. This observation raises immediately to important sets of questions. First, can we document systematically this heterogeneity and can we provide a conceptual framework for explaining this diversity? Second, how should the patent system deal with these differences? Should patent laws be tailored to industry specificities or should they be kept as homogeneous as possible? In this paper, we focus mainly on the first question and only tangentially on the second one. In particular, we try to review what is known about the inter-sectoral differences in the uses of patents and their more recent evolution and we suggest that such diversity is just to expected as it depends on complex interactions between the properties of technologies, the nature of markets and the patterns of competition, the evolution of legislation and its interpretation. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:kites33_wp&r=ipr |
| By: | Grammig, Joachim; Jank, Stephan |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces Schumpeter's idea of creative destruction into asset pricing. The key point of our model is that small and value firms are more likely destroyed during technological revolutions, resulting into higher expected returns for these stocks. A two-factor model including market return and patent activity growth - the proxy for creative destruction risk - accounts for a large portion of the cross-sectional variation of size and book-to-market sorted portfolios and prices HML and SMB. The expected return difference between assets with the highest and lowest exposure to creative destruction risk amounts to 8.6 percent annually. -- |
| Keywords: | creative destruction,asset pricing,size and value premium,patents |
| JEL: | G12 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:1014&r=ipr |
| By: | Juergen Bitzer (Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg); Ingo Geishecker (Department of Economics, University of Goettingen); Philipp Schroeder (Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | Job-Market signaling is ranked high among the explanations why in- dividuals engage voluntarily in OSS projects. If true, signaling implies the existence of a wage premium for OSS engagement. However, due to a lack of data this issue has not been tested previously. Based on a novel data set comprising detailed demographic and wage information for some 7,000 German IT employees, this paper fills this gap. In the empirical analysis, however, we find no support for the signaling hypoth- esis, a result that is robust to different measures of OSS involvement and different model specifications. |
| Keywords: | open source software, signaling, wage differentials |
| JEL: | J31 J24 D01 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:old:wpaper:321&r=ipr |
| By: | Koen Frenken; Roderik Ponds; Frank van Oort |
| Abstract: | This study shows for eight science-based industries that the citation impact of research collaboration is higher for international collaboration than for national and regional collaboration. A further analysis of institutional affiliations shows that university-industry-government collaborations profit from being organised at the regional scale only in the cases of biotechnology and organic fine chemistry. The alleged importance of physical proximity for successful interaction between university, industry and government thus is not robust across industries. We discuss the policy implications that follow. |
| Keywords: | proximity, citation, globalisation, university-industry-government collaboration, triple helixience, economics of science, geography of science, sociology of scientific knowledge |
| JEL: | O30 R10 |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:tuecis:wpaper:1002&r=ipr |
| By: | Claudio Panico (KITeS, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy) |
| Abstract: | Managing research collaborations remains challenging in many respects. The research efforts of the parties involved are hardly verifiable, and it is not possible to contract a clearly defined research output in advance. The parties negotiate to allocate potential gains, but the collaboration still is unstable and prone to disintegration. Although contractual forms of collaboration have become increasingly common and sophisticated, formal contracts are incomplete and produce a large variety of governance structures with specified ownership patterns and the configurations of control. In the context of a research collaboration between two parties with asymmetric positions, such as a large pharmaceutical company contracting with a small biotech, the company must decide how to allocate ownership and control rights while considering the effects on the biotech's bargaining position in the negotiation. This study shows that the forms of governance vary with the contractibility of effort and the stability of the collaboration, which suggests novel prescriptions for the management of research collaborations. |
| Keywords: | research collaborations, governance, contracts, property rights, control rights |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:kites32_wp&r=ipr |
| By: | Adermon, Adrian (Uppsala University); Liang, Che-Yuan (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of illegal file sharing (piracy) on music and movie sales. The Swedish implementation of the European Union directive IPRED on April 1, 2009 suddenly increased the risk of being caught and prosecuted for file sharing. We investigate the subsequent drop in piracy as approximated by the drop in Swedish Internet traffic and the effects on music and movie sales in Sweden. We find that the reform decreased Internet traffic by 18 percent during the subsequent six months. It also increased sales of physical music by 27 percent and digital music by 48 percent. Furthermore, it had no significant effects on the sales of theater tickets or DVD movies. The results indicate that pirated music is a strong substitute for legal music whereas the substitutability is less for movies. |
| Keywords: | Copyright protection; Piracy; File sharing; Music; Movies; IPRED; Natural experiment |
| JEL: | D12 D40 K11 K42 |
| Date: | 2010–10–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0854&r=ipr |