nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2010‒07‒10
six papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Why Did Corporations Patent in Spain? Some Historical Inquiries By Saiz, J. Patricio
  2. An analysis of the efficiency of public spending and national policies in the area of R&D By Conte, Andrea; Schweizer, Philip; Dierx , Adriaan; Ilzkovitz, Fabienne
  3. Measuring Industry Relatedness and Corporate Coherence By Giulio Bottazzi; Federico Tamagni
  4. Fairness Ex Ante & Ex Post – The Benefits of Renegotiation in Media Markets By Christoph Engel; Michael Kurschilgen
  5. Boosting innovation in Europe By André Sapir; Bruno van Pottelsberghe; Reinhilde Veugelers; Mathias Dewatripont
  6. Transaction Cost, Technology Transfer and Mode of Organization By Mandal, Biswajit; Marjit, Sugata

  1. By: Saiz, J. Patricio (Departamento de Análisis Económico (Teoría e Historia Económica). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid)
    Abstract: In this paper we will explore how international corporations used the Spanish patent system in the late nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century in order to discover what the actual effects of its apparent weakness were. The origins and evolution of corporate patenting in Spain, the effects of compulsory working clauses, the management of assignments, the various strategies followed by the firms, and the effects of patents on technology transfer to the Spanish economy will be clarified. The conclusions yields understanding on real patent management in the long-term by analyzing the strategies of Brown Boveri and Babcock Wilcox corporations in Spain.
    Keywords: Patents of introduction; National innovation system; Spain; Technology transfer.
    JEL: N43 N44 N73 N74 O31 O32 O34 O52
    Date: 2010–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uam:wpapeh:201002&r=ipr
  2. By: Conte, Andrea; Schweizer, Philip; Dierx , Adriaan; Ilzkovitz, Fabienne
    Abstract: Improving the quality of public finances is a major challenge for European policy makers. The economic crisis has increased budgetary pressures and accentuated the tension between the need to sustain public spending aimed at raising the EU growth potential and the increased scarcity of public resources. Rising the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending in growth-enhancing areas such as education, R&D and innovation has become, therefore, even more important. This paper reviews the innovation performance of the different EU Member States and provides estimates of the relative efficiency of their R&D spending. In doing so, it aims at moving the policy discussion from mere volume-based policy targets towards a better assessment of the quality and effects of public R&D spending. The main contribution of this paper is therefore the identification of both (1) a suitable methodology for the evaluation of efficiency levels across Member States and (2) structural and policy determinants which may contribute to raise efficiency levels of R&D spending across countries and over time. Results indicate that there exist large cross-country differences in terms of measured efficiency, which is an indication that in many Member States there remains a significant potential for further improvement. Currently, there appears to be a divide in efficiency levels between old and new Member States. However, there is some evidence that the new Member States are catching up. The estimated efficiency scores indicate that all EU Member States have improved their efficiency levels over time. There is evidence that the efficiency of R&D spending is higher in countries with a strong knowledge base which, in turn, implies that increases in R&D spending do not necessarily lead to reductions in efficiency levels. Other factors that positively affect efficiency levels include the high-tech specialisation of the economy, the level of investment in education, the employment share in science and technology, and the degree of protection of intellectual property rights. Finally, a R&D tax treatment more oriented towards fiscal incentives rather than direct subsidies appears to have a positive effect on the efficiency level of R&D spending across EU Member States. This work is based on both a quantitative measurement of efficiency levels and a qualitative analysis of the policy instruments used in the Member States to promote R&D efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency scores are calculated by means of the Stochastic Frontier Analysis for a set of input and output indicators in order to overcome the limitations associated with each individual indicator. A complementary survey of national governments highlights some further policy instruments that could contribute to increase the efficiency of R&D and innovation policies, in particular at the national level. The results of the survey argue in favour of adopting a systemic approach to R&D, education and innovation policies, including three main elements: (i) adapting educational programmes and the research infrastructure to the needs of science and industry; (ii) making a sustained commitment to knowledge investment by adopting medium-term funding programmes; and (iii) evaluating existing R&D programmes in order to determine which policy tools are the most effective and in which areas R&D investments offer the highest returns. More recently, Member States have introduced R&D spending measures specifically targeted to deal with the consequences of the economic crisis. A closer look at these measures reveals that Member States consider direct grants and offers of tax relief as appropriate instruments to counteract the effects of the crisis. It should be clear that such policy measures should be tailored to the specific needs and strengths of every Member State.
    Keywords: Public Finance; Efficiency; R&D spending; patents; innovation policy.
    JEL: H50 C23 O33
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23549&r=ipr
  3. By: Giulio Bottazzi; Federico Tamagni
    Abstract: Since the seminal work of Teece et al. (1994) firm diversification has been found to be a non-random process. The hidden deterministic nature of the diversification patterns is usually detected comparing expected (under a null hypothesys) and actual values of some statistics. Nevertheless the standard approach presents two big drawbacks, leaving unanswered several issues. First, using the observed value of a statistics provides noisy and nonhomogeneous estimates and second, the expected values are computed in a specific and privileged null hypothesis that implies spurious random effects. We show that using Monte Carlo p-scores as measure of relatedness provides cleaner and homogeneous estimates. Using the NBER database on corporate patents we investigate the effect of assuming different null hypotheses, from the less unconstrained to the fully constrained, revealing that new features in firm diversification patterns can be catched if random artifacts are ruled out.
    Keywords: corporate coherence; relatedness; null model analysis; patent data
    JEL: C1 D2 L2
    Date: 2010–07–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2010/10&r=ipr
  4. By: Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Michael Kurschilgen (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
    Abstract: The market for copyrights is characterised by a highly skewed distribution of profits: very few movies, books and songs generate huge profits, whereas the great bulk barely manages to recover production cost. At the moment when the owner of intellectual property grants a licence ("ex ante"), neither party knows the true value of the traded commodity. A seemingly odd norm from German copyright law, the so-called "bestseller provision", stipulates that the seller of a licence has a legally enforceable right to a bonus in case the work ("ex post") turns out a blockbuster. We experimentally explore the effect of the provision on market prices, on the number of deals struck and on perceived fairness. Our results show that the provision leads to lower prices for copyrights. More copyrights trade. The buyers perceive less ex-post unfairness.
    Keywords: experiment, fairness, Copyright, Uncertainty
    JEL: C91 K12
    Date: 2010–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_29&r=ipr
  5. By: André Sapir; Bruno van Pottelsberghe; Reinhilde Veugelers; Mathias Dewatripont
    Abstract: Innovation is key to the future of Europe. This Policy Contribution, written together by Mathias Dewatripont, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; Bruno van Pottelsberghe and Andre Sapir, Senior Fellows at Bruegel and professors at ULB; and Reinhilde Veugelers, senior fellow at Bruegel and professor at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, makes suggestions based on three principles: to give primacy to merit-based selection of projects at the European level, to strengthen the single market to make it conducive for research and innovation and to remove barriers that hinder dynamic restructuring. This paper is addressed to the July 2010 informal Competitiveness Council (Research) under the Belgian Presidency.
    Date: 2010–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bre:polcon:432&r=ipr
  6. By: Mandal, Biswajit; Marjit, Sugata
    Abstract: We develop a monopolistically competitive model for a closed economy without contract incompleteness. We show that if superior technology is not allowed to be transferred, integration would be the best mode of organization given that the transaction cost of intermediate input is sufficiently small. However, transferability of technology calls for adding the dimension of factor intensity of input. We then prove that integration could be the better option only when input production technology is capital-intensive. Thus we validate the empirical claim of Antras (2003) from a perspective other than incomplete contract.
    Keywords: Transaction Cost; Technology Transfer; Outsourcing; Organization of Production; Intra-firm Trade.
    JEL: D23 L23 F12 O14
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23602&r=ipr

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