nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2007‒08‒14
five papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. The Role(s) of Intellectual Property Rights for Innovation : A Review of the Empirical Evidence and Implications for Developing Countries By Andréanne Léger
  2. IPR for Public and Private Innovations, and Growth By Luca, SPINESI
  3. India ' s journey toward an effective patent By Abramson, Bruce
  4. Why Don't Inventors Patent? By Petra Moser
  5. Identifying the Age Profile of Patent Citations By Aditi Mehta; Marc Rysman; Tim Simcoe

  1. By: Andréanne Léger
    Abstract: The role patents play for innovation is not clear, but patenting activity has increased in the last decades. This article reviews the empirical evidence on traditional and novel roles of patents to assess their impacts on innovation in developing countries. It shows that patents are not likely to support innovation in developing countries, even though their non-traditional functions fulfill important roles. This questions the relevance of domestic patent systems, and indicates the need to reassess the costs and benefits of the patent system, the use of patents as innovation indicators, and the need for more research on developing countries.
    Keywords: Intellectual property rights, developing countries, innovation
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp707&r=ipr
  2. By: Luca, SPINESI
    Abstract: The empirical analyses show that public and private R&D are strongly intertwined. On the one hand, the existence of large direct spillovers from public R&D to private industry has extensively proven. Yet, both a substitutability and complementarity relationship between private and public R&D investment has been found. From an institutional point of view, to stimulate the technology transfer from public R&D to private industry to U.S. adopted an uniform patent policy for public funded research, such as that guaranteed by the Bayh-Dole Act. This paper contributes to explain this empirical evidence. Within a neo-Schumpeterian endogenous growth model, it is shown that the intellectual appropriation share of new commercial valuable idea by private firms and the subsidy of private R&D costs are two equivalent ways to stimulate private R&D effort, and they affect in the same way the endogenous per capita output growth rate. The existence of a trade off between the per capita output growth rate and level has found. The main policy implication of these results consists into guarantee two different regimes of IPR for industrial and public innovations. Furthermore, it is shown that the large direct spillovers from public R&D to private industry allows to have better growth performance even if public R&D investment crowds out private innovative effort. A gain a trade off between the per capita output growth rate and level has found.
    Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Private and Public R&D, Growth
    JEL: O31 O34
    Date: 2007–07–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2007015&r=ipr
  3. By: Abramson, Bruce
    Abstract: The decade following India ' s accession to the World Trade Organization ' s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ushered in numerous changes to the country ' s patent system, culminating in a series of amendments in 2005. But a functioning patent system is more than a statute. This paper discusses the steps that India must still take to develop an effective, functioning patent system capable of attracting foreign direct investment, motivating domestic innovation and education, and filtering its benefits to all elements of Indian society, including the poor and the possessors of traditional knowledge. The analysis combines data studies of historical and recent patenting activity in India and by Indians, interviews with Indian government officials, intellectual property attorneys, industrialists, and researchers, and lessons gleaned from patent systems abroad. It identifies critical needs and concrete steps to meet them. Improving public awareness of the revenue-generating potential of patents will enhance incentives for the participation of individuals and small and medium enterprises in the patent system. Formalizing guidelines for patents derived through government research funds-coupled with needed changes in institutional governance-will enhance prospects for technology transfer from laboratories to commercial markets. Compensation schemes for traditional knowledge will extend the benefits of intellectual property rights to the poorest members of society. This paper ' s recommendations would help India achieve both a fully functioning patent system and a mechanism for ensuring that poor people living traditional lifestyles receive their share of the social gains that a working innovation system can confer.
    Keywords: E-Business,Technology Industry,Labor Policies,Real & Intellectual Property Law,Knowledge Economy
    Date: 2007–08–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4301&r=ipr
  4. By: Petra Moser
    Abstract: This paper argues that the ability to keep innovations secret may be a key determinant of patenting. To test this hypothesis, the paper examines a newly-collected data set of more than 7,000 American and British innovations at four world's fairs between 1851 and 1915. Exhibition data show that the industry where an innovation is made is the single most important determinant of patenting. Urbanization, high innovative quality, and low costs of patenting also encourage patenting, but these influences are small compared with industry effects. If the effectiveness of secrecy is an important factor in inventors' patenting decisions, scientific breakthroughs, which facilitate reverse-engineering, should increase inventors' propensity to patent. The discovery of the periodic table in 1869 offers an opportunity to test this idea. Exhibition data show that patenting rates for chemical innovations increased substantially after the introduction of the periodic table, both over time and relative to other industries.
    JEL: D02 D21 D23 D62 K0 L1 L5 N0 N2 N21 N23 O3 O31 O34 O38
    Date: 2007–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13294&r=ipr
  5. By: Aditi Mehta (Department of Economics, Boston University); Marc Rysman (Department of Economics, Boston University); Tim Simcoe (J.L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto)
    Abstract: Previous work studying the age distribution of citations for patents relies on functional form assumptions to address the co-linearity between the birth year, citation year, and age. This paper proposes a non-parametric identification strategy that uses the lag between application and grant as a source of exogenous variation. We show empirically that the “citation clock” starts only when a patent issues, and we examine the potential bias if our assumption is incorrect. We use our approach to re-examine some prior results on the citation age profile of patents from different technological fields. We discuss potential extensions into other research areas.
    JEL: L1 O3
    Date: 2007–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2007-022&r=ipr

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