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on Environmental Economics |
| By: | G. Cornelis van Kooten |
| Abstract: | Under Kyoto, biological activities that sequester carbon can be used to create CO2 offset credits that could obviate the need for lifestyle-changing reductions in fossil fuel use. Credits are earned by storing carbon in terrestrial ecosystems and wood products, although CO2 emissions are also mitigated by delaying deforestation, which accounts for one-quarter of anthropogenic CO2 emissions. However, non-permanent carbon offsets from biological activities are difficult to compare with each other and with emissions reduction because they differ in how long they prevent CO2 from entering the atmosphere. This is the duration problem; it results in uncertainty and makes it difficult to determine the legitimacy of biological activities in mitigating climate change. While there is not doubt that biological sink activities help mitigate climate change and should not be neglected, in this paper we demonstrate that these activities cannot be included in carbon trading schemes. |
| Keywords: | carbon offset credits from biological activities, climate change, duration of carbon sinks |
| JEL: | Q54 Q56 |
| Date: | 2008–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rep:wpaper:2008-04&r=env |
| By: | Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Kataria, Mitesh (National Environmental Research Institute, University of Aarhus); Lampi, Elina (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator preferences regarding improvements in environmental quality differ from citizen preferences. The scope and significance of the possible difference are assessed by conducting identical choice experiments (CE) on a random sample of Swedish citizens and a random sample of administrators working at the Swedish EPA. The experiment concerns two environmental quality objectives: a Balanced Marine Environment and Clean Air. The EPA administrators were asked to choose the alternatives they would recommend as a policy, while the citizens were asked to act as private persons. We find that the rankings of attributes differ between the two groups, and that there are significant differences in the willingness to pay (WTP) for particular attributes. EPA administrators have a higher WTP for five out of the seven attributes, and in some cases the difference is not only significant but also substantial. We also asked the administrators to motivate their CE choices, and the main motive was ecological sustainability.<p> |
| Keywords: | Choice experiment; environmental policy; administrators; citizens |
| JEL: | D61 Q51 Q58 |
| Date: | 2008–04–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0297&r=env |
| By: | GRIMAUD André; LAFFORGUE Gilles; MAGNE Bertrand |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:08.10.254&r=env |
| By: | GRIMAUD André; LAFFORGUE Gilles |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ler:wpaper:08.11.255&r=env |
| By: | Michel Damian (LEPII - Laboratoire d'Économie de la Production et de l'Intégration Internationale - CNRS : UMR5252 - Université Pierre Mendès-France - Grenoble II) |
| Abstract: | Les réponses au changement climatique au cours de la dernière décennie ont négligé les enjeux relatifs à l’adaptation. Cette position n’est plus tenable une fois admise l’inéluctabilité du réchauffement climatique. Reconnaître les besoins d’adaptation contribuerait à mieux faire accepter le renforcement des politiques de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre. |
| Keywords: | CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE ; ADAPTATION ; POLITIQUE ENVIRONNEMENTALE |
| Date: | 2007–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00270701_v1&r=env |
| By: | Tarik Tazdaït; Alejandro Caparros; Jean-Chrsitophe Péreau (OEP - Organisation, Efficacité, Production - CNRS : EA2550) |
| Abstract: | Emission trading systems have been recently proposed in diffrerent regions to reduce polluting emissions (e.g. in the European Union for carbon dioxide). One of the objectives of these systems is to encourage firms to adopt advanced abatement technologies. However permits create an incentive to reduce production, which may be seen as negative by policy makers. Combining the emission trading system<br />with a more rigid labour market, we show conditions under which it is possible to avoid this impact keeping the incentives to improve abatement technologies. The analysis is done for oligopolistic firms engaged<br />in international rivalry. |
| Keywords: | emission trading, labor market, international rivalry |
| Date: | 2007–09–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00271222_v1&r=env |
| By: | Paulo Augusto Nunes |
| Abstract: | This paper focus on a contingent valuation (CV) exercise as to compute estimates for the willingness to pay (WTP) for recreation and biodiversity benefits of a Natural Park in Portugal. The CV survey gathers 1678 respondents and three development policy options. We refer to the Wilderness Areas (WA) tourism development scenario; the Recreational Areas (RA) tourism development scenario and, finally, a scenario version which is characterised by the tourism development of both WA and RA. The results show that the respondents evaluate the WA and RA differently. However, we find no statistical difference between the WTP for the WA and the WTP for the WA jointly with the RA. The last result can be interpreted as an indicator of an eventual presence of warm-glow in the WTP responses. |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces9812&r=env |
| By: | Christoph Böhringer and Knut Einar Rosendahl (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emission trading regimes across multiple jurisdictions. Since the EU ETS covers only some industries, it implies a hybrid emission control scheme where EU member states must apply complementary domestic emissions regulation for the non-trading sectors of their economies in order to comply with their national emission reduction targets. The EU ETS thus opens up for strategic partitioning of national emissions budgets by the member states between trading and non-trading sectors. In this paper we examine the potential effects of such strategic behavior on compliance cost and emissions prices. We show that concerns on efficiency losses from strategic partitioning are misplaced if all the member states behave in a Nash-Cournot manner. However, if a single country takes the official partitioning of the other countries as a reference point, there is substantial scope for exploiting market power. |
| Keywords: | Emissions Trading; Allocation of Quotas; Strategic Behavior |
| JEL: | C61 C72 Q25 |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:538&r=env |
| By: | Olivier Chanel (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579); Stephane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we extend the individual dynamic model of life-time resource allocation to assess the monetary value given to the increase in survival probabilities of every member of a household induced by improved air quality. We then interpret this monetary value as a flow of Value of Life Years Lost (VOLY), and estimate the corresponding Value of a Prevented Fatality (VPF) for different ages and different household members. Using French contingent valuation data on air pollution, we estimate a mean VOLY of Euros 150,000 and a mean VPF<br />of Euros 2.15 million. In addition, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between age and VPF. |
| Keywords: | Value of statistical life, Air pollution, Familial Altruism, Contingent Valuation |
| Date: | 2008–04–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00272776_v1&r=env |
| By: | Paulo Augusto Nunes |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the statistical validity of the willingness to pay (WTP) answers from a contingent valuation (CV) survey concerning value assessment of recreation and biodiversity protection programs. Firstly, we use a non-parametric testing approach as to evaluate the whether (a) different information levels concerning the government costs with the Park and (b) different payment vehicles influence the stated WTP responses. Secondly, we use a parametric model specification as to investigate the impact of the elicitation question format on the stated WTP responses. The likelihood ratio test results, at 95% confidence level, confirm the validity of the proposed survey a measurement instrument. Nevertheless, the presence of free riding turns out to be statistically significant in one of the survey versions. The parametric model results suggest that the differences in the mean WTP estimates across the two question formats are not statistically different. Furthermore, the double bounded dichotomous choice model value estimates point out that the WTP for the recreation protection program is lower than the WTP for the biodiversity protection program, thus confirming the importance of non-use value component of the Natural Area. |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces9811&r=env |
| By: | Susanne Gretzinger |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fln:wpaper:018&r=env |
| By: | Simona Cantono (Department of Economics, University of Turin); Gerald Silverberg (UNU-MERIT) |
| Abstract: | An obstacle to the widespread adoption of environmentally friendly energy technologies such as stationary and mobile fuel cells is their high upfront costs. While much lower prices seem to be attainable in the future due to learning curve cost reductions that increase rapidly with the scale of diffusion of the technology, there is a chicken and egg problem, even when some consumers may be willing to pay more for green technologies. Drawing on recent percolation models of diffusion by Solomon et al. [7], Frenken et al. [8] and Höhnisch et al. [9], we develop a network model of new technology diffusion that combines contagion among consumers with heterogeneity of agent characteristics. Agents adopt when the price falls below their random reservation price drawn from a lognormal distribution, but only when one of their neighbors has already adopted. Combining with a learning curve for the price as a function of the cumulative number of adopters, this may lead to delayed adoption for a certain range of initial conditions. Using agent-based simulations we explore when a limited subsidy policy can trigger diffusion that would otherwise not happen. The introduction of a subsidy policy seems to be highly effective for a given high initial price level only for learning economies in a certain range. Outside this range, the diffusion of a new technology either never takes off despite the subsidies, or the subsidies are unnecessary. Perhaps not coincidentally, this range seems to correspond to the values observed for many successful innovations. |
| Keywords: | Innovation diffusion, learning economies, percolation, networks, heterogeneous agents, technology subsidies, environmental technologies |
| JEL: | C61 H23 O32 O33 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2008025&r=env |
| By: | Jon G. Sutinen |
| Abstract: | A political economy perspective of fisheries governance is presented in this paper. In most countries, formal and informal linkages exist among four components of the governance system. The legislature passes laws that authorise the implementation of policies and programmes by a fisheries agency. The fisheries agency establishes a fisheries management authority. Stakeholders often have a formal role – from advising to decision-making – in the management plan development process and approved plans are implemented by the fisheries agency. In general, governance failure (that is, undesirable public policy outcomes) has been attributed to special interest effects, rational voter ignorance, bundling of issues, shortsightedness, decoupling of costs and benefits, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. No studies demonstrate whether private interests significantly influence fishery policies and regulations, but evidence from other sectors suggests that this is very likely. One of the features that distinguishes the fishing industry from other regulated activities is that often there are no strong property rights, and regulation seeks to prevent overexploitation of a common pool resource (CPR). Fishers, in effect, impose costs on each other rather than on consumers, in the absence of regulation. A laboratory experiment was designed to simulate lobbying to influence regulation of a CPR. Results show that competition for fishery earnings weakens the incentive to effectively lobby for regulations that maximise group well-being. More experienced participants believe that their contributions to changing a regulation are not worthwhile. Instead, they focus more on competing for earnings from their use of the CPR. Correcting or mitigating government failure in fisheries might be assisted by the introduction of strong property rights, the devolution of rights and responsibilities to user groups, the use of the cost recovery and sustainable financing mechanisms, and for shielding fishery managers from the shortsighted tendencies of elected officials. But these recommendations may have difficulty in being implemented in the face of strong opposition from private interests in the fishery. <P>Les grands défis de la réforme de la pêche : Économie politique de la réforme <BR>Une analyse de la gouvernance des pêcheries sous l’angle de l’économie politique est présentée dans ce document. Dans la plupart des pays, il existe des liens formels et informels entre les quatre composantes du système de gouvernance. Le Parlement vote des lois autorisant les autorités compétentes de la pêche à mettre en œuvre des politiques et des programmes. Ces autorités compétentes de la pêche établissent un organisme de gestion des pêches. Les parties prenantes jouent souvent un rôle officiel — variant du conseil à la prise de décision — dans le processus d’élaboration des plans de gestion ; les plans approuvés sont mis en œuvre par les autorités compétentes de la pêche. En général, les échecs de gouvernance (à savoir les résultats indésirables des mesures adoptées par les pouvoirs publics) sont mis sur le compte des intérêts particuliers, de l’ignorance des électeurs, du regroupement des problèmes, de l’absence de vision, du découplage des coûts et des avantages et de l’inefficacité bureaucratique. Bien qu’aucune étude n’ait démontré que les intérêts privés influaient sensiblement sur les politiques et la réglementation de la pêche, ce que l’on a pu observer dans d’autres secteurs laisse à penser que cette influence est très vraisemblable. Le secteur de la pêche se distingue d’autres activités réglementées notamment par l’absence fréquente de droits de propriété solidement établis et par le fait que la réglementation tente d’éviter la surexploitation de ressources communes. En l’absence de réglementation, les pêcheurs font en fait peser des coûts les uns sur les autres plus que sur les consommateurs. Une expérience en laboratoire a été conçue pour simuler les activités de groupes de pression destinées à influer sur la réglementation des ressources communes. Les résultats de l’expérience montrent que la compétition entre pêcheurs pour réaliser le maximum de profits diminue leur volonté de faire pression en faveur de règlements qui maximiseraient le bien-être du groupe. Des participants plus expérimentés estiment que leur contribution à la modification de la réglementation ne présente aucun intérêt. Ils s’attachent en fait davantage à se disputer les profits de l’exploitation de la ressource commune. L’introduction de droits de propriété solidement établis, la délégation des droits et des responsabilités aux groupes d’utilisateurs, le recours à la récupération des coûts et à des mécanismes durables de financement et la protection des gestionnaires des pêches contre la tendance des élus à raisonner à court terme pourraient contribuer à corriger et à réduire l’échec des pouvoirs publics. Néanmoins, ces recommandations risquent de ne pouvoir être mises en œuvre aisément face à la forte opposition des intérêts privés dans le secteur de la pêche. |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:agraaa:8-en&r=env |
| By: | Alvaro Calzadilla; Katrin Rehdanz; Richard S.J. Tol (Economic and Social Research Institute) |
| Abstract: | We use the new version of the GTAP-W model to analyze the economy-wide impacts of enhanced irrigation efficiency. The new production structure of the model, which introduces a differentiation between rainfed and irrigated crops, allows a better understanding of the use of water resources in agricultural sectors. The results indicate that a water policy directed to improvements in irrigation efficiency in water-stressed regions is not beneficial for all. For water-stressed regions the effects on welfare and demand for water are mostly positive. For non-water scarce regions the results are more mixed and mostly negative. Global water savings are achieved. Not only regions where irrigation efficiency changes are able to save water, but also other regions are pushed to conserve water. |
| Keywords: | Computable General Equilibrium, Irrigation, Water Policy, Water Scarcity, Irrigation efficiency |
| JEL: | D58 Q17 Q25 |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sgc:wpaper:160&r=env |