nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2009‒11‒07
eight papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Corporate Taxation and the Choice of Patent Location within Multinational Firms By Tom Karkinsky; Nadine Riedel
  2. Monopoly Pricing of an Antibiotic Subject to Bacterial Resistance By Markus Herrmann
  3. Co-determination and Innovation By Kraft, Kornelius; Stank, Jörg; Dewenter, Ralf
  4. Piracy on the internet: Accommodate it or fight it? A dynamic approach By Herings P. Jean-Jacques; Peeters Ronald; Yang Michael S.
  5. Goldilocks and the Licensing Firm: Choosing a Partner when Rivals are Heterogeneous By Anthony Creane; Hideo Konishi
  6. Social capital and knowledge in interorganizational networks: Their joint effect on innovation By Ana Pérez-Luño; Carmen Cabello Medina; Antonio Carmona Lavado; Gloria Cuevas Rodríguez
  7. Trading Cultural Goods in the Era of Digital Piracy By Stefania Lionetti; Roberto Patuelli
  8. Innovative interventions in support of innovation networks. A complex system perspective to public innovation policy and private technology brokering By Federica Rossi; Margherita Russo; Stefania Sardo; Josh Whitford

  1. By: Tom Karkinsky (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation); Nadine Riedel (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, CESifo Munich)
    Abstract: Corporate patents are perceived to be the key profit-drivers in many multinational enterprises (MNEs). Moreover, as the transfer pricing process for royalty payments is often highly intransparent, they also constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities between multinational entities. For both reasons, MNEs have an incentive to locate their patents at affiliates with a relatively small corporate tax rate. Our paper empirically tests for this relationship by exploiting a unique dataset which links information on patent applications to micro panel data for European MNEs. Our results suggest that the corporate tax rate (differential to other group members) indeed exerts a negative effect on the number of patents filed by a subsidiary. The effect is quantitatively large and robust against controlling for affiliate size. The findings prevail if we additionally account for royalty withholding taxes. Moreover, binding `Controlled Foreign Company' rules tend to decrease the number of patent applications.
    Keywords: corporate taxation, multinational enterprise, profit shifting
    JEL: H25 F23 H26 C33
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:btx:wpaper:0931&r=ipr
  2. By: Markus Herrmann
    Abstract: We develop a dynamic bio-economic model of bacterial resistance and disease transmission in which we characterize the pricing policy of a monopolist who is protected by a patent. After expiration, the monopolist behaves competitively in a generic industry having open access to the common pool of antibiotic efficacy and infection. The monopolist manages endogenously the levels of antibiotic efficacy as well as the infected population, which represent quality and market size respectively and achieves, at least temporarily, higher such levels than a hypothetically myopic monopolist who does not take into account the dynamic externalities. The pricing policy and the biological system are characterized by the turnpike property. Before the patent vanishes, the monopolist behaves more and more myopically, leading to a continuous decrease in the price of the antibiotic. Once the generic industry takes over, a discontinuous fall in price occurs. Whether a prolongation of the patent is socially desirable depends on the relative levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection.
    Keywords: Antibiotic efficacy, public health, monopoly pricing, renewable resource, optimal control, turnpike, patent length
    JEL: I18 L12 Q21
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0946&r=ipr
  3. By: Kraft, Kornelius (University of Dortmund); Stank, Jörg (HOCHTIEF AG); Dewenter, Ralf (Technische Universität Ilmenau)
    Abstract: This paper examines the effect of the German co-determination law of 1976 (MitbestG) on the innovative activity of German firms. Co-determination applies to firms with 2000 employees or more. Data from 1971-1976 and 1981-1990 on 148 firms are used to compare the number of patents granted to co-determined firms before and after the introduction of the law. Several control variables are applied and in particular, in order to avoid a possible bias from specific effects of firm size, we compare the co-determined firms with others before and after 1976. The results do not support the view that co-determination slows down technological progress and reduces innovativeness.
    Keywords: co-determination, innovation, patents
    JEL: J5 L2 O3
    Date: 2009–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4487&r=ipr
  4. By: Herings P. Jean-Jacques; Peeters Ronald; Yang Michael S. (METEOR)
    Abstract: This paper uses a dynamic stochastic model to solve for the optimal pricing policy of themusic recording companies in the presence of P2P file-sharing networks eroding their CDsales. We employ a policy iteration algorithm on a discretized state space to numericallycompute the optimal price policy. The realistically calibrated model reflects the real-worldfigures we observe and provides estimates of figures we can not observe, such as changesin total welfare. The results suggest that, thanks to the existence of P2P networks, totalwelfare in 2008 in the U.S. is about $25.6 billion more per annum than in 1999 before P2Pwas introduced. Moreover, the results predict that the current trend of decreasing CDsales will continue until around the year 2020 when it will stabilize at around 231.2 millioncopies per year, comparing to the industry all-time high of 938.9 million in 1999. Thecomparative static analysis shows that full enforcement of intellectual property rights,although helpful for the industrial profit, may have adverse effect on total welfare.
    Keywords: microeconomics ;
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2009034&r=ipr
  5. By: Anthony Creane (Michigan State University); Hideo Konishi (Boston College)
    Abstract: Markets are often characterized with firms of differing capabilities with more efficient firms licensing their technology to lesser firms.  We  examine the effects that the amount of the technology transferred, and the characteristics of the partner have on this licensing.  We find that a partial technology transfer can be the joint-profit minimizing transfer; no such transfer then is superior. However, under weakly concave demand, a complete transfer always increases joint profits so long as there are at least three firms in the industry.  We also establish a "Goldilocks" condition in partner selection: it is neither too efficient nor too inefficient.  Unfortunately, profitable transfers between sufficiently inefficient firms reduce welfare, while transfers from relatively efficient firms increase welfare.  However, an efficient firm might not select the least efficient partner, though it is the social-welfare-maximizing partner.
    Keywords: licensing, technology transfers
    JEL: D4 L24 L4
    Date: 2009–11–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:720&r=ipr
  6. By: Ana Pérez-Luño (Department of Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide); Carmen Cabello Medina (Department of Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide); Antonio Carmona Lavado (Department of Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide); Gloria Cuevas Rodríguez (Department of Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)
    Abstract: This research analyzes the effects of interorganizational links on innovation using a comprehensive framework that integrates three research streams: social capital, knowledge based view and innovation. Using data from 143 R&D and/or marketing departments of innovative manufacturing and service companies, our results show that while knowledge complexity, per se, exerts a clear influence on the degree of innovations radicalness, the effect of knowledge tacitness appears only when it is combined with social capital. Similarly, the mere existence of strong cooperation agreements (relational social capital) does not guarantee more radical innovations. It is only when this social capital is combined with tacit knowledge that it really produces more innovative products. We also find that such radical products have an important impact on firm performance.
    Keywords: : Innovation; radicalness; social capital; knowledge complexity; knowledge tacitness; firm performance
    Date: 2009–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpbsad:09.04&r=ipr
  7. By: Stefania Lionetti (Institute of Economic Research (IRE), University of Lugano); Roberto Patuelli (Institute of Economic Research (IRE), University of Lugano; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA))
    Abstract: The issue of digital piracy as violation of intellectual property rights is a hot button among many governments around the world. Until now, nor legislation or its enforcement have managed to keep up with the most recent technologies facilitating piracy. Piracy rates may significantly affect both internal demand and international trade of cultural goods. This paper aims to empirically assess the effect of digital piracy on bilateral trade in cultural goods. We focus on trade in music and media. Analysing an 11-year panel of 25 countries, we find that piracy does affect negatively bilateral trade, although to a varying extent.
    Keywords: trade; cultural goods; piracy; spatial filtering; network autocorrelation
    JEL: F1 C23 Z11
    Date: 2009–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lug:wpaper:0907&r=ipr
  8. By: Federica Rossi; Margherita Russo; Stefania Sardo; Josh Whitford
    Abstract: The linear model of innovation has been superseded by a variety of theoretical models that view the innovation process as systemic, complex, multi-level, multi-temporal, involving a plurality of heterogeneous economic agents. Accordingly, the emphasis of the policy discourse has shifted over time. It has gone from a focus on direct public funding of basic research as an engine of innovation, to the creation of markets for knowledge goods, to, eventually, the acknowledgement that knowledge transfer very often requires direct interactions among innovating actors. In most cases, these interventions attempt to facilitate the match between “demand” and “supply” of the knowledge needed to innovate. A complexity perspective calls for a different framing, one focused on the fostering of process characterized by multiple agency levels, multiple temporal scales, ontological uncertainty and emergent outcomes. The article explores what it means to design interventions in support of innovation processes inspired by a complex systems perspective. It does so by analyzing two different examples of coordinated interventions: an innovative public policy funding networks of innovating firms, and a private initiative supporting innovation in the mechanical engineering industry thanks to the set up of a technology broker. Relying on two unique datasets recording the interactions of the various organizations involved in these interventions, the article combines social network analysis and qualitative research in order to investigate the dynamics of the networks and the roles and actions of specific actors in fostering innovation processes. Building upon this comparative analysis, some general implications for the design of coordinated interventions supporting innovation in a complexity perspective are derived.
    Keywords: Innovation policy; local development policies; regional development policies; evaluation management
    JEL: D78 O31 O32 O38 R58
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:depeco:0619&r=ipr

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