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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Moschini, GianCarlo |
| Abstract: | Research and Development (R&D) and innovation are crucial features of the seed industry. To support large R&D investments by the private sector, strong intellectual property rights, such as patents, are necessary. The exclusivity granted by patents naturally creates market power positions and raises difficult and unresolved competition issues in an antitrust context. |
| JEL: | L1 L4 O3 Q1 |
| Date: | 2010–06–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:31611&r=ipr |
| By: | Bruno Van Pottelsberghe |
| Abstract: | This paper puts forward a new methodology that aims at comparing quality across patent systems. Quality is defined as the extent to which patent offices comply with the legal standards that rule patentability conditions (novelty, inventiveness, transparency). The methodology consists in a two-layer analytical framework composed of "legal standards" and their "operational design". Operational designs include several elements that frame the rigour and transparency of the filtering processes. The in-depth analysis of these two layers for the patent offices of the USA (USPTO), Japan (JPO) and Europe (EPO) lead to the following conclusions. The operational designs’ components are interdependent and form a coherent system. This systemic approach underlines that if legal standards are similar across countries, their operational design are heterogeneous. The empirical evidence suggests that the EPO provides higher quality services than the USPTO, the JPO being in an intermediate position. These differences call for a multi-faceted convergence of patent systems before worldwide mutual recognition and worksharing practices are to be put in place. |
| Keywords: | quality; patent propensity; intellectual property; patent system |
| JEL: | O30 O31 O34 O38 O57 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/57640&r=ipr |
| By: | Gaétan de Rassenfosse; Bruno Van Pottelsberghe |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems. Two main research questions are usually addressed: the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees. Studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good. Studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application (or pre-grant) fees and renewal (or post-grant) fees, depending on the structural context and on the policy objectives. The paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of thirty patent offices worldwide. It is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees, and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age (to the notable exception of Switzerland and the U.S.). |
| Keywords: | application fees; price elasticity; patent system; Intellectual property policy; renewal fees |
| JEL: | O30 O31 O38 O57 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/57652&r=ipr |
| By: | Noriyuki Doi (Kwansei Gakuin University) |
| Abstract: | To disentangle the relations between standards, innovation and competition, this paper examined the processes and effects of standardization in Japanese firms. The realities of their activities were provided by a postal questionnaire sent to progressive large firms in Japanese industries. Overall, although Japanese firms have sufficiently understood the significance of increased standardization, they donft always actively and strategically involve in the standardization process. The conclusion may be derived from the respondentsf evaluations that 1) the effects of standardization are less likely to be profitable; 2) formal standard setting organizations are not always an effective coordination mechanism of intellectual property rights; and 3) they donft have a sufficient internal institution for standardization strategy. They are rather skeptical of particularly formal and semi-formal standardization processes. |
| Keywords: | Consensus-based Standards, Split Type of Standardization, Intellectual Property Rights, Standards Setting Organizations; Patent Hold-up |
| JEL: | L15 L22 L41 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kgu:wpaper:55&r=ipr |
| By: | Bouguezzi, Fehmi |
| Abstract: | This paper studies and compares licensing regimes of a cost reducing innovation in a two dimensional square city where consumers are located in the interior of the square city and pay a quadratic transport cost when moving to one of the competing firms. The difference between results in this model and results in the other models of the existing literature is that here I find that royalties licensing is always better than fixed fee licensing independently of the size of the innovation. This result contradicts those found in a linear city à la Hotelling and in a circular city à la Salop. However, the paper shows that optimal licensing strategies for the patent holding firm are the same as in a Hotelling model where royalties are better for a non drastic innovation. |
| Keywords: | Technology transfer; Patent licensing; Square city |
| JEL: | O32 O31 C21 L24 |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23158&r=ipr |
| By: | Jolian McHardy (Department of Economics, The University of Sheffield Author-Person=pmc71); Tapan Biswas |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with strategic behaviour of firms in a duopoly, subsequent to the claim by one firm that it has reduced the unit cost of production. A variety of possible strategic equilibria are discussed in the context of a duopoly game between a multinational and a local firm. In the context of an extended uniform period of patenting, as finally agreed in the Uruguay round (1994), firms have increased incentive to take patents. In the presence of cost differences, the act of taking process-patents has implications for the equilibrium output strategies of the duopoly firms and sometimes may have a negative overall welfare effect for the local producer and consumers. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric Information, Duopoly, Process Patenting, Repeated Games |
| JEL: | O12 D23 D43 |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:shf:wpaper:2010014&r=ipr |
| By: | germán daniel lambardi |
| Abstract: | In this paper I study how innovation investment in a software duopoly is affected by the fact that one of the firms is, or might become Open Source. Firms can either be proprietary source (PS) or open source (OS), and have different initial technological levels. An OS firm is a for profit organization whose basic software is OS and it is distributed for free. The OS firm, however, is able to make profits from selling complementary software and, on the cost side; it receives development help from a community of users. I first compare a duopoly composed by two PS firms with a mixed duopoly of a PS and OS firm and I find that a PS duopoly might generate more innovation than a mixed duopoly if the initial technological gap between firms is small. However if this gap is large, a PS duopoly generates less innovation than a mixed duopoly. I then extend the setting to allow PS firms to switch to OS or to remain PS. A PS firm wants to become OS if it gets behind enough in the technological race against a competitor. I find that the outside option to become OS might soften competition on innovation since the technological leader prefers to reduce his innovation investment to avoid the OS switch of the follower. Therefore, although the switch to OS could generate higher investment levels ex-post it might generate lower investment ex-ante. In this context I find that a government subsidy to OS firms could be potentially harmful for innovation. |
| Date: | 2010–06–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000130:007097&r=ipr |
| By: | Elisa Barbieri (Dipartimento di Economia Istituzioni e Territorio Università degli Studi di Ferrara); Roberto Iorio (Dipartimento di Sociologia e Scienza della Politica Università degli Studi di Salerno); Giuseppe Lubrano Lavadera (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche Università degli Studi di Salerno) |
| Abstract: | The current economic crisis has put government intervention and policy evaluation at the centre of the debate on industrial development policy. Government efforts to stimulate a structural change of Italian industries are needed and in this context it becomes fundamental to engage in evaluation exercises in order to understand what policies are working. The paper offers an evaluation exercise on the major instruments used to promote R&D and innovation activities of Italian firms. We concentrate in particular on Law 46/82 and we look at the effects of the incentives it provides on firms expenditures on R&D and on new employment generation. We also consider the effects of such incentives when other similar laws are at work. Results suggest that a rethinking of the system of incentives might be needed to limit an inefficient overlapping of instruments. |
| Keywords: | Evaluation of industrial policies; R&D and innovation; R&D incentives |
| JEL: | L52 O38 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cme:wpaper:1003&r=ipr |
| By: | Marie Ferru (CRIEF - Centre de Recherche sur l'Intégration Economique et Financière - Université de Poitiers) |
| Abstract: | This paper tries to elicit elements which explain the geography of science-industry collaborations by focusing on their construction process which is rarely studied regarding the existing literature. Constraints linked to the search of resources, on the one hand, and constraints linked to the logics of contact, on the other, weigh on actors when choosing their partner and could influence the geography of collaborations. An empirical study on collaborations established between Poitiers University's laboratories and firms confirms this hypothesis. Cognitive constraints lead to the spatial dissemination of collaborations. An econometric model shed light on the impact of logics of contact and shows that whereas most of these logics enable the construction of local and non local partnerships, non professional ties favor significantly local ones. |
| Keywords: | Collaborations; geography; social networks; institutions; resources |
| Date: | 2010–10–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00461262_v1&r=ipr |