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on Africa |
| By: | Kibriya, Shahriar; Xu, Zhicheng P.; Zhang, Yu |
| Abstract: | By using a geo-coded disaggregated dataset in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1997–2013, we exploit year-to-year rainfall variation as an instrumental variable to estimate the causal effect of economic shocks on civil conflict conditional on governance quality. We confirm earlier findings that adverse rainfall shocks increase the likelihood of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. We also investigate the role of governance quality on conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. The results underscore that improvement of governance quality can effectively mitigate the detrimental effect of negative income shocks on regional peace. However, due to the limited penetration of countrywide governance structures, this effect of governance quality is more significant in areas closer from the capital cities than in the remote areas. |
| Keywords: | conflict, rainfall shocks, institution, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Development, Political Economy, D74, O17, O43, |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea15:205321&r=afr |
| By: | Joseph, Mawejje; Lawrence, Bategeka |
| Abstract: | Uganda discovered commercially viable oil deposits in 2006. Estimated oil reserves as of September 2012 stood at 3.5 billion barrels. Since the discoveries, there has been much public debate on the types of public policies that the Government of Uganda (GoU) can implement in order to avoid or minimize the economic, social and political dislocations that have usually accompanied the exploitation of oil and gas in other African countries. It is important to note that the discovery and eventual exploitation of natural resources, such as gas and oil, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the upheavals that are collectively referred to as “the curse of natural resources.” The reason why many African countries that have significant endowments of commercially viable oil and gas reserves often end up with the curse is that they do not have institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law. Without appropriate legal and judicial systems—that is, those that adequately constrain civil servants and politicians—the latter are likely to engage in corruption and other forms of political opportunism, and fail to implement policies to allocate resources efficiently and equitably and hence, enhance human development. It is hoped that Uganda will use its newly-discovered oil and gas resources to promote genuine economic growth and human development. This study employs a perception analysis of the views of key stakeholders on the suitability and impacts of available spending options. |
| Keywords: | growth, oil resources, intergenerational equity, oil and gas value chain, Uganda, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Demand and Price Analysis, Environmental Economics and Policy, Industrial Organization, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Land Economics/Use, Production Economics, Productivity Analysis, Public Economics, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty, |
| Date: | 2013–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eprcrs:167526&r=afr |
| By: | Fatema, Naureen; Kibriya, Shahriar |
| Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Food Security and Poverty, International Development, |
| Date: | 2015–05–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea15:205354&r=afr |
| By: | Porteous, Obie C. |
| Abstract: | How large are trade costs in the world's poorest countries and what are their consequences? I explore this question using a new dataset I have assembled of monthly prices and production of 6 staple grains from 2003 to 2013 in 230 market catchment areas covering all 42 countries of continental sub-Saharan Africa. I estimate and solve a spatial temporal model of monthly storage and trade under uncertainty including storage in each of the 230 markets, overland trade between 413 pairs of markets, and trade with the world market through 30 ports. I then re-solve the model for a counterfactual scenario in which trade costs are lowered to match transportation costs in the rest of the world. I find median intra-national trade costs over 5 times higher than elsewhere in the world along with significant extra costs for trade across borders and with the world market. Lowering trade costs for staple grains results in a 46.4% drop in the average food price index, a contraction in the agriculture, storage, and trade sectors, and a net welfare gain of 2.4% ($125 billion equivalent variation). I show that 87.5% of this welfare gain can be achieved by lowering trade costs through ports and along key links representing just 18% of the trade network, supporting a corridor-based approach for infrastructure investment and trade policy. In an extension, I find that the effects of agricultural technology adoption depend crucially on trade costs, with farmers only benefiting from technology adoption when trade costs are low. |
| Keywords: | Trade Costs, Storage, Sub-Saharan Africa, Trade Corridors, Technology Adoption, Agricultural and Food Policy, Demand and Price Analysis, Food Security and Poverty, International Development, International Relations/Trade, F14, O13, Q11, Q17, |
| Date: | 2015–05–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea15:205776&r=afr |
| By: | Ouedraogo, Aissatou |
| Abstract: | One of the features of the production system in many countries of West Africa is the coexistence of both collectively-managed and individually-managed ‘private’ plots within the same. Within these households, economic activities are influenced by socio-cultural norms, which impact agricultural input decisions. This paper uses a two-year panel data on Mali to investigate intrahousehold allocation of productive resources across collective plots and ‘private’ plots. A major contribution of this paper is the clear distinction it makes between collective plots and the head’s ‘private’ plots, which is vital in understanding whether the observed yield and input differentials across collective plots and ‘private’ plots are due to headship or to the attributes of the collective plots. We find that significantly higher yields are achieved on collective plots relative to ‘private’ plots and this yield differential persists after restricting the sample to heads that control the collective plots and their own private plots. The estimations of the intensity of labor use show that collective plots are more intensively farmed with male-labor and child labor whereas the opposite is observed for femalelabor. However, after isolating the gender effect by excluding female-controlled plots from the sample, we find that collective plots are more intensively farmed than male-controlled ‘private’ plots regardless of the labor source. We infer from these results the importance of taking the gender component into account when studying intrahousehold farm-labor allocation. Unlike previous similar studies that only focus on labor allocation, we also investigate chemical fertilizer application. We find that the probability of fertilizer application tends to be higher on ‘private’ plots while the intensity of its use is higher for collective plots. These contrasting findings highlight the importance to investigate not only the probability of the use of a given technology but also the intensity of its application, especially for inputs such as fertilizer that requires a certain amount in order to obtain a yield response. |
| Keywords: | Social norms, intrahousehold resource allocation, International Development, |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea15:205772&r=afr |
| By: | Gemma, Ahaibwe; Ibrahim, Kasirye; Mildred, Barungi |
| Keywords: | Community/Rural/Urban Development, Financial Economics, Industrial Organization, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Labor and Human Capital, Marketing, Production Economics, Public Economics, Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession, |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eprcpb:206185&r=afr |