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<rss:title>Dynamic General Equilibrium</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>Dynamic General Equilibrium</rss:description>
<dc:date>2026-11-09</dc:date>
<rss:items><rdf:Seq><rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-502&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
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<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-500&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-504&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:023907&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2026-06&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.32963&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:wpaper:154&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-503&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:1118&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpwp:104010&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35980&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ake:iiepdt:2026-125&amp;r=&amp;r=dge"/>
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<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-502&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>The macroeconomics of energy-transition metal bottlenecks</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-502&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which energy-transition metals are essential inputs into both production and capital accumulation, while their supply capacity adjusts endogenously and gradually. The green transition shifts investment toward metal-intensive green technologies, generating bottlenecks that depress investment and potential output. Nominal rigidities amplify short-run losses while monetary-policy stabilization faces a trade-off: supporting economic activity raises demand for scarce transition inputs, increasing their relative prices and the cost of investment. Climate-policy continuation risk further increases transition costs by weakening investment in green capital and ETM production capacity, making bottlenecks more persistent and raising long-run output losses. We compare taxes and subsidies targeting sectoral output with those targeting metal use. Targeting metal use can reduce transition costs relative to output-based policies when metals enter production and demand is sufficiently elastic. When metals enter capital accumulation and demand is inelastic, however, taxing brown-sector metal use slows the transition and increases its macroeconomic costs because the policy raises investment costs while releasing few metals for green investment. Our findings show how endogenous metal-supply adjustment, policy credibility, and the choice of tax and subsidy bases jointly shape the macroeconomic consequences of the green transition.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Romain Houssa</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Jolan Mohimont</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Energy transition metals; bottlenecks; fiscal policy; monetary policy trade-offs; climate-policy uncertainty; DSGE models.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-10</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20263306&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Debt maturity and government spending multipliers</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20263306&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>Government spending effectiveness depends critically on how it is financed. Using state dependent SVAR models and local projections on post-war US data, we show that fiscal expansions financed with short-term debt generate significantly larger output multipliers than those financed with long-term debt. This difference mainly stems from private consumption responses: short-term financing crowds in consumption while long-term financing does not. Torationalize this finding, we construct an incomplete markets model in which households invest in short-term and long-term assets. Short assets provide liquidity/safety services; households can (more readily) use them to cover sudden idiosyncratic spending needs. An increase in the supply of these assets, through a short-term debt-financed government expenditure shock, boosts private consumption. We first show this mechanism analytically in a simplified model, and then quantify it in a carefully calibrated New Keynesian model. We find that fiscal multipliers differ substantially across financing modes, with short-term-financed shocks typically exceeding unity while long-term-financed shocks typically fall below unity. We show these differences persist across monetary and fiscal policy regimes, with important implications for optimal debt management and stimulus design. JEL Classification: D52, E31, E43, E62</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Priftis, Romanos</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ghomi, Morteza</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Mankart, Jochen</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Oikonomou, Rigas</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>debt maturity, fiscal policy, incomplete markets, local projections, spending multiplier, SVAR</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-11</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-501&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Energy Shocks and the Green Adoption Channel According to E-HANK</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-501&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>We build a E-HANK model, an Environmental-Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian model with an energy sector, distinguishing clean from dirty energy and allowing households to adopt a costly clean energy technology. We use this framework to study the transmission of fossil energy shocks and the effectiveness of fiscal, monetary, and climate policy responses. Clean technology adoption acts as a stabilizing channel, dampening inflation and output losses relative to an economy with no adoption or only fossil fuels available. Energy price subsidies shield fossil energy users but weaken adoption incentives, creating a policy trade-off that (un)targeted transfers avoid while still insulating households. An aggressive monetary response yields small, short-lived inflation gains at a large output cost, and slows down adoption. Recycling carbon revenues into clean technology subsidies rather than lump-sum rebates has the potential to green the economy and dampens the inflationary impact of energy shocks, but comes at the cost of shifting the burden of higher energy prices on the households least able to adopt.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Boris Chafwehé</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Francesca Diluiso</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Guillaume Schwengler</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Energy shocks; E-HANK; fiscal/monetary policy; green technology adoption; ETS2.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-10</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35967&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Aggregate-Surplus Maximizing Monetary Policy</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35967&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>We study optimal monetary policy in a general heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian (HANK) economy. Instead of maximizing a social welfare function, the policymaker maximizes the joint surplus of all households, without taking a stance on how that surplus should be distributed. This is the policy that maximizes resources left over if winners from reform were to compensate losers. We derive the approximate optimal policy using linear-quadratic methods. The quadratic objective function nests the standard New Keynesian loss function and adds losses from incomplete markets and heterogeneous labor wedges. We show that optimal policy is the sum of time-dependent and state-contingent components. When labor wedges are homogeneous, monetary policy cannot improve household insurance: the time-dependent component is zero, and optimal policy coincides with the representative-agent New Keynesian (RANK) benchmark. Departures from RANK arise from heterogeneous labor wedges. In that case, the time-dependent component temporarily alleviates incomplete-market distortions but vanishes over time. The state-contingent component solves a dual-mandate problem, as in RANK, but with a higher weight on output-gap stabilization relative to inflation stabilization. In a calibrated model, heterogeneous labor wedges raise this weight by about 37 percent. We also find that a dual mandate with this higher weight achieves almost all of the aggregate-surplus gains from the full optimal policy and requires no compensatory transfers between winners and losers.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>David Baqaee</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ariel Burstein</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Joao Guerreiro</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-10</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-500&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Protecting households from energy shocks: wage indexation and fiscal policy</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-500&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>This paper evaluates the role of automatic wage indexation following an imported energy price shock in a small open economy belonging to a monetary union. We develop a two-agent New Keynesian model with energy in consumption and production and featuring Ricardian and hand-to-mouth (HtM) households. Wage indexation protects purchasing power through an income channel but impairs the competitiveness of domestic firms, reduces employment, and affects consumption through real interest rate dynamics. We show that although universal indexation mitigates the rise in inequality after an energy shock, HtM consumption benefits only partially because adverse general equilibrium effects offset some of the gain in real wages. Targeting indexation at vulnerable households alleviates the cost for firms but creates distortions in the labour market that may harm the disposable income of indexed workers. Among fiscal instruments, both wage-cost and energy-price subsidies are effective in supporting HtM consumption and reduce welfare inequalities among households. Stabilising energy prices is particularly beneficial for households with a high share of energy in their consumption, especially when a significant portion of their consumption expenditures is dedicated to essential energy needs.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Charles de Beauffort</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Gregory de Walque</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Thomas Lejeune</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Jolan Mohimont</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ansgar Rannenberg</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Wage indexation, Energy prices, Cost-of-living crisis, Agent heterogeneity, Fiscal policy, Welfare analysis</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-10</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-504&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Different Unconventional Monetary Policies, Different Stories? A HANK Perspective</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-504&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>We develop a two-asset HANK model to examine the effects of various unconventional monetary policies, including Quantitative Easing, Operation Twist, Reserve Management Purchases and Liquidity Facilities. Our analysis focuses on the macrofinancial implications of these policies, as well as their impact on wealth and income inequality through shifts in portfolio composition between liquid and illiquid assets. The model features a financial sector with mutual funds and banks that invest in short- and long-term bonds, reserves, and credit to firms. Calibrating the model to the US economy, we find that Operation Twist has weaker effects than standard QE interventions, although all strategies are qualitatively similar in their impact on output, inflation, and the composition of liquid and illiquid assets. Quantitative Easing and Liquidity Facilities are more effective at the zero lower bound, and are the two policies that raise wealth inequality most.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Charles de Beauffort</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ansgar Rannenberg</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Unconventional monetary policy, Quantitative easing, Operation Twist, Heterogeneous agents, Zero lower bound, Wealth and income inequality.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-10</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:023907&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Lighting the shadows: central bank policy transmission through banks and non-banks</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:023907&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) account for an increasingly large share of credit provision and play a central role in quantitative easing (QE). We develop a DSGE model with banks, NBFIs and a central bank interacting through wholesale deposits, bonds and reserve markets to study how monetary transmission changes as the size of NBFIs expands. We estimate the model on UK data to evaluate key parameters in the financial sector. We find that the transmission of conventional interest rate policy to output and inflation is essentially unaffected by the size of the NBFI sector. Conversely, the transmission of QE is strongly altered by the size of the NBFI sector and the source of its expansion. When the NBFI sector expands due to firm funding preferences, this amplifies QE. When it expands due to an increased cost of obtaining bank finance, transmission is largely unchanged. The results underscore that monetary policymakers retain rate control regardless of financial structure, but that the effectiveness of balance sheet policies depends on the composition and behaviour of the non-bank sector.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Nicolò Bandera</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Kristina Bluwstein</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Michael Kumhof</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Mauricio Salgado-Moreno</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Jacob Stevens</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Monetary policy tools;QE;reserves;NBFIs;DSGE estimation</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-10-23</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2026-06&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Irreversibility, Lumpy Investment, and the Dynamics of Public Capital and Sovereign Debt</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2026-06&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>We build a sovereign default model of a small open economy where the government’s public capital accumulation faces two investment frictions: capital irreversibility and lumpy investment induced by fixed costs. We show that irreversible public capital and lumpiness both individually and together, lower default risk. A model with convex adjustment costs and neither investment friction requires 13% higher default costs at mean productivity in order to match the data relative to our Benchmark. Borrowing costs are lower when the government invests to grow the public capital stock relative to when it does not, ceteris paribus. When the public capital stock is low, the government issues debt primarily to invest, whereas at higher public capital levels, it borrows mainly for consumption smoothing. We provide evidence from emerging economy data for these results.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Alok Johri</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Shunzhe Zhong</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Sovereign default; sovereign spreads; public capital; investment frictions</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-11</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.32963&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Fiscal Dominance and Global Determinacy</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.32963&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>The existing literature on monetary-fiscal policy interactions emphasizes that an active monetary/passive fiscal policy regime causes global indeterminacy of equilibrium, supporting liquidity traps and self-fulfilling hyperinflations as possible equilibrium outcomes. In a nonlinear New Keynesian model with costly price adjustment, I show that an analogous critique, with different global macroeconomic dynamics, extends to a passive monetary/active fiscal policy regime whenever the fiscal response to government liabilities is below the steady-state real interest rate but positive. In this case, although the equilibrium is locally unique according to the Blanchard-Kahn conditions, there exist multiple inflation paths originating around the saddle path that converge asymptotically to the central bank's target rate while satisfying the private sector's transversality condition. I demonstrate that global determinacy instead requires a pure regime of fiscal dominance, with primary surpluses set independently of the real value of government liabilities. Only then are all nonlinear off-saddle trajectories ruled out as equilibria, for they violate the private sector's transversality condition or its no-Ponzi game condition, or imply an infeasible allocation. The transversality condition coincides with the government debt valuation equation, in which primary surpluses are discounted at the endogenous real interest rate, and pins down a unique initial jump in inflation onto the saddle path, leading to the unique steady state. The results imply that, when globally determinate, inflation is a fiscal phenomenon, shaped by the central bank's interest-rate policy.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Alessandro Piergallini</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-10</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:wpaper:154&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Firm Productivity and the Composition of Jobs in the Green Economy: Factor Reallocation with Heterogeneous Clean Destinations</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:wpaper:154&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>Abstract We study the macroeconomic consequences of emissions reductions in a model with heterogeneous firms, search-and-matching frictions, endogenous technology adoption, and sector-specific capital adjustment costs. Extending the framework of Finkelstein Shapiro and Metcalf (2023) and calibrating to Finland, we distinguish between high- and low-productivity clean technologies within a three-sector framework. Our results show that an emission reduction policy implemented via a carbon tax induces modest losses in output and consumption, as part of the reallocation away from emissions-intensive sector is absorbed by lower-productivity clean sector. By contrast, the standard two-sector model with a single clean technology shows slightly positive output effects due to a greater increase in average firm productivity. These findings highlight that the macroeconomic costs of climate policies depend on the productivity composition of the expanding clean sector. Within the emissions-intensive sector, emissions are mainly reduced through abatement activities, but the degree of factor reallocation is still substantial: under the baseline calibration, employment in the emissions-intensive sector declines by nearly one-quarter in response to a 40% emissions reduction target. Lower abatement costs reduce the extent of factor reallocation required to achieve a given emissions reduction target.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Kuusela, Olli-Pekka</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Kuusi, Tero</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Carbon tax, Green transition, Firm heterogeneity, Search frictions, Technology adoption, Capital adjustment costs, Finland</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-11-02</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-503&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Trade Frictions and the Small Open-Economy Fiscal Multiplier</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbb:reswpp:202610-503&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>This paper shows that, once households hold intertemporal marginal propensities to consume out of income which are consistent with micro evidence, sectoral and trade frictions become central for the output response to a government spending shock in a small open economy. This result holds for both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, with the four-year cumulative multiplier out of a transitory spending shock reaching 1.5 and 1.4, respectively. The dampening effect of the frictions on international trade, a key determinant of the output response in highly open economies, explains why those multipliers are larger than the simple one-sector economy counterpart. Absent of the consumption impulse inherent to our heterogeneous-agent economy, trade frictions matter much less for fiscal multipliers.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Charles de Beauffort</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ansgar Rannenberg</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Fiscal policy, Heterogeneous agents, Small Open economy, Sectoral spillovers, Government spending, Consumption, Trade</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-10</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:1118&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Macroprudential Policy When the Poor Cannot Borrow</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:1118&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>Emerging markets with greater inequality tend to have fewer capital controls. We propose a novel dynamic real-exchange-rate distributional externality as a potential explanation. Our model features nonhomothetic preferences, collateral- constrained high-income borrowers, and low-income hand-to-mouth households. Borrowing generates intertemporal redistribution through the real exchange rate. A planner can improve redistribution by manipulating the terms of trade in favor of the poor. We decompose the optimal borrowing tax into Fisherian and distribu- tional components. Incorporating inequality can substantially lower the average optimal macroprudential tax, even generating a subsidy. Our mechanism remains quantitatively significant in a production economy as long as wages are flexible.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Fernando Arce</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Yaakov Levin</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Monica Tran-Xuan</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Inequality; Macroprudential policy; Nonhomothetic preferences; Sudden Stops</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-11-06</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpwp:104010&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Public and Private Money: Inflation Dynamics and Optimal Policy</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpwp:104010&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>The total money supply of a modern economy is a combination of publicly and privately issued monies. This paper develops a theory of inflation dynamics and optimal policy for a system in which public fiat money and collateral-backed private liabilities jointly circulate. Private money finances investment projects, and its supply depends on the issuer’s net worth and collateral constraints. The resulting feedback mechanism can generate persistent oscillations and stable banking cycles without aggregate shocks. For some public money growth rates, a dual-money steady state coexists with a boundary regime in which private money displaces fiat money. Policy affects liquidity and investment. When the collateral constraint is slack, the Friedman rule attains the first best; when it binds, a public money growth rate above the Friedman rule can be optimal. The Ramsey problem considers the transitional dynamics in the net worth of banks.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Daniel R. Sanches</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Private money; public money; inflation dynamics; collateral constraints; banking cycles; Friedman rule; optimal monetary policy</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-11-02</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35980&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>Demand-Driven Inflation</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35980&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>Post-covid inflation was predominantly driven by unexpectedly strong demand forces---both in the United States and in the Euro Area. We establish this result using a sequence of structural VARs with progressively richer specifications, interpret it through the lens of standard AD-AS analysis and an estimated DSGE model, and provide independent support for this conclusion using survey forecasts and real-time data. These demand forces reflected a combination of surprisingly robust pent-up demand following the pandemic restrictions, stronger-than-expected expansionary fiscal policies, and an unusually accommodative monetary stance. Together, they mitigated the recessionary effects of adverse supply shocks and supported the recovery, albeit at the cost of higher inflation. The economic intuition is simple: When a central bank responds forcefully to inflationary pressures, as the Fed and the ECB have done in recent decades, the aggregate demand curve is relatively flat, so supply disturbances move real activity much more than inflation. A large inflation surge, therefore, requires a shift or rotation of the aggregate demand curve.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Domenico Giannone</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Giorgio Primiceri</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-10</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ake:iiepdt:2026-125&amp;r=&amp;r=dge">
<rss:title>IA más accesible, más informalidad? un mercado de trabajo dual para economías en desarrollo</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ake:iiepdt:2026-125&amp;r=&amp;r=dge</rss:link>
<rss:description>Este artículo estudia qué ocurre cuando la inteligencia artificial (IA) se abarata, con especial énfasis en los resultados del mercado laboral, en particular si genera empleo formal o si empuja a los trabajadores hacia la informalidad. Sostenemos que la respuesta depende de la elasticidad de sustitución entre el capital de IA importado y el trabajo formal. Para ello, desarrollamos un modelo DSGE de una economía pequeña y abierta con un mercado laboral dual, capital de IA importado y riesgo país, calibrado para una economía donde la informalidad es generalizada. La misma caída en los precios de la IA produce resultados muy diferentes en el mercado laboral, dependiendo de si la IA sustituye o complementa a los trabajadores formales. En el caso de sustitución, el abaratamiento de la IA debilita la demanda de trabajo formal y aumenta el papel del sector informal como mecanismo de absorción del empleo. En el caso de complementariedad, expande el empleo formal y amplifica la producción, los salarios, la inversión y la acumulación de capital. El modelo muestra, por lo tanto, que la IA puede convertirse tanto en una fuente de presión sobre el empleo como en un motor de expansión del sector formal, dependiendo de cómo interactúe con el trabajo humano.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Gabriel Montes Rojas</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Fernando Toledo</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Juan Manuel Rodríguez Repeti</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Inteligencia Artificial; Economía Informal; Mercados Laborales Duales; DSGE; América Latina</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-08</dc:date>
</rss:item>
</rdf:RDF>
