nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2010‒09‒25
four papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. The role of patent protection in (clean/green) technology transfer By Hall, Bronwyn; Helmers, Christian
  2. Determinants Influencing Adoption of Geographical Indications Certification: A Case Study from Northeastern Thailand By Ngokkuen, Chuthaporn; Grote, Ulrike
  3. Strategic Technology Investments in Open Economies By Anna Bohnstedt; Christian Schwarz
  4. The hope for neglected diseases: R&D incentives By Brigitte Granville; Eshref Trushin

  1. By: Hall, Bronwyn (University of California at Berkeley, UNU-MERIT, and Maastricht University); Helmers, Christian (CEP, London School of Economics and Political Science, and CSAE, University of Oxford)
    Abstract: Global climate change mitigation will require the development and diffusion of a large number and variety of new technologies. How will patent protection affect this process? In this paper we first review the evidence on the role of patents for innovation and international technology transfer in general. The literature suggests that patent protection in a host country encourages technology transfer to that country but that its impact on innovation and development is much more ambiguous. We then discuss the implications of these findings and other technology-specific evidence for the diffusion of climate change-related technologies. We conclude that the "gdouble externality" problem, that is the presence of both environmental and knowledge externalities, implies that IP may not be the ideal and cannot be the only policy instrument to encourage innovation in this area and that the range and variety of green technologies as well as the need for local adaptation of technologies means that patent protection may be neither available nor useful in some settings.
    Keywords: climate change, intellectual property, innovation, technology transfer
    JEL: O19 O33 O34 Q54 Q55 Q58
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2010046&r=ipr
  2. By: Ngokkuen, Chuthaporn; Grote, Ulrike
    Abstract: Geographical indications (GIs) have gained more interest since its protection has been ensured multilaterally under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) is the first officially registered GI Jasmine rice in Thailand. A GI certification is licensed to producers and other business operators of the GI production line through a membership application in a GI club. This paper aims at identifying factors that are likely to predict the behaviour of Thai Jasmine rice households in the Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKRH) area in adopting a GI certification. A logit model is applied for empirical analyses. The marginal effects of the key factors on the probability of adoption are estimated. All analyses are based on survey data collected through a formal survey in two districts of the TKRH area where 541 Thai Jasmine rice households were selected for interviews using a disproportionate stratified random sampling procedure. The results indicate that institutional and social factors such as information, transportation costs and membership of a cooperative influence the decision to obtain the GI certification of the Thai Jasmine rice households in the TKRH area significantly. --
    Keywords: Geographical Indications,Certification,Adoption,Logit Model,Jasmine rice,Thung Kula Rong-Hai,Thailand
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gdec10:52&r=ipr
  3. By: Anna Bohnstedt; Christian Schwarz
    Abstract: We study a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous fi rms, where countries can strategically invest in technology. The countries’ motive is to improve fi rms’ productivity, leading to a competitive advantage in international trade. We are interested in how trade liberalization aff ects this governmental incentive to invest in technology. In the closed economy countries invest if consumers have a suffi ciently high preference for varieties. In the open economy we analyze the Nash-equilibrium policy and the cooperative policy. If there are no cross-country investment spillovers, countries strategically compete in their investment levels and increase their investments with higher trade openness. From a social perspective we have an overinvestment problem. If there are cross-country investment spillovers, we diff erentiate between weak and strong spillovers. In both cases the cooperative solution predicts a positive relationship between investments and trade openness. If there are weak (strong) spillovers, we fi nd a positive (hump-shaped) relationship between technology investments and trade openness in the Nash-equilibrium. From a social perspective we obtain an over (under)-investment problem if spillovers are weak (strong).
    Keywords: Heterogeneous fi rms; technology investments; monopolistic competition; strategic trade policy
    JEL: F12 F13
    Date: 2010–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0199&r=ipr
  4. By: Brigitte Granville; Eshref Trushin
    Abstract: Neglected diseases are neglected because they cannot generate enough return on R&D to pharmaceutical firms. This paper analyzes and compares existing proposals for public intervention in R&D for neglected diseases. Incentives for neglected diseases are comprehensively evaluated based on seventeen selected criteria grouped into four categories: efficiency, feasibility, fairness, and sustainability. Our conclusion is that public-private partnerships coordinated through a centralized service platform have the highest potential to satisfy the criteria for the successful development..
    Keywords: neglected diseases, incentives, pharmaceutical R&D, policy analysis
    JEL: I12 I18 H41 H87
    Date: 2010–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgs:wpaper:35&r=ipr

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