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<rss:title>Sociology of Economics</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-sog</rss:link>
<rss:description>Sociology of Economics</rss:description>
<dc:date>2026-08-31</dc:date>
<rss:items><rdf:Seq><rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19303&amp;r=&amp;r=sog"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:315&amp;r=&amp;r=sog"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.14760&amp;r=&amp;r=sog"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.14164&amp;r=&amp;r=sog"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19235&amp;r=&amp;r=sog"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12888&amp;r=&amp;r=sog"/>
</rdf:Seq></rss:items>
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<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19303&amp;r=&amp;r=sog">
<rss:title>Women in Editorial Boards: An Investigation of Female Representation in Top Economic Journals</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19303&amp;r=&amp;r=sog</rss:link>
<rss:description>We study the evolution of female representation in editorial roles for 15 top journals in economics from 1960 to 2019. We first document that the share of women in editorial roles has steadily increased over the past six decades. Second, we investigate whether this increase is due to an expansion of the pool of qualified female economists, or due to a change in the preference for appointing women. We find evidence for both using a large database on detailed CVs of more than 37, 000 economists. Third, we study the implications of female editors on the type and quality of accepted papers and potential trickle down effects on female authorsâ€™ publishing prospects. Finally, to understand whether there are gender gaps in the probability of being offered and/or of accepting editorial positions, we administer a large-scale survey among most prominent scholars in economics. We only find evidence for the offering channel.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Funk, Patricia</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Iriberri, Nagore</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Venus, Nicole</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2024-07</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:315&amp;r=&amp;r=sog">
<rss:title>How did empirical economic research improve over the last decades: Recent trends and prospects</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:315&amp;r=&amp;r=sog</rss:link>
<rss:description>We map the evolution of economics research from 1998 to 2019 to assess progress and identify remaining challenges. Using text mining of 30, 675 full-text articles and an in-depth analysis of 578, 132 statistical tests from 3, 746 articles across a broad range of journals, we document changes in research practices over time. We highlight the influence of the credibility revolution and the open science movement. Awareness of reproducibility has increased modestly, largely driven by journal adoption of data and code sharing policies. At the same time, reliance on non-public data has grown, especially among authors at top-five universities, posing new challenges for transparency. Sample sizes have increased substantially, while reported effect sizes have declined, consistent with reduced exaggeration and potentially more policy-relevant estimates. Econometric methods and causal inference practices have become more sophisticated, and articles now report more tables and statistical tests. However, pre-analysis plans, power analyses accompanying null results, and corrections for multiple hypothesis testing remain uncommon. Article length has remained stable or declined slightly, and authors from top-five universities continue to represent a large and stable share of publications in top journals. Our findings provide a baseline for tracking future developments and for guiding efforts to further strengthen the credibility and transparency of economics research.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Brodeur, Abel</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Bruns, Stephan B.</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Herwartz, Helmut</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Islam, Chris-Gabriel</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Replication crisis, Credibility revolution, Open science, Trends, Empirical research</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.14760&amp;r=&amp;r=sog">
<rss:title>The Price of Submission</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.14760&amp;r=&amp;r=sog</rss:link>
<rss:description>Economics journals ration access to peer review with time and money. A July 2026 census of 500 RePEc-ranked economics journals accepting unsolicited submissions finds that 113 (22.6 per cent) charge a fee, with incidence falling from 68 per cent in the top 50 to 2 per cent in the bottom 50. A sequential-submission model shows that waiting pays part of the capacity-clearing price, leaving the fee as a residual. Because rejected manuscripts move down the ranking, a fee reduces system-wide referee demand only when authors stop, shorten their submission chains or switch to journals requiring fewer reports.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Johan Fourie</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.14164&amp;r=&amp;r=sog">
<rss:title>Science under Threat? A Natural Experiment in Economics</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.14164&amp;r=&amp;r=sog</rss:link>
<rss:description>Academic freedom has come under growing strain worldwide. To study whether and how academics respond to political pressure, we exploit a natural experiment: the publication in early 2025 of a "blacklist" of words flagged by the U.S. government. We find that the release of this list led to a sharp reduction in the use of these flagged words among economists at universities that rely heavily on federal funding, relative to scholars from institutions that are less dependent on federal funding or based in the UK. The drop is driven by content related to gender, race, and environment. We show that changes are not simply semantic but reflect actual paper content and that neither the individual funding status nor time-invariant author characteristics are driving the effects. We also document interesting heterogeneous effects by department quality and author gender and ethnicity. Our findings are consistent with the idea that scholars respond strongly to political pressure.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Dominic Rohner</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Oliver Vanden Eynde</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Philine Widmer</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-08</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19235&amp;r=&amp;r=sog">
<rss:title>Designing Scientific Grants</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19235&amp;r=&amp;r=sog</rss:link>
<rss:description>This paper overviews the economics of scientific grants, focusing on the interplay between the inherent uncertainty in research, researchersâ€™ incentives, and grant design. Grants differ from traditional market systems and other science and innovation policy tools, such as prizes and patents. We outline the main economic forces specific to science, noting the limited attention given to grant funding in the economics literature. Using tools from information economics, we identify key incentive problems at various stages of the grant funding process and offer guidance for effective grant design. In the allocation stage, funders aim to select the highest-merit applications while minimizing evaluation costs. The selection rule, in turn, impacts researchersâ€™ incentives to apply and invest in their proposals. In the grant management stage, funders monitor researchers to ensure efficient use of funds. We discuss the advantages and potential pitfalls of (partial) lotteries and emphasize the effectiveness of staged grant design in promoting a productive use of grants. Beyond these broadly applicable insights, our overview highlights the need for further research on grantmaking. Understudied areas include, at the micro level, the interplay of different grant funding stages, and at the macro level, the interaction of grants with other instruments in the market for science.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Carnehl, Christoph</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ottaviani, Marco</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Preusser, Justus</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2024-07</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12888&amp;r=&amp;r=sog">
<rss:title>Measuring the Acceptability of Experimental Research in Economics</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12888&amp;r=&amp;r=sog</rss:link>
<rss:description>This paper examines public acceptability of randomized experimental research in economics using a preregistered conjoint experiment with 1, 471 U.S. respondents. Acceptability varies substantially across domains: health-promoting interventions rank highest, while covert political advertising falls below the scale midpoint. Participant vulnerability is the dominant design attribute, followed by country of implementation and funding source. We also ask who should set ethical standards for experimental research, finding that the public assigns greatest governance legitimacy to experiment participants, citizens, and scientists and least to elected representatives and lawyers. We complement these findings with a companion study of research-active economists (N = 461) across the same experimental scenarios. Economists rate experiments substantially higher overall, preserve the public’s acceptability hierarchy, and assign the highest governance legitimacy to scientists rather than experiment participants. Our findings have direct implications for IRB design, research communication, and the political economy of evidence-based policymaking.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Francesco Capozza</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Robert Dur</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Pedro Rey-Biel</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>experiments, preferences, IRB, economists</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026</dc:date>
</rss:item>
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