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on Intellectual Property Rights |
| By: | Siebert, Ralph; von Graevenitz, Georg |
| Abstract: | In a patent thicket licensing provides a mechanism to either avoid or resolve hold up. We study the choice between ex ante licensing to avoid hold up and ex post licensing to resolve it. Firms’ choice of licensing contract is studied in the context of a patent portfolio race. We show that high expected blocking leads to ex ante licensing while ex post licensing arises if expected blocking is low but realized blocking is high. Also, ex ante licensing reduces firms’ R&D incentives. A sample selection model of licensing is derived from the theoretical model. In this framework theoretical predictions on effects of blocking are tested with data from the semiconductor industry. We show that licensing helps firms to resolve blocking. However, licensing is not a cure all: it decreases as fragmentation of property rights increases and arises mainly between large firms with similar market shares. Using a treatment effects model we also confirm the prediction that ex ante licensing reduces the level of R&D investment. |
| Keywords: | Hold-Up Problem; Licensing; Innovation; Patent Race; Patent Thicket. |
| JEL: | L13 L49 L63 |
| Date: | 2008–01–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:msmdpa:2104&r=ipr |
| By: | José Miguel Benavente (INTELIS, Department of Economics, University of Chile); Gustavo Crespi (International Development Research Centre); Alessandro Maffioli (Inter-American Development Bank) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyzed the effectiveness of a Chilean TDF, the FONTEC program. We found that FONTEC’s subsides partially crowded-out private investments in innovation and they more effectively promoted technological upgrades and process innovations, rather than radical product innovations. In the empirical analysis, we considered four levels of potential impact: input additionality, behavioral additionality, innovative output, and performances. In terms of input additionality, although FONTEC increased the overall R&D budget of the firms, it did not stimulate additional private investment in innovation activities. In terms of behavioral additionality, FONTEC effectively promoted process innovation and induced changes in the innovation strategy of the firms. In terms of innovative outputs, FONTEC did not significantly foster patenting activities and had no significant impact on the creation and adoption of new products. In terms of performances, although FONTEC increased the sales, employment and export, it did not significantly foster productivity. In the absence of randomized experiments, we estimated these impacts through a quasi-experimental approach that combines difference-in-difference and propensity score matching techniques. |
| Keywords: | FONTEC; Chile; Research and Development; Matching Grants; Policy Evaluation. |
| JEL: | O30 O38 H43 |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:ovewps:0507&r=ipr |
| By: | Jakub Kastl (Stanford University); David Martimort (Toulouse School of Economics); Salvatore Piccolo (Toulouse School of Economics, University of Naples and CSEF) |
| Abstract: | We use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document the positive relationship between delegation of decisions within organizations and innovation incentives. In order to obtain the causal effect, we build a contract theory model with asymmetric information and moral hazard which predicts that awarding autonomy to the manager spurs innovation incentives relative to arrangements based on vertical control. We use the model to guide our search for suitable instruments. Using several alternative instrumental variables and different specifications we find a strong positive effect of delegation on R&D spending. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric Information, Delegation, Hold-up, R&D and Vertical Control |
| Date: | 2008–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:192&r=ipr |
| By: | Russo Antonio P.; Segre Giovanna |
| Abstract: | In this paper the institution of Collective Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) is proposed as a regulatory tool for the development of Creative Tourist Districts based on local knowledge and trust, described as a superior organisational model of destinations to alternative models founded on individual property. As there are various types and contexts of applications of CIPR, as well as different development objectives to be achieved, the paper designs a strategy to maximise the expected impacts from case to case. It then proposes “area labels”, based on a combination of controls on quality and delimitation of areas of validity of the right, as the best instrument to foster a strategic orientation to quality across the local tourism industry. |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:eblawp:200712&r=ipr |
| By: | Berrone, Pascual (IESE Business School); Gelabert, Liliana (Universidad Carlos III); Fosfuri, Andrea (Universidad Carlos III); Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. (Arizona State University) |
| Abstract: | We examine institutional pressures as antecedents of environmental innovation. Drawing on institutional theory and a resource-based view of the firm, we argue that regulatory and normative forces influence companies' propensity to innovate in environment-related projects. Furthermore, we suggest that this relationship is contingent on the availability and specificity of the companies' resources. These relationships were tested using environmental patents and citations of 340 publicly-traded companies from polluting industries in the U.S. Results suggest that institutional pressures can be a source of competitive advantage, and regulatory forces are becoming more strongly associated with environmental innovations as the intensity of companies' R&D activities increase. |
| Keywords: | environmental innovation; institutional theory; resource-based view; |
| Date: | 2007–11–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0723&r=ipr |
| By: | Giammario Impullitti |
| Abstract: | The geographical distribution of R&D investment changes dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1970s U.S. firms are the uncontested world leaders in R&D investment in most manufacturing sectors. Later, led by Japan and Europe, foreign firms start challenging American R&D leadership in many sectors of the economy. In this period of increasing competition we also observe a substantial increase in the U.S. R&D subsidy. In a version of the multi-country quality ladder growth model I study the effects of foreign R&D competition on domestic welfare and on the optimal R&D subsidy. I build a new empirical index of international R&D rivalry that can be used to perform quantitative analysis in this type of frameworks. In a calibrated version of the model I focus on the period 1979-1991 and perform the following quantitative exercises: first, I evaluate the quantitative effects of the observed increase in foreign R&D competition on U.S. welfare. I find that the positive growth effect and the negative business-stealing effect of foreign competition on U.S. welfare substantially balance each other, and the overall welfare effect of competition is negligible - less then 1 percent of per-capita consumption. Moreover, using estimates of the effective U.S. R&D subsidy rate, I compute the distance from optimality of the observed subsidy at each level of competition. I find that international competition increases the optimal subsidy and that, surprisingly, the U.S. subsidy observed in the data is fairly close to the optimal subsidy. |
| Keywords: | international competition, R&D-driven growth theory, strategic R&D policy, international trade and growth |
| JEL: | F12 F13 O41 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2008/11&r=ipr |