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on Environmental Economics |
| By: | Francesco Bosello (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei); Roberto Roson (Ca’Foscari University of Venice and International Centre for Theoretical Physics); Richard S.J. Tol (Hamburg University, Vrije Universiteit and Center for Integrated Study of the Human Dimensions of Global Change) |
| Abstract: | We study the economic impacts of climate-change-induced change in human health, viz. cardiovascular and respiratory disorders, diarrhoea, malaria, dengue fever and schistosomiasis. Changes in morbidity and mortality are interpreted as changes in labour productivity and demand for health care, and used to shock the GTAP-E computable general equilibrium model, calibrated for the year 2050. GDP, welfare and investment fall (rise) in regions with net negative (positive) health impacts. Prices, production, and terms of trade show a mixed pattern. Direct cost estimates, common in climate change impact studies, underestimate the true welfare losses. |
| Keywords: | Impacts of climate change, Human health, Computable general equilibrium |
| JEL: | C68 D58 Q25 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.97&r=env |
| By: | Richard S.J. Tol (Hamburg University, Vrije Universiteit and Carnegie Mellon University) |
| Abstract: | I compare and contrast five climate scenarios: (1) no climate policy; (2) non-cooperative cost-benefit analysis (NC CBA); (3) NC CBA with international permit trade; (4) NC CBA with joint and several liability for climate change damages; and (5) NC CBA with liability proportional to a country’s share in cumulative emissions. As estimates of the marginal damage costs are low, standard NC CBA implies only limited emission abatement. With international permit trade, emission abatement is even less, as the carbon tax is reduced in countries with fast-growing emissions, and because a permit market ignores the positive, dynamic externalities of abatement. Proportional liability shifts abatement effort towards the richer countries, but away from the fast-growing economies; again, long-term, global emission abatement is reduced. Joint and several liability would lead to more stringent climate policy. These findings are qualitatively robust to the size and accounting of climate change impacts, to the definition of liability, and to the baseline scenario |
| Keywords: | Climate Change, Cost-benefit Analysis, Liability, Permit Trade |
| JEL: | Q54 |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.88&r=env |
| By: | Moslener, Ulf; Requate, Till |
| Abstract: | We analyze a dynamic multi-pollutant problem where abatement costs of several pollutants are not separable. The pollutants can be either technological substitutes or complements. Environmental damage is induced by the stock of accumulated pollution. We find that optimal emission paths are qualitatively different for substitutes and complements. We derive general properties governing optimal emission paths and present numerical examples to illustrate our main results. In particular we find that optimal emission paths need not be monotonic, even for highly symmetric pollutants. Finally, we describe a comparatively simple method to implement the optimal path without explicitly knowing its shape. |
| Keywords: | Multi-pollution, abatement technology, accumulating pollutants |
| JEL: | L5 Q2 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cauewp:2913&r=env |
| By: | Requate, Till |
| Abstract: | In this article I survey the theoretical literature on environmental policy in the presence of imperfect competition, ranging from early contributions in the 1960s to the present. I cover the following market structures when polluting firms have market power in the output market: monopoly, Cournot oligopoly, Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous products, pricesetting duopoly with differentiating commodities, and models of monopolistic competition. Among the latter I consider Cournot oligopoly with free entry, the Dixit-Stiglitz model, and Salop’s model of the circular city with polluting firms. The regulation instruments I concentrate on are emission taxes, tradable permits, and both absolute and relative standards. I also discuss taxation when firms have market power in the input market, and I study models where firms exercise market power in the market of tradable permits. In the latter case I also survey some recent results from the literature on experimental economics. Finally, I briefly discuss environmental policy in open economies when firms have market power in international markets. Here I suggest different decompositions of the unilateral second-best optimal tax rate, thus attempting to unify alternative interpretations of these decompositions in the literature. |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cauewp:3198&r=env |