nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2009‒09‒26
seven papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Macroeconomic Effects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey By Chu, Angus C.
  2. Inventors and Impostors: An Economic Analysis of Patent Examination By Florian Schuett
  3. Policy approaches regarding technology transfer: Portugal and Switzerland compared By Maria das Dores B. Moura Oliveira; Aurora A.C. Teixeira
  4. Mixed Source By Ramon Casadesus-Masanell; Gaston Llanes
  5. Count Data Stochastic Frontier Models, with an application to the patents-R&D Relationship By Eduardo Fé-Rodríguez; Richard Hofler
  6. Breakthrough Inventions and Migrating Clusters of Innovation By William R. Kerr
  7. What Turns Knowledge into Innovative Products? The Role of Entrepreneurship and Knowledge Spillovers By Block, J.H.; Thurik, A.R.; Zhou, H.

  1. By: Chu, Angus C.
    Abstract: This paper provides a survey on studies that analyze the macroeconomic effects of intellectual property rights (IPR). The first part of this paper introduces different patent-policy instruments and reviews their effects on R&D and economic growth. This part also discusses the distortionary effects and distributional consequences of IPR protection as well as empirical evidence on the effects of patent rights. Then, the second part considers the international aspects of IPR protection. In summary, this survey draws the following conclusions from the literature. Firstly, different patent-policy instruments have different effects on R&D and growth. Secondly, there is empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, but the evidence is stronger for developed countries than for developing countries. Thirdly, the optimal level of IPR protection should tradeoff the social benefits of enhanced innovation against the social costs of multiple distortions and income inequality. Finally, in an open economy, achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an international coordination (rather than the harmonization) of IPR protection.
    Keywords: economic growth; innovation; intellectual property rights
    JEL: O34 O31 O40
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:17342&r=ipr
  2. By: Florian Schuett
    Abstract: The objective of patent examination is to separate the wheat from the chaff. Good applications - those satisfying the patentability criteria, particularly novelty and nonobviousness - should be accepted, while bad applications should be rejected. How should incentives for examiners be designed to further this objective? This paper develops a theoretical model of patent examination to address the question. It argues that examination can be described as a moral-hazard problem followed by an adverse-selection problem: the examiner must be given incentives to exert effort (looking for evidence to reject), but also to truthfully reveal the evidence he finds (or lack thereof). The model can explain the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the U.S. patent office, where examiners are essentially rewarded for granting patents, as well as variation in compensation schemes across patent offices. It also has implications for the retention of examiners and for administrative patent review.
    Keywords: innovation, patent office, soft information, intrinsic motivation, incentives for bureaucrats
    JEL: O31 O38 D73 D82 L50
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2009/28&r=ipr
  3. By: Maria das Dores B. Moura Oliveira (UPIN – Universidade do Porto Inovação, Universidade do Porto); Aurora A.C. Teixeira (INESC Porto; CEFUP, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)
    Abstract: The environment in which technology transfer takes place plays a key role in defining the best approaches and, ultimately, their success. In the present paper we analyse the extent to which Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) efficiency is influenced by framework conditions and, in particular, by the innovation policies and programmes. We hypothesise that countries with higher technology transfer efficiency levels would have innovation policies more supportive to technology transfer efforts. Results based on an in depth account and statistical analysis of over 60 innovation policies from Switzerland (widely associated to high levels of technology transference efficiency) and Portugal (a laggard country in this particular) corraborate our initial hypothesis. Switzerland policies overall include more references to knowledge and technology transfer, in the form of licenses, R&D collaboration and spin-offs, than Portuguese policies. One exception is the case of patents (intellectual property rights, in general) with stronger weight in Portuguese policies and, to some extent, the support to spin-off creation and venture capital. The findings highlighted significant differences in variables with impact in technology transfer, namely the priorities addressed, target groups and funding eligibility, aspects of the innovation process targeted and forms of funding. From the exercise it was possible to derive some policy implications. Specifically, we advance that if a country wishes to increase technology transfer efficiency then it should implement a mandate for R&D cooperation between different actors, give priority to fund cutting edge science and research performers, and attribute a higher emphasis on applied industrial research and prototype creation aspects of the innovation process.
    Keywords: Technology transfer, innovation policies, technology transfer efficiency
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inc:wpaper:2009-09-wp5&r=ipr
  4. By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell (Harvard Business School, Harvard University); Gaston Llanes (Harvard Business School, Harvard University)
    Abstract: We study competitive interaction between profit-maximizing firms that sell software and complementary goods or services. In addition to tactical price competition, we allow firms to compete through business model reconfigurations. We consider three business models: the proprietary model (where all software modules offered by the firm are proprietary), the open source model (where all modules are open source), and the mixed source model (where a few modules are open). When a firm opens one of its modules, users can access and improve the source code. At the same time, however, opening a module sets up an open source (free) competitor. This hampers the firm's ability to capture value. We analyze three competitive situations: monopoly, commercial firm vs. non-profit open source project, and duopoly. We show that: (i) firms may become "more closed" in response to competition from an outside open source project; (ii) firms are more likely to open substitute, rather than complementary, modules to existing open source projects; (iii) when the products of two competing firms are similar in quality, firms differentiate through choosing different business models; and (iv) low-quality firms are generally more prone to opening some of their technologies than firms with high-quality products.
    Keywords: Open Source, User Innovation, Business Models, Complementarity, Vertical Differentiation, Value Creation, Value Capture
    JEL: O31 L17 D43
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:0906&r=ipr
  5. By: Eduardo Fé-Rodríguez; Richard Hofler
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:man:sespap:0916&r=ipr
  6. By: William R. Kerr (Harvard Business School, Entrepreneurial Management Unit)
    Abstract: We investigate the speed at which clusters of invention for a technology migrate spatially following breakthrough inventions. We identify breakthrough inventions as the top one percent of US inventions for a technology during 1975-1984 in terms of subsequent citations. Patenting growth is significantly higher in cities and technologies where breakthrough inventions occur after 1984 relative to peer locations that do not experience breakthrough inventions. This growth differential in turn depends on the mobility of the technology's labor force, which we model through the extent that technologies depend upon immigrant scientists and engineers. Spatial adjustments are faster for technologies that depend heavily on immigrant inventors. The results qualitatively con.rm the mechanism of industry migration proposed in models like [Duranton, G., 2007. Urban evolutions: The fast, the slow, and the still. American Economic Review 97, 197.221].
    Keywords: Agglomeration, Clusters, Entrepreneurship, Invention, Mobility, Reallocation, R&D, Patents, Scientists, Engineers, Immigration.
    JEL: F2 J4 J6 O3 O4 R1 R3
    Date: 2009–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:10-020&r=ipr
  7. By: Block, J.H.; Thurik, A.R.; Zhou, H. (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University)
    Abstract: The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship seeks to explain the sources of entrepreneurship and its consequences with regard to economic performance. This paper extends this theory and links it to innovation performance. We propose that a high rate of entrepreneurship facilitates the process of turning knowledge into innovative products while it has no effect on the relation between knowledge and imitative products. We use European country-level data to test our propositions. Our results show that a high rate of entrepreneurship increases the chances that knowledge turns into innovative products. The findings highlight the importance of entrepreneurs in the process of commercialization of knowledge. Implications for innovation policy are discussed.
    Keywords: innovation;entrepreneurship;knowledge;patents;technology policy;knowledge spillovers;commercialization of knowledge;economic growth;O30
    Date: 2009–09–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:eureri:1765016769&r=ipr

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