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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Andrea Mantovani (University of Bologna); Alireza Naghavi (niversity of Bologna and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the consequences of parallel import (PI) on process innovation of firms heterogeneous in their production technology. In an international setting where foreign markets differ with respect to their intellectual property rights regime, a move by a technologically inferior firm to exploit a new unregulated market can result in imitation and PI. The impact of PI on innovation is determined by the degree of heterogeneity between firms and trade costs. Increasing trade costs shifts from the market share losses brought by PI from the more to the less productive firm. This induces the former to invest more in R&D. At this point, sales in the foreign market become a determinant of the R&D decision by the technologically inferior firm. For low levels of firm heterogeneity, PI increases output by this firm targeted for the unregulated market, hence increases its innovation efforts. A tariff policy accompanied by opening borders to PI only increases welfare when the technological gap between the two firms is sufficiently large. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual Property Rights, Parallel Imports, Innovation, Trade Costs, Welfare |
| JEL: | F12 F13 L11 |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.40&r=ipr |
| By: | Martimort, David; Poudou, Jean-Christophe; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried |
| Abstract: | We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives but in different ways according to the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). For example, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise with a limited amount of information revealed. |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:21957&r=ipr |
| By: | Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the incentives that developing countries have to enforce intellectual properties rights (IPR). On the one hand, free-riding on rich countries technology reduces the investment cost in R&D. On the other hand, it yields apotential indirect cost: a firm that violates IPR cannot legally export in a country that enforces them. IPR act like a barrier to entry of the advanced economy markets. Moreover free-riders cannot prevent other to copy their own innovation. The analysis, which distinguishes between large and small developing countries, predicts that small ones should be willing to respect IPR if they want to export and access advanced economies markets, while large emerging countries, such as China and India, will be more reluctant to do so as their huge domestic markets develop. Global welfare is higher under the full protection regime if the developing country does not innovate. It is higher under a partial regime if both countries have access to similar R&D technology and the developing country market is large enough. |
| JEL: | F12 F13 F15 L13 O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:22270&r=ipr |
| By: | McAusland, Carol (University of British Columbia, Vancouver); Kuhn, Peter J. (University of California, Santa Barbara) |
| Abstract: | We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets. |
| Keywords: | intellectual property rights, development, brain drain, international labor migration |
| JEL: | F22 J6 O34 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4936&r=ipr |
| By: | Van den Oord A.; Van Witteloostuijn A.; Duysters G.; Gilsing V. |
| Abstract: | In organizational ecology, the focus is on the evolution of a population of organizations. Adopting a similar logic, we deal with the evolution of a population of related inventions. By employing a population perspective to technology, we aim to determine to what extent the pattern of technological growth can be attributed to the structural or systemic characteristics of the technology itself. Through an empirical investigation of patent data in the biotechnology industry, we show that a technology‘s internal (i.e., density and diversity) and external (i.e., crowding and status) characteristics have a significant effect on its growth rate. |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ant:wpaper:2010006&r=ipr |
| By: | Jeon, Doh-Shin; Rochet, Jean-Charles |
| Abstract: | More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articles are accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through author fees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on a journal’s quality standard. If the journal’s objective was to maximize social welfare, open access would be optimal as long as the positive externalities generated by its diffusion exceed the marginal cost of distribution. However, we show that if an open access journal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers’ utility, the impact of the journal or its profit), it tends to choose a quality standard below the socially efficient level. |
| JEL: | D42 L42 L82 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:21922&r=ipr |