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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Reyer Gerlagh (University of Manchester); Snorre Kverndokk (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research); Knut Einar Rosendah (Research Department, Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the timing and interdependence between innovation and environmental policy in a model of research and development (R&D). On a first-best path the environmental tax is set at the Pigouvian level, independent of innovation policy. With infinite patent lifetime, the R&D subsidy should be constant and independent of the state of the environment. However, with finite patent lifetime, optimal innovation policy depends on the stage of the environmental problem. In the early stages of an environmental problem, abatement research should be subsidized at a high level and this subsidy should fall monotonically over time to stimulate initial R&D investments. Alternatively, with a constant R&D subsidy, patents’ length should initially have a very long life-time but this should be gradually shortened. In a second-best situation with no deployment subsidy for abatement equipment, we find that the environmental tax should be high compared to the Pigouvian levels when an abatement industry is developing, but the relative difference falls over time. That is, environmental policies will be accelerated compared to first-best. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Policy, Research and Development, Innovation Subsidies, Patents |
| JEL: | H21 O30 Q42 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.53&r=ipr |
| By: | Simona Tenaglia (ISFOL - Institute for the Development of Training for Workers); Marco Ventura (ISAE - Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at estimating the value of legal patent protection of environment-related technologies, using the real options approach. In particular, we manage to overcome the problem of the lack of data for those countries that do not collect patent renewal data. Following this estimation strategy, we rank the value of legal patent protection for seventeen countries, closely reproducing other rankings based on surveys, for instance the PatVal survey by the EU Commission (2006), but relying on macro data publicly available and easy to access. The unit value of damage is found to be the most important determinant of the value of patents granted by legal protection. |
| Keywords: | value of patents, legal protection, real options, abatement technology, environmental technologies. |
| JEL: | K40 O38 Q55 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isa:wpaper:103&r=ipr |
| By: | Vasileios Zikos (Loughborough University) |
| Abstract: | We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. A key finding of the paper is that state-owned enterprises may be used as policy instruments in tackling the potential conflict between individual and collective incentives for R&D collaboration. |
| Keywords: | Networks, R&D Collaboration, Mixed Oligopoly |
| JEL: | C70 L13 L20 L31 L32 O31 D85 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.25&r=ipr |
| By: | Valerie Mercer-Blackman |
| Abstract: | Do tax incentives for science and technology stimulate additional investment? We use detailed data on applications and acceptances for R&D tax incentives, a special survey, and for the first time, the science and technology module from the 2000-2002 Survey of Manufacturers database in Colombia to analyze this question. We estimate the effect of the R&D tax deduction instituted in Colombia using Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regressions method, and find that the elasticity of demand of R&D investment in manufacturing is quite high in Colombia compared to other countries, particularly for smaller firms, but that the direct benefit from existing policies is minimal. Overall, the results of the paper suggest that there is a great potential for such incentives to promote R&D investment in Colombia, but in their current form, they fail to target those firms that could benefit the most. |
| Keywords: | Working Paper , Colombia , Tax incentives , Manufacturing sector , Industrial investment , Economic models , Development , |
| Date: | 2008–07–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/178&r=ipr |
| By: | Ngo Van Long; Horst Raff; Frank Stähler |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how trade liberalization affects the innovation incentives of firms, and what this implies for industry productivity and social welfare. For this purpose we develop a reciprocal dumping model of international trade with heterogeneous firms and endogenous R&D. We identify two effects of trade liberalization on productivity: a direct effect through changes in R&D investment, and a selection effect due to inefficient firms leaving the market. We show how these effects operate in the short run when market structure is fixed, and in the long run when market structure is endogenous. Among the robust results that hold for any market structure are that trade liberalization (i) increases (decreases) aggregate R&D for low (high) trade costs; (ii) increases expected industry productivity; and (iii) raises expected social welfare if trade costs are low |
| Keywords: | international trade, firm heterogeneity, R&D, productivity, market structure |
| JEL: | F12 F15 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kie:kieliw:1430&r=ipr |
| By: | David Frachisse (CREUSET, Jean Monnet University); Pascal Billand (CREUSET, Jean Monnet University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we compare two different representations of Framework Programs as affiliation network: “One-mode networks”' and “Two-mode networks”'. The aim of this article is to show that the choice of the representation has an impact on the analysis of the networks and on the results of the analysis. In order to support our proposals, we present two forms of representation and different indicators used in the analysis. We study the network of the 6th Framework Program using the two forms of representation. In particular, we show that the identification of the central nodes is sensitive to the chosen representation. Furthermore, the nodes forming the core of the network vary according to the representation. These differences of results are important as they can influence innovation policies. |
| Keywords: | Affiliation Network, Innovation Policies, Centrality |
| JEL: | L14 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.32&r=ipr |