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<rss:title>Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-ltv</rss:link>
<rss:description>Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty</rss:description>
<dc:date>2026-05-11</dc:date>
<rss:items><rdf:Seq><rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2548&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18593&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18577&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18575&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv"/>
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<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2548&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv">
<rss:title>Errors in survey and administrative data on employment earnings: Austria and the United Kingdom compared</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2548&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv</rss:link>
<rss:description>We contribute new cross-national evidence about the nature of measurement errors in employment earnings, fitting the same error components model to harmonised earnings data for Austria and the UK. The model allows for measurement error in the administrative data and linkage error as well as survey measurement error. We find several cross-national similarities in error structure but also intriguing differences in error component probabilities, means, and dispersions.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Christopher R. Bollinger</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Stephen P. Jenkins</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Fernando Rios-Avila</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Iva V. Tasseva</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>measurement error, linkage error, earnings, linked survey data, administrative data, finite mixture models</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2025-08</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18593&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv">
<rss:title>The Twenty-four Hour Economy or Rolled-up Sidewalks: Trends in Work Timing and Their Causes</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18593&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv</rss:link>
<rss:description>We demonstrate nearly steady trends from 1973-2023 in the U.S. in the timing of when people work for pay, away from evening and night hours toward â€œusualâ€ daytime hours. Much of the trend is related to increased real incomes, with rising educational attainment, the changing composition of the (declining) manufacturing industry, and the increased wage premium for undesirable work times - evenings and nights - that we document accounting for the rest. The trend exists in all major industries except retail, in which changes in technology biased work away from daytime hours. It was accelerated by the sharp increase in telework that occurred after the Covid pandemic, an increase that was especially concentrated during daytime hours. While we observe the same phenomenon in France from 1966 to 2010, we do not in the U.K. from 1974-2015, arguably because of the very sharp decline in unionization in the U.K. and the changes in retailing.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Biddle, Jeff</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Hamermesh, Daniel</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>work timing, Covid, time use, home work</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-04</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18577&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv">
<rss:title>Trust and Cooperation in Labor-Management Relations</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18577&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv</rss:link>
<rss:description>We review the literature on trust and cooperation with application to labour-management relations. We begin with the neo-classical economic view of self-regarding individuals operating with perfect information and show that once one abandons the dyadic case with perfect information, cooperation deteriorates as group size increases and the probability of behavioural or perceptual error rises. We show that self-regarding models have no way of explaining cooperative outcomes between management and labour under typical conditions and lead to less optimal forms of non-cooperative strategic bargaining. By way of contrast, models of cooperation with other-regarding preferences and trust â€“ drawn from behavioural economics, social psychological, economic sociology and industrial relations literatures â€“ show that a high level of cooperation can be attained even in large groups, with modest informational requirements, and that conditions allowing the evolution of trust and other-regarding social preferences are plausible and find empirical support. We also show that actorsâ€™ perceptions of the employment relationship underpin assumptions of human nature, which is what inevitably determines strategies used in labour-management relations.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Gomez, Rafael</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Bryson, Alex</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Willman, Paul</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>trust, cooperation, labor-management relations</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-04</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18575&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv">
<rss:title>Paying Disadvantaged Teenagers to Stay in School</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18575&amp;r=&amp;r=ltv</rss:link>
<rss:description>We evaluate the Education Maintenance Allowance, a large conditional cash transfer scheme that paid low-income teenagers in England to remain in education beyond age 16. Using the staggered national roll-out of the programme and linked administrative data tracking education, earnings, welfare payments and criminal convictions to age 31, we find no significant overall effect of the policy on labour market outcomes or criminality. High-attaining students were more likely to attend university but no more likely to graduate. Low-attaining students committed fewer crimes. We estimate the Marginal Value of Public Funds was 0.85 (95% confidence interval 0.52â€“1.29); even at the upper bound of this interval, benefits barely outweigh costs.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Britton, Jack</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ridpath, Nick</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Villa, Carmen</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Waltmann, Ben</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>conditional cash transfers, education, crime</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-04</dc:date>
</rss:item>
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