nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2010‒05‒08
three papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Technology transfer in a circular model By Bouguezzi, Fehmi
  2. US market entry by Spanish pharmaceutical firms By Fabrizio Cesaroni; Marco S. Giarratana; Ester Martínez-Ros
  3. Cooperation with public research institutions and success in innovation: Evidence from France and Germany By Robin, Stéphane; Schubert, Torben

  1. By: Bouguezzi, Fehmi
    Abstract: This paper compares three licensing regimes in a symmetric duopoly model situated on a circular city à la Salop. One of the firms holds a patent allowing to reduce the marginal production cost and decides to license its innovation under a fixed fee or a royalty regimes or not to license. The paper shows that fixed fee licensing is better than no licensing for a non drastic innovation which contradicts the result found by Poddar and Sinha (2004) in a linear model. Results also show that, for a non drastic innovation, fixed fee licensing is better than royalty licensing and the opposite for a drastic innovation. Finally, I show that optimal licensing regime for the patent holding firm when innovation is not drastic is fixed fee and I show that for this licensing regime a Nash equilibrium exists. When innovation is drastic, patent holding firm do not license and become a monopoly.
    Keywords: Salop model; Technology transfer; Patent licensing
    JEL: O32 O31 C21 L24
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22417&r=ipr
  2. By: Fabrizio Cesaroni; Marco S. Giarratana; Ester Martínez-Ros
    Abstract: This work explores the factors that spur firms’ propensity to enter in international markets. Among the whole population of Spanish firms active in the pharmaceutical sector (over the period 1995-2004), we identify those firms that have entered the US market by assessing whether they have filed at least a trademark in the US Patents and Trademarks Office. By means of a hazard model, we empirically estimate which firm’s characteristics affect the probability of entry in the US market in a given year. Results show that technological capabilities (breadth and depth of firms’ patent base), and the firm’s cost structure explain the entry in the US market with a branded product. Moreover, our evidence shows that entry strategies based on differentiation advantage (technological diversification) and strategies based on cost advantage (scale economies) are exclusive and do not mix well each other
    Keywords: Foreign market entry, Internationalization strategies, Firm-Specific advantages, Competitive advantage, Innovation and R&D, Patents, Trademarks
    JEL: F23
    Date: 2010–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we101103&r=ipr
  3. By: Robin, Stéphane; Schubert, Torben
    Abstract: We evaluate the impact of cooperation with public research institutions on firms' inno-vative activities in France and Germany, using data from the fourth Community Innova-tion Survey (CIS4). We propose an original econometric methodology, which explicitly takes into account potential estimation biases arising from self-selection and endoge-neity, and apply it to both process and product innovation. We find a positive effect of cooperation on both types of innovation. This effect is significant in both countries, but much higher in Germany than in France. Drawing on a comparison of the institutional context of cooperation across both countries, we interpret this difference as a conse-quence of the more diffusion-oriented German science policy. Finally, our robustness checks confirm the importance of controlling for selection and endogeneity. We show that these problems can be serious, and may lead to inconsistent estimates if ne-glected. --
    Keywords: Public/private research partnerships,University/industry linkages,Innova-tiveness,Heckit procedure with endogenous regressors
    JEL: O31 O33 O38
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fisidp:24&r=ipr

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