nep-ipr New Economics Papers
on Intellectual Property Rights
Issue of 2007‒06‒23
nine papers chosen by
Roland Kirstein
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

  1. Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation By Michael Noel; Mark Schankerman
  2. Research Tool Patents and Free-Libre Biotechnology: A Unified Perspective. By Julien Pénin; Jean Pierre Wack
  3. Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation around the World : Evidence from Panel Data By Andréanne Léger
  4. From Science to License: An exploratory analysis of the value of academic patents By Eleftherios Sapsalis
  5. Academic Patenting in Europe: New Evidence from the KEINS Database. By Francesco Lissoni; Patrick Llerena; Maureen McKelvey; Bulat Sanditov
  6. Science vs Technology: a faculty dilemma? 35 years of patenting at the School of Engineering and Applied Science of Columbia University. By Eleftherios Sapsalis
  7. Harnessing Success: Determinants of UniversityTechnology Licensing Performance By Sharon Belenzon; Mark Schankerman
  8. Barriers to Technology Adoption, International R&D Spillovers and Growth By Jesus Crespo Cuaresma; Neil Foster; Johann Scharler
  9. Türkiye’de Bölgesel Yenilik Sistemi ve Devlet Üniversiteleri By Aykut Lenger

  1. By: Michael Noel; Mark Schankerman
    Abstract: Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating,especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This paperstudies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and marketvalue in the computer software industry. We focus on two key aspects:patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, andthe fragmentation of patent rights (.patent thickets.) which increases thetransaction costs of enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates botheffects, together with R&D spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic patenting and R&D spilloversstrongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.
    Keywords: patents, anti-commons, patent thickets, R&D spillovers, marketvalue
    JEL: L43 L86 O31 O32 O33 O34 O38
    Date: 2006–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stieip:43&r=ipr
  2. By: Julien Pénin; Jean Pierre Wack
    Abstract: This paper proposes a unified conceptual framework to analyse the multiple role and consequences of patents in the case of biotechnology research tools. We argue that the knowledge/information and independent/complementary nature of research tools define heterogeneous frameworks in which the patent system plays different roles. In particular, using the analogy with the free-libre open source movement in software, we show that patents can promote open innovation by ensuring the freedom of some pieces of knowledge. A strong conclusion of the paper is therefore that, against common belief, an adequate use of the patent system may contribute to preserving freedom of access to upstream research tools within a framework that we call free-libre biotechnology.
    Keywords: Intellectual property rights, sequential innovation, open source, life science, collective invention.
    JEL: D2 O3
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-24&r=ipr
  3. By: Andréanne Léger
    Abstract: This article contributes to the literature on innovation and development by identifying the determinants of innovation, and the role of intellectual property rights, in industrialized and developing countries. Controlling for sample selection, I find that, in general, the level of intellectual property protection and a country's technological capital stock are positively related to research and development investments, while openness to trade has a negative effect. I also find the determinants of innovation to be different for industrialized and developing countries. This is supported by endogeneity tests showing that intellectual property protection is endogenous in industrialized countries, but not in developing countries. However, in both sub-samples, research and development investments Granger-cause intellectual property protection levels, whereas surprisingly, intellectual property protection does not Granger-cause research and development investments.
    Keywords: Innovation; intellectual property rights; developing countries; panel data; selection model
    JEL: O30 O34 C23
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp696&r=ipr
  4. By: Eleftherios Sapsalis (Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Business School, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels.)
    Abstract: This paper analyses the industrial and entrepreneurial value of 334 patent families applied for by six major Belgian universities. It identifies the value determinants underlying the patent documents and highlights the positive and significant impact of collaboration and tacit scientific knowledge of the inventors’ team on the probability to get licensed. It also shows that there are technological differences between patents licensed to existing companies and the ones licensed to spin-offs. It suggests that existing companies are more likely to license technologies to be cited by academia when spin-offs exploit academic patents that are cited by the industry. These results advocate that existing companies and start-ups are two different valorisation patterns to commercialise different types of academic technologies. The paper stresses also the importance of collaboration between public and corporate research teams in order to get patent licensed. It pleads for a better management and valorisation sheme of patents co-applied for by many academic assignees and draws attention on the need to focus on academic researchers with a high scientific profile in terms of publications in order to crystallize their tacit knowledge into valuable patents.
    Keywords: Patent value, patent indicators, knowledge sources, license, spin-off.
    JEL: L24 M13 O33 O34
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:07-018&r=ipr
  5. By: Francesco Lissoni (University of Brescia, Brescia and Cespri - Bocconi University, Milano, Italy.); Patrick Llerena (BETA - Université L.Pasteur, Strasbourg, France.); Maureen McKelvey (RIDE-IMIT - Chalmers University, Gothenburg, Sweden.); Bulat Sanditov (Cespri - Bocconi University, Milano, Italy and MERIT - Maastricht University, The Netherlands.)
    Abstract: The paper provides summary statistics from the KEINS database on academic patenting in France, Italy, and Sweden. It shows that academic scientists in those countries have signed many more patents than previously estimated. This re?evaluation of academic patenting comes by considering all patents signed by academic scientists active in 2004, both those assigned to universities and the many more held by business companies, governmental organizations, and public laboratories. Specific institutional features of the university and research systems in the three countries contribute to explain these ownership patterns, which are remarkably different from those observed in the US. In the light of these new data, European universities’ contribution to domestic patenting appears not to be much less intense than that of their US counterparts.
    Keywords: Technology transfer, University patents, Academic inventors.
    JEL: I23 O31 O34
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:wp202&r=ipr
  6. By: Eleftherios Sapsalis (Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Business School, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels and Columbia University, US.)
    Abstract: In the large and complex debate related to the creation, diffusion and protection of academic research results, this paper intends to understand the characteristics of academics involved in the knowledge creation as measured by publications and patents. Moreover, it aims to produce some piece of evidence that it is possible to manage patenting activity without jeopardizing publishing. Analysing the publishing and patenting activity of the 326 faculty members of the School of Engineering at Columbia University between 1970 and 2005, we find out that more than the Bayh-Dole Act, it is the implementation of the IP policy at Columbia University that has created an incentive to patent at the engineering school. We also find out that the probability and propensity to patent is influenced by the scientific production of a researcher, his contacts with industry but also his mindset towards patenting. Analysing the scientific productivity of the researchers, we confirm that heterogeneity in the career might deter the productivity of a researcher. We find that scientific collaboration with industry and technological collaboration on application-oriented projects with public or industrial partners had a positive impact on the probability to be among the best scientists. Finally our results suggest that patenting activity undertaken by Columbia University does not divert academics from publishing and relay the recent findings of the literature.
    Keywords: Academia, Patent, Publication
    JEL: O10 O33 O34 O38 L38
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:07-017&r=ipr
  7. By: Sharon Belenzon; Mark Schankerman
    Abstract: We study the impact of incentive pay, local development objectives and governmentconstraints on university licensing performance. We develop and test a simple contractingmodel of technology licensing offices, using new survey information together with paneldata on U.S. universities for 1995-99. We find that private universities are much morelikely to adopt incentive pay than public ones, but ownership does not affect licensingperformance conditional on the use of incentive pay. Adopting incentive pay is associatedwith about 30-40 percent more income per license. Universities with strong localdevelopment objectives generate about 30 percent less income per license, but are morelikely to license to local (in-state) startup companies. Stronger government constraints are'costly' in terms of foregone license income and startup activity. These results are robustto controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.Keywords: incentives,
    Keywords: incentives,
    JEL: O31 O32 O33 F23
    Date: 2007–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stieip:44&r=ipr
  8. By: Jesus Crespo Cuaresma; Neil Foster; Johann Scharler
    Abstract: Panel data is used to investigate the extent of R&D spillovers between OECD countries, and the importance of barriers to technology adoption in affecting the benefits of such spillovers. Our results indicate that countries with less regulated goods and labour markets benefit more from foreign R&D.
    Keywords: R&D Spillovers, Technology Adoption, Economic Growth
    JEL: O30 O40 C33
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2007-09&r=ipr
  9. By: Aykut Lenger (Department of Economics, Ege University)
    Abstract: (This paper is in Turkish) This paper investigates the role of state played in the regional innovation systems through state universities and legal and institutional setup in Turkey. After a discussion of the lack of regional perspective in policy-making until very recently, the paper examines two salient laws that have ramifications for regional economics. The technology development regions/centers, university-industry joint research centers and state universities on account of public research undertaken in and their role in the mentioned centers/regions seem to be key elements in regional innovation systems. The econometric analysis forwarded that each of these elements has a positive and statistically significant effect on the patenting performance of regions.
    JEL: R1 O18 O31
    Date: 2007–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ege:wpaper:0704&r=ipr

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