nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2007‒08‒27
nine papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Close to You? Bias and Precision in Patent-Based Measures of Technological Proximity By Mary Benner; Joel Waldfogel
  2. Academic licensing: a European study By Annamaria Conti; Patrick Gaulé; Dominique Foray
  3. Northern and Southern Patent Novelty Requirement Harmonization, Growth and Trade By Gilles Koléda
  4. The Spatial Distribution of Innovation Networks By Wilhelmsson, Mats
  5. Is Distance Dying at Last? Falling Home Bias in Fixed Effects Models of Patent Citations By Rachel Griffith; Sokbae Lee; John Van Reenen
  6. Leveraging Resistance to Change and the Skunk Works Model of Innovation By Andrea Fosfuri; Thomas Rønde
  7. Making the transition from imitation to innovation: An enquiry into the technological capabilities of China's firms By Wendy Dobson; A. E. Safarian
  8. The Impact of Patenting on New Product Introductions in the Pharmaceutical Industry By Stuart, Graham; Matthew, Higgins
  9. On the Roles and Rationales of European STI Policies By Rahel Falk; Werner Hölzl; Hannes Leo

  1. By: Mary Benner; Joel Waldfogel
    Abstract: Patent data have been widely used in research on technological innovation to characterize firms' locations as well as the proximities among firms in knowledge space. Researchers could measure proximity among firms with a variety of measures based on patent class data, including Euclidean distance, correlation, and angle between firms' patent class distributions. Alternatively, one could measure proximity using overlap in cited patents. We point out that measures of proximity based on small numbers of patents are imprecisely measured random variables. Measures computed on samples with few patents generate both biased and imprecise measures of proximity. We explore the effects of larger sample sizes and coarser patent class breakdowns in mitigating these problems. Where possible, we suggest that researchers increase their sample sizes by aggregating years or using all of the listed patent classes on a patent, rather than just the first.
    JEL: O31
    Date: 2007–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13322&r=ipr
  2. By: Annamaria Conti (Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Patrick Gaulé (Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Dominique Foray (Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne)
    Abstract: This paper is an empirical analysis of the impact that different organisational forms of the Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) in Europe have on their licensing activity. Given the great diversity of organization forms prevailing across European TTOs, our paper attempts to shed more light on which of those forms might be more efficient. We use as a measure of efficiency and as dependent variable of our model the number of license agreements concluded. Controlling for staff, invention disclosures, quality of the academic institution, life science orientation and demand for technology, we find evidence for the importance of personnel with a PhD in science in the TTO to facilitate communication between academics and the TTO. We find that the age of the TTO has a significant but negative effect. We do not find a positive effect for private organization of the TTO. Our data is derived from the 2004-2005 survey on TTO activities by the Association of European Science and Technology Professionals (ASTP) and information collected from TTO web sites.
    Keywords: technology transfer offices, technology licensing, university licensing
    JEL: L3 O31 O32 O38
    Date: 2007–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmi:wpaper:cemi-workingpaper-2007-001&r=ipr
  3. By: Gilles Koléda
    Abstract: We study the incentive that governments have to protect IPR in a trading world economy, focusing on the patent novelty requirement and its effect on growth and trade. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two regions. The North is assumed to have a higher wage than the South and a greater capacity for innovation, the South is assumed to have a larger population than the North. We introduce heterogeneity in innovation size together with the obligation, imposed by Patent Office inside each region, that innovation size must be higher than the patent novelty requirement. This patent characteristic stands to be a useable instrument to promote innovation and growth, and also a strategic trade policy instrument. We numerically determine the Nash equilibrium of the strategic game that results of the patent novelty requirement setting by each regional authority. We then compare, in terms of welfare, the non-cooperative equilibrium with the equilibrium that results from the patent novelty requirement harmonization, when the level of this common patent novelty requirement is set by a supra-regional organization.
    Keywords: patent novelty requirement, innovation, growth, quality ladders, harmonization, North and South
    JEL: O34 O40 F43
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:deg:conpap:c012_011&r=ipr
  4. By: Wilhelmsson, Mats (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology)
    Abstract: Innovation networking has become both more feasible with improved telecommunication and more important as it usually produces research of higher quality. However, the spatial distribution of academic networks and innovative networks are not uniform. Despite overwhelming evidence on the benefits of collaboration, patent data from 1994-2001 in Sweden demonstrate that innovation networks are not very common. In addition, the pattern of innovative networks is very fragmented. Our results indicate that innovation networks are more likely to exist in densely populated areas with a diversified industry. Face-to-face contacts in such areas seem to promote networking. Moreover, science-oriented industries appear to benefit more from proximity to universities when it comes to collaboration. However, the size of the market does not matter at all when it comes to collaboration, more important is the density and diversity of the market.
    Keywords: innovation; networks; patent; collaboration
    JEL: N34 O31 R11
    Date: 2007–08–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0091&r=ipr
  5. By: Rachel Griffith; Sokbae Lee; John Van Reenen
    Abstract: We examine the home bias of international knowledge spillovers as measured by the speed of patent citations (i.e. knowledge spreads slowly over international boundaries). We present the first compelling econometric evidence that the geographical localization of knowledge spillovers has fallen over time, as we would expect from the dramatic fall in communication and travel costs. Our proposed estimator controls for correlated fixed effects and censoring in duration models and we apply it to data on over two million citations between 1975 and 1999. Home bias declines substantially when we control for fixed effects: there is practically no home bias for the more modern sectors such as pharmaceuticals and information/communication technologies.
    JEL: F23 O32 O33
    Date: 2007–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13338&r=ipr
  6. By: Andrea Fosfuri (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Thomas Rønde (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: We study a situation in which an R&D department promotes the introduction of an innovation that results in costly re-adjustments for a production department. In response, the production department tries to resist change by improving the existing technology. We show that firms balancing the strengths of the two departments perform better. As a negative effect, resistance to change might distort the R&D department’s effort away from radical innovations. The firm can solve this problem by implementing the so-called skunk works model of innovation where the R&D department is isolated from the rest of the organization. Several implications for managing resistance to change and for the optimal design of R&D activities are derived.
    Keywords: resistance to change; innovation; skunk works model; contest
    JEL: L2 M12 M54 O31 O32
    Date: 2005–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuieci:2007-10&r=ipr
  7. By: Wendy Dobson; A. E. Safarian (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto)
    Abstract: We examine evidence on whether and how the Chinese economy will make the transition from imitation and labor intensive production to innovation as the source of sustained long term growth. We note the risk of obstacles to innovation such as outdated institutions and incentive systems that cause the “disequilibrium trap” in which growth slows down. We review existing literatures that focus on macroeconomic indicators, institutions and the behavior of firms and which suggests that China can make the transition, but progress depends on addressing significant institutional weaknesses including the weak legal system, continued reliance on imitation and on international rather than domestic supply chains, and partial linkages between the growing public science and technology base and industry. Much depends on the behavior of firms. We study such behavior in our results of a firm-level survey. Interviews with privately-owned SME producers in five industries designated as “high tech” shed light on how they are learning by examining three main inputs to their innovation processes: learning with respect to organizational, marketing, sourcing or production processes; education and skills development; and changes in the quantity and types of R&D. Most of the firms are less than 20 years old and focus on the domestic product market, adapting and learning as a result of intense competitive pressures, demanding customers, interaction with research institutes and the use of international linkages, foreign acquisitions or foreign partners.
    Keywords: China. Technological capabilities of firms. Catchup. Transition to innovation economy.
    Date: 2007–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ttp:itpwps:0704&r=ipr
  8. By: Stuart, Graham; Matthew, Higgins
    Abstract: Since Comanor and Scherer (1969), researchers have been using patents as a proxy for new product development. In this paper, we reevaluate this relationship by using novel new data. We demonstrate that the relationship between patenting and new FDA-approved product introductions has diminished considerably since the 1950s, and in fact no longer holds. Moreover, we also find that the relationship between R&D expenditures and new product introductions is considerably smaller than previously reported. While measures of patenting remain important in predicting the arrival of product introductions, the most important predictor is the loss of exclusivity protection on a current product. Our evidence suggests that pharmaceutical firms are acting strategically with respect to new product introductions. Finally, we find no relationship between firm size and new product introductions.
    Keywords: Patenting; Pharmaceutical industry; New product management; Research productivity
    JEL: O30
    Date: 2007–08–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:4574&r=ipr
  9. By: Rahel Falk; Werner Hölzl (WIFO); Hannes Leo (WIFO)
    Abstract: EU enlargement has increased the diversity of the European Union in a substantial way, in particular with respect to its capacities in the fields of science, technology and innovation (STI). The shares of both gross and business sector expenditures on R&D in GDP are increasingly diverging following EU enlargement pointing at quite different levels of technological opportunities and absorptive capacity. Against this background, this paper tries to disentangle the rationales for STI policies at an EU level. Starting from the different policy rationales we assign different STI policy fields to levels of governance. Our discussion suggests that the European Union plays two quite distinct roles in EU STI policy. The first role is closely related to the assignment of policy competences and establishes the fields where the EU should act as policy maker and program owner. But this alone is likely not enough when it comes to the managing and coordination of complex horizontal policy fields such as STI policy. Here the second role of the European Commission comes into place. This second role is not related to policy making but to the "right" to fuel discussions to find coordinated solutions. This role is essentially political and relates to the job to stimulate activities in areas where the Commission has no mandate (due to missing clear rationales) to act alone.
    Keywords: EU enlargement, science, technology and innovation (STI), policy rationales, subsidiarity, policy competences, coordination, horizontal policy fields
    Date: 2007–08–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2007:i:299&r=ipr

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